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ABSTRACT 
“Media Power” represents the extent to which individuals or groups influence the 
content of media messages relevant to their interests.  As mass media  are the primary 
image builders in contemporary society, an  ability to  shape the contents of media has 
become central to impression management and public relations.  This  research documents 
the  extent  to  which  police  influence  the  image  of  law  enforcement - “police 
performances” -  through police media relations offices and public idonnation officers 
(PIOS). 
A questionnaire was distributed to municipal police departments nationwide to 
obtain general infomation regarding the nature and fkquency of police interaction, about 
the  policies  dictating police-media relations,  and  about  police  perceptions of  their 
department’s image within the news.  A total of 255 surveys were distributed, yielding a 
response rate of 76%  (1 94).  Information garnered fiom  survey data was used to identify 
four police departments that served as case studies for an understanding of the political 
and administrative context within which police-media relations occur.  Each department 
selected differed fiom the others with regard to its media strategies, public information 
personnel,  staff  training  in public relations, and perceived quality of its department’s 
media image.  Approximately 100 hours of observation was conducted across all sites. 
0 
Research findings suggest that the quality of a department’s media image has little 
to do with the municipality crime rate and more to do with how  departments manage 
crime news and  information.  Specifically, departments that  do not  streamline public 
information through one official spokesperson only but encourage communication with 
reporters at all ranks report a more favorable media image.  Police training in television  a 
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appearance skills is similarly significantly associated with a more favorable department 
image.  Finally, the  dynamics of police-media relations shift during  times  of police- 
involved accidents or scandal.  Those departments more familiar with media formats and 
the  news-making process are  more adept  at  making potentially damaging news story 
quickly disappear. 
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AUTHOR’S NOTE 
All participant quotes contained in this research have been documented in a manner that 
best represents the ideas expressed by the speakers.  Nevertheless, statements do not 
always  appear as direct transcriptions.  Many  views were  expressed when  verbatim 
documentation was not possible.  Such comments will be denoted as “author notes,” 
while  transcribed  statements will  be  indicated  as “author interviews.”  Information 
provided through  open-ended questionnaire items will be denoted as “survey responses.” 
Further, repetitious words and  stutters have been omitted hm  recorded statements for 
reading  clarity and fluidity.  Throughout, every attempt has been  made to accurately 
reflect the meaning, language, and tone of  the participants in this study. 
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There is no intrinsic reason .  .  . why the constructions of reality 
by public relations specialists should be thought of & any diflerent 
porn those in any group in the business of telling stories. 
- Robert Jackal1 (1999366) 
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CHAPTER 1 
MEDIA POWER & THE POWER OF MEDIk 
[We’ve]  seen the demise of  two  other chiefs because  of 
media.  When they shut out the press, the media starts this 
campaign to  discredit not  only this department, but  it’s 
leaders . . . It’s not us against them . . .We have to work 
with the media to the best of our ability without getting 
eaten up.  We’ve  seen the  end  result  of what  they’re 
capable of doing.  If they want to go into attack mode, they 
will. The last Chief was out the door because bf that. 
-Former Morganville PI0 
(Author bterview) 
Introduction 
In an era when guns, drugs and gangs occupy city streets, media may very well 
prove to be law enforcement’s most formidable foe.  This is because the media  are a 
source of political  and  social power.  As  providers of news, and  information,  their 
messages influence the attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and voting patterns of the public. For 
this reason,  government officials and  special interest groups attempt to influence the 
content of media for the purpose of shaping public opinion.  “Media power” represents 
the extent to which interested groups command control of media messages relevant to 
their particular interests (Altheide, 1985).  This  research documents the extent to which 
police agencies wield media power  through police media-relations ofices and public 
infomation  officers.  Its  central  thesis  asserts  that  police  who  conform  to  the 
dramaturgical demands of contemporary media formats will maintain a more favorable 
media image. 
In their daily scrutiny of public officials, the media are a powerful force for police 
i 
accountability,  and they  are  often critical  of police practices (Skolnick  and McCoy, 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 2 
1984).  Traditionally, police have adopted a reactive approach to dealing with media 
(Kasinsky, 1994).  As gatekeepers in the crime news-making process, they often respond 
to  unfavorable media coverage by cutting off knowledge available to reporters or by 
e 
defending their  actions when  questioned (Ericson, Baranek  and  Chan,  1989).  This 
strategy, however, has proven ineffective in maintaining a positive public image of police 
agencies. 
Due to the emergence of new media technology throughout the twentieth century, 
and following intense media coverage of policecitizen disputes during the 1960s, police 
have begun to adopt a proactive approach to media publicity by taking numerous steps to 
construct an image that is favorable to the public.  Specifically, police are now  beginning 
to maintain media-relations offices staffed by public information officers trained in media 
communication and journalism whose primary responsibility is to engage the news media 
to advance the goals of the police organization. Unfortunately, little is known about the 
processes by  which  police  officials actively pursue media  coverage  through public 
information officers, or about the effectiveness of this newly adopted strategy. 
One objective of this research is to provide an account of the mechanisms by 
which police oficials actively construct a positive image of law enforcement via news 
media.  Building upon Goffinm’s  (1 959; 1974) metaphor of the theatrical performance of 
social life and Manning’s (1977) conceptualization of the dramaturgy of police work, this 
study  provides  an account  of  how  police  agencies  exercise  the  art  of  impression 
management through media services.  Previous research examining the news-malung 
process (Epstein, 1973; Gans, 1979; Fishman,  1980; Chibnall,  1981; Ericson, Baranek 
and  Chan,  1989; Chermak,  1994) has focused on the role of the reporter  and  news 
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organization in the construction of social issues.  The present research focuses  on the role 
of police in shaping the public image of crime and its control.  it describes how  they 
engage news media services to maintain a favorable organizational image, to serve as the 
primary definers of the crime "problem",  and to use news reports to further their crime 
0 
prevention goals. 
An assessment  of  police  "media power" entails the  review  of  police-media 
relations hm  a number of approaches.  To  begin, one must have general information 
about the nature and fiwluency of routine police-media intktion, about the demands 
reporters place on law enforcement for information, and about the ability and willingness 
of  agencies  to  comply  with  the  requests  of  news  organizations.  To  obtain  such 
information, a survey was distributed to municipal police departments nationwide.  The 
survey identified a number of characteristics about police-media interaction, including: 
(a) the prevalence of police-media relations offices  (b)  the media strategies of various 
police departments and  their role in the police organization  (c) the characteristics of 
police public information officers, such as background experience in journalism, public 
relations, or communication studies (d) the policies regarding police-reporter interaction 
and  the  dissemination of information  (e) the  extent to which  line officers and  high 
ranking police officials receive training in handling media inquiries, and  (0 actions taken 
by public information officers to offset negative coverage of police practices. 
I 
Secondly, an assessment of police media power requires an understanding of the 
context within  which police-media  relations occur.  To achieve this, results Erom  the 
survey were  used  to  identify four police departments that  served  as case studies for 
ethnographic observation of police media relations offices and their personnel. The goal 
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quantitative  data  with  an  understanding  of  the  political  cldate,  work  patterns, 
administrative position and organizational role within which police public information 
officers operate.  Each of the departments selected differed hm  each other -  and  others 
included in the survey -  on an array of variables, including: their media strategies, public  I 
idormation personnel,  staf€ training in public relations, and their reported quality of 
police-media relations.  Approximately 100 hours of observation were conducted across 
I 
all sites for the purpose of documenting the daily processes that’  encompass the working 
dynamic between police and  media  organizations.  Finally,  a review  of  department 
standard operating procedures, newspaper coverage of selected agencies, participation in 
a police public information training program, and in-depth interviews with both police 
public infomation officers and crime “beat” reporters aided in the evaluation process. 
The  remainder  of  this  chapter  discusses  social  and  political  life  in  an era 
dominated by media formats.  Chapter 2  illustrates the relationship between the police as 
street perfonners and actors as stage performers. It argues that the nature of police work 
requires law enforcement to conform to the dramaturgical demands placed upon them by 
new image-producing technologies.  Chapter 3 reviews the ways in which stones about 
police have traditionally been constructed by the news media, detailing the news-making 
process during both “routine” events and times of accidents or police scandal.  It also 
presents a discussion of recent events that have sparked a change in the way police deal 
with  news  media.  A  description  of  the research  questions, design,  and  case  sites 
comprise Chapter 4, establishing the criteria for the analysis of media power that follows 
throughout.  Chapter 5 provides an account of police performance during routine news  a 
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e  events.  It discusses police-media interaction during non-crisis situations,  evaluates the 
effectiveness  of departmental policies that  dictate  communication with media during 
routine events, and details the role of the public infomation officer in daily impression 
management.  Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the ways police may use media to their 
organizational advantage.  To illustrate the relative strengths of various techniques, the 
chapter  draws heavily hm  case study notes,  observations and  interview transcripts 
gamered fkom  the  four research sites.  Chapter 7  evaluates impression management 
during the Occurrence of non-routine news events, such as accidents and police scandals. 
At  such times, impression management takes on an  entirely new importance as vocal 
critics meet police performances. Finally, Chapter 8 provides of summary of the present 
findings on police media power, pointing to areas for hture research. At the same time, 
it  cautions  against  the  misuse  of  media  for  distortion,  deception,  and  purposive 
misrepresentation. While a number of  agency-specific social,  political  and budgetary 
factors influence the nature, shape and ultimate success of  police administration, the aim 
of the present study is to add media relations and the policdcrime news-making process 
to the  factors that influence the success of contemporary policing by identirjing the 
processes by which police agencies use the media  “as part of the policing apparatus” 
(Ericson et al., 1989). 
e 
Why Media? 
Historically, power has rested among those with the ability to master the art of 
communication and control the flow of information.  In the pre-literate,  oral societies of 
early  Greece,  citizens  having  political  power  were  those  proficient  in  the  verbal 
communication of poetry.  Poetry was not  merely expressive but  a political necessity  a 
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of Greek politics (Havelock, 1963).  In scribal societies, the skills of‘  literacy were limited 
to  a selected few, and scribes were thus  treated as royalty (Innis, 1951).  The Medieval 
Church was able to maintain its authority due to the limited number of people who could 
read the scripture and  offer alternate intqretations of the gospel.  Today, the mass 
society of electronic and broadcast technology is one marked by a small “power elite” 
who controls the flow of information and public opinion through  access to and control of 
media (Mills,  1956). 
The interrelationship of communication media and authority suggests that a loss 
of infomation control by those in power threatens their authority and legitimacy within 
the social order (Meyrowitz,  1986).  The printing press, the first truly mass medium, 
afforded  an  opportunity  for  revolutionary  ideas  that  countered  the  teachings  of 
Christianity  to  be  widely  disseminated,  ultimately  bringing  about  the  Protestant 
Reformation  (Eisenstein,  1983).  Cultural  critic  Lewis  Mumford  (1934),  while 
highlighting  the  advantages  of  “instantaneous  personal  communication  over  long 
distances” afforded by radio, al’so wamed of the possibilities for evil and of threat to 
political unity should access to this medium fall into the wrong hands.  Even the advent 
of television has altered the social hierarchy of authority with its shift away from literacy 
and back to orality.  The oral and visual nature of television inhibits the ability of parents 
and leaders to hide sex and violence from children (Postman, 1994). 
Authority, then,  rests on  information management (Meyrowitz,  1986).  Those 
seeking social power,  or those wishing to maintain their legitimacy within the social 
order, must make a conscious attempt to  shape the nature and  content of information  a 
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relevant to their social standing. Loss of  information control threatens  the traditional 
social hierarchy, and it is the mass media that transmits a prepondLce of political and 
social  information.  As primary  authority  figures within the community, police  are 
regularly  featured  in  the  news  headlines  of  mass  media  Yet  changes  in  media 
technology threaten the legitimacy ofthe police image as new information &out police 
performance becomes increasingly public and, therefore, difficult to manage.  Therefore, 
“it is the instant consequences of electrically moved information that makes necessary a 
/ 
deliberate artistic aim in the placing and management of news” (McLuhan, 1964:203). 
Impression Management 
The legitimacy of any individual or group is largely dependent upon the ability of 
the social actor to maintain a favorable public image.  Even the police, who occupy a 
position  marked  by necessity and  authority, must  never  become  complacent  in their 
privileged  status,  as history suggests that  even the most  solidified public  figures are 
precariously situated on the plains of public opinion.  For this reason, individuals and 
organizations alike strive to consciously present themselves publicly in a manner that 
conforms to their personal or administrative goals.  Erving Goffinan (1959) has described 
all social interaction as a composite of theatrical performances, staged by individuals and 
organizations for the purpose of impression management.  These performances refer to 
behavior taking place in the presence of particular audiences.  Social actors wishing to 
convey  an  image  or  “scripted  impression”  express  qualities  that  contribute to  the 
legitimacy of their social standing.  Thus: 
When  an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his 
observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered 
before them.  They are asked to believe that the character 
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they  see actually possesses  the  attributes he  appears to 
possess,  that  the  task  he  performs  will  have  the 
consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in 
general, matters are what they appear to be @. 17). 
According to  Goffinan, a regiop  is any place that  is bounded by barriers of 
perception.  Like theatrical actors, social actors stage different performmces in different 
regions.  A hnt  region represents an area allowing for public view; therefore, social 
performances are  staged  in  hnt  regions.  Performances in hnt  regions represent 
conscious efforts on the part of social actors to project the appearance of legitimacy and 
respectability.  In  the presence of  a  public  audience,  pexfomers  accentuate certain 
behaviors and  expressions  while suppressing those that might undermine their credibility. 
A  back  region,  conversely,  is  a  place  where  public  performances  may  be 
knowingly contradicted.  It is "backstage",  away hm  the view of a judging audience, 
where actors are free to behave in a manner contrary to their public performances.  A 
back region represents a place where the performer can reliably expect that no  member of 
the audience will intrude.  It is here,  also, that individuals and  groups rehearse their 
public performances and openly construct their impressions. 
Because back regions represent places where performers can relax and drop their 
hnts, it  becomes imperative that  non-pexfomance behaviors remain  secluded hm 
public view for proper impression management.  Problems may arise when back region 
or non-scripted  behavior occurs in  the presence of  an unintended  audience or when 
"outsiders"  unexpectedly enter a back region.  When individuals witness a show that was 
not meant for them, they may become disillusioned with the performer or performers, and 
all social legitimacy may be lost. 
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The mass media, and especially the electronic media, penetrate backstage regions 
of social settings (Surette, 1998), potentially threatening the legitimacy of many social 
actors and their staged performances.  They permeate the aural and visual boundaries that 
traditionally conceal back region behavior. Media may be conceptualized as Gof€tnan’s 
outsiders who witness pdormances not meant for public view.  The intrusiveness and 
pervasiveness of the mass media, then, make the art of impression management difficult 
to achieve.  It is now exceedingly difficult for a social actor to deny malung an offensive 
statement  or  behaving  inappropriately,  since  the  behavior  may  be  photographed, 
recorded,  and distributed for public view.  Increasingly, social actors must partake in 
repairing a damaged public image.  It is only recently that the phrase “no comment” 
became  a  common  response  to  public  inquiries  (Boorstin,  1961).  Due  to  the 
intrusiveness of  mass  media,  it  has become  a modem  necessity for  social actors to 
conform to media formats and restructure their behavior to meet the demands of a media- 
driven society. 
Media Formats 
Media formats are rules and procedures for presenting information in the era of 
mass media (Altheide,  1985).  In the twentieth century, media formats have become 
central to virtually all areas of political and social life, and the dominant formats in a 
media-driven society are those of advertising and promotion.  As  early as 1922, Walter 
Lippmann wrote about a revolution that was taking place in the creation of political and 
social consent through the means of modem communication. According to Lippmann, the 
news  media  are filled with symbols placed  there by  a leader wishing to organize his 
following.  The public is constantly exposed to suggestion.  “It reads not the news, but 
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the news with an aura of suggestion about it” (pp. 150-155).  More recently, Wernick 
(1991) has argued that the rise of mass media in late capitalist societies has produced a 
culture  dominated  by  advertising  and  promotion.  Promotion  extends  beyond  the 
packaging and advertising of material commodities and is applicable to institutions and 
personas as well. 
Successful promotion of political or social agendas requires special knowledge of 
media formats. Such expertise usually rests with the public relations counsel or public 
information officer - individuals trained in the  art of communication and mass media 
fomts. Edward L. Bemays (1923) was among the first scholars to write extensively on 
the  public  relations  specialist.  His seminal  work,  Crystallizing  Public  Opinion, 
introduced the concept of public relations to businesses and political organizations.  It 
defined its scope and outlined its principles as practiced by specialists trained in dealing 
with the public and communications media.  As defined by Bernays, a public relations 
specialist: 
Directs and supervises the activities of his clients wherever 
they  impinge  upon the  daily  life  of  the  public.  He 
interprets the client to the public, which he is enabled to do 
in part because he interprets the public to the client.  His 
advice is given on all occasions on which his client appears 
before the public, whether it be in concrete fonn or as an 
idea.  His advice is given not only on actions which take 
place, but  also on the use of mediums which bring these 
actions  to  the  public  it  is  desired  to  reach,  no  matter 
whether these mediums be the printed, the spoken or the 
visualized word -  that is, advertising, lectures,  the stage, 
the pulpit, the newspaper, the photograph, the wireless, the 
mail or any other form of thought communication @. 14). 
According to Bernays, one of the most significant social and political changes that has 
i 
occurred in the present century has been the increase in attention paid to public opinion,  a 
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no doubt a result of the rise of the press and other communication media  This increase 
’ has occurred not only by  individuals or organizations dependent upon public support, 
“but also by men and organizations which until very recently stood aloof hm  the general 
public and were able to say, ‘The public be damned”’ (p. 34). 
a 
1 
A primary responsibility of the public relations counsel is to create events that 
will generate media attention and create a favorable image among the judging public. 
According to historian Daniel J. Boonth (1961), the staging of events has become the 
business of America in the last half century due to the proliferation of the mass media. 
News making has replaced newsgathering, as a larger proportion of news  has come to 
consist of what he calls “pseudo-events.”  A pseudo-event is an event or Occurrence that 
is planned primarily for the purpose of being reported or reproduced through the mass 
media  It is intended to serve as a mechanism of self-promotion, image enhancement, 
and shaper of public opinion.  The press conference, the staged interview, and the press 
release are all variations of these promotional events.  According to Boorstin, the most 
successful politicians in recent years have been those most adept at using the media to 
create pseudo-events for the purpose of self-promotion. 
Media fonnats often resemble what Goffinan (1974) refers to as “frames”.  They 
are the principles that govern the presentation of events.  Individuals or groups seeking 
successful public relations through the staging of events must be versed in media formats 
and fiame their behaviors in accordance with the demands of the media, for access to 
news  organizations is often essential to public relations and  impression management. 
Clearly, an  understanding of news  and  news  formats “must be  an integral part  of the 
equipment of  the public relations counsel” (Bemays, 1923: 183). 
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All news organizations operate under certain constraints and formats that impact 
Different mediums operate  the issues and events they choose to cover (Gans,  1979).  e 
under different formats.  Thus, unlike newspapers that  have more space to more hlly 
address an issue, television requires brevity.  And while newspapers may rely upon the 
# 
spoken word,  television is dependent upon the visual.  Yet there exist certain constants 
across news formats that largely determine the amount of coverage and publicity.  These 
include the “newsworthiness” or novelty of the event, the amount of “action” included in 
the story, time considerations (i.e.,  will the story make  it to press or broadcast by  a 
deadline), and predictability (planned events are easier to report) (Epstein, 1973; Gans, 
1979). 
Public relations, then, are predicated upon an understanding of media formats, and 
many corporations and government agencies are adapting their organizations to conform 
to these media formats as it becomes increasingly apparent that impression management 
requires mass media.  Governments that  communicate with their various publics only 
infiequently or indirectly through the news media soon discover how crucial relations 
with the press are to their administrative goals (Gamett,  1992).  To date, an array of 
government  agencies  publish  “how  to”  manuals  providing  guidance  on  dealing 
effectively with media organizations. 
Recognizing that “the enormous appetites of the media actually translate into 
good news  and  opportunities” (National League of  Cities,  1993), local  govemment 
agencies are beginning to seek out media coverage through the use of specialists trained 
in the art of media formats. The belief is that a proactive, open and promotional approach 
to  dealing with the media will be viewed  favorably among the public and places the  a 
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government agency in  a position to construct a favorable image of the administrative 
agency.  Many organizations and agencies are recruiting employees having a background 
in journalism, marketing, or public relations.  Some  are even housing fully stafi‘ed  media- 
relations offices. The police represent such agencies. 
l 
Importance of This Research 
Police constructions of the news as a means of impression management represents 
an area largely unexamined in criminological and journalism studies.  Most discussions 
of the crime news-making process describe police as passive agents in creation of crime 
narratives.  Specifically, the police are often defined as news “gatekeepers” who simply 
decide which daily events to pass on  to reporters and  which events or details to withhold. 
Yet gatekeeping may involve elements of news shaping, display, repetition, and timing. 
Gatekeepers may decide to not only release information but also provide its intexpretive 
fkamework, thereby usurping the role of the reporter as storyteller (Shoemaker, 1991). 
Given that live media broadcasts have made it increasingly difficult for public figures to 
filter the release of information, the role of the gatekeeper today has come to resemble 
that of a public relations or marketing specialist, who works toward providing the best 
possible interpretation of already public information. 
This  research examines the role of the police as news filters, as storytellers, and as 
public relations specialists.  In doing so, it builds upon previous studies of the crime 
news-making process in several ways.  First, it examines news construction fiom the 
vantage of the police, stepping away fi-om the role of the reporter while placing the police 
as active participants at  the forefkont of the crime news-making process.  It therefore 
recognizes the multifaceted role of the police news  gatekeeper who not  only releases 
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news information, but who also responds to police-related news stories stemming from 
critical, non-official sources.  Secondly, this research investigates the political, social, and 
administrative  constraints  that  influence  the  release  and  shaping  of  events  into  a 
hework  that will ultimately prove beneficial to the police organization.  It therefore 
examines  the necessity for police to  construct  the  news  for purposes  of impression 
management.  Thirdly,  this study identifies the different  types of policing events that may 
require different forms of gatekeeping responses.  For example, routine events such as 
i 
police responses to standard criminal events may allow police to adopt a rather passive 
role  in  the  news-process,  while  police  accidents  or  scandal  necessitate  a  more 
constructivist approach to media relations.  Using interviews with police chiefs, their 
PIOs, and local beat reporters while relying upon actual news case studies, this research 
seeks to  uncover  the  situational  aspects of police  involvement  in  news  production. 
Finally, this study is one of organizational change and adaptation in a rapidly evolving 
technological climate.  It attempts to illustrate how  changes in media communication 
redefine the role of contemporary police and their interaction with news reporters.  As 
police have become more proactive in their strategic approach to policing the public,  so 
too have they become proactive in the manner with which they construct the police image 
in the public mind. 
Conclusion 
This  chapter discussed the power of media over social and political life.  It argued 
that communication and authority go hand  in hand. With mass media now the primary 
means by  which political leaders communicate with their constituency, familiarity with 
media  formats  is necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  social  legitimacy.  Clearly,  the 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 15 
dominant format that transcends all types of mass media  is that of promotion,  where 
'communicators must constantly sell both themselves and their ideas to a judging public. 
0 
This chapter also  introduced the concepts of performance  "regions,"  or areas where 
public leaders may temporarily abandon their promotional personas and be at ease.  The 
,I 
chapter  concluded  with  a  warning  that  as media  technology  confinues  to  develop, 
performance  regions are becoming  increasingly permeable, where the entire world  is 
figuratively a stage where performances must be played  out to convince audiences of 
political legitimacy.  As the police represent among the most visible of public officials, 
their actions are continuously found within the images that comprise mass media  As 
such,  police must  recognize that even their back-stage performances are occasionally 
subject to front-stage view. 
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CHAPTER  2 
I  POLICE  & PERFORMANCE 
We live in a media world!  Everything and everyone is fair 
gqe  for the roving video camera; there’s  a profit  in it! 
Whether it’s  a professional news  station shooting some 
dramatic footage in order to win the ratings race or a home 
movie enthusiast selling hidher tape to the highest bidder, 
video pays!  All  one needs  is a  television  to  see how 
popular unstaged ‘video happenings’ have become, and the 
evening news is only one of many venues for them.  Today, 
shows like  World’s Wildest Police Chases proliferate the 
airways. 
16 
As  Police Officers, we must realize that the nature of our 
work makes us  a natural  and very attractive  subject for 
reality-based television. programs  (news and  otherwise). 
Therefore, it is  more  important  than  ever to  maintain  a 
professional demeanor.  We simply do not have the luxury 
of letting our guard down.  We  owe it to ourselves, our 
fellow officers,  our department and  our families, not  to 
become a negative story.  There are cameras evthywhere! 
Let them catch us doing the job the way we were trained. 
-Roll call training instruction, 
Urbandale Police Department 
(Internal document #009) 
Police work often resembles that of a stage performer convincing audiences that 
appearances are real.  Using jargon  such  as the  “blue curtain“ of policing, “staged” 
operations, and police “performance”, many texts and articles emphasize this on the job 
dramaturgy.  Perhaps the most developed articulation of the theater of policing is that of 
Manning (1977), who discusses police work as a dramatic performance, staged to create 
the  appearance  of  control.  Based  upon  Goffman’s  (1959)  notion  of  impression 
management, Manning describes police work in terms of symbols, themes, dramas, and 
appearances.  Police seize upon particular aspects of their activities to dramatize their 
effectiveness.  OfEcers represent actors playing agents of social control.  They use props, 
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such  as published  crime statistics, for the purpose of  a dramatic presentation of their 
performance outcome. 
While Manning’s  (1977) description  of  the performance nature of policing is 
among the most direct, other scholars have alluded to the theatrical aspects of patrolling 
! 
the  streets.  The policeman  has been  described  as a “Rorschach in  uniform” whose 
‘‘occupational accouterments -  shield, nightstick, gun and summons  book -  clothe him in 
a mantle of  symbolism that stimulates fantasy and projection” (Niederhoffiz, 1967:l). 
Van  Maanen (1974:104)  refers to the lack of affect displayed by  many  officers as “a 
mask to  fend  off the perceived  curse of  doing  society’s dirty work.” He  describes 
patrolmen in terms of Goffinan’s (1959) ‘’performance teams,” working together to create 
an impression of law  and  order.  Loader  (1997)  argues  that  police  primarily  wield 
symbolic, rather than coercive, power.  Similar to Manning’s description of the dramatic 
power  of the police  funeral, he argues that  police use  other rituals and  symbols for 
instrumental purposes. 
Clearly,  the  appearance  of  control  represents  a  fundamental  component  of 
successfbl police work.  To maintain the public performance and, therefore, legitimacy, 
police must constantly be aware of their behavior in varying social regions. 
[Tlhey  must  segment  their  audiences  so  that  certain 
presentations are available only to some segments of the 
society; they must control the information available on their 
actions in order to be effective (both in crime control and in 
the  maintenance  of  public  credibility) . . . they  must 
decrease the amount of information available to their public 
that  indicates  the  dirty, the  boring,  the  ineffectual,  the 
illegal or potentially immoral; and  they must  through the 
management  of  appearances  create  the  sense  of 
commitment  to  and  enforcement  of rules  and tenets on 
which there is only an “as if” public agreement (Manning, 
1977:  18). 
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To  uphold  the  appearance of control, then,  police  organizations traditionally operate 
under a veil of secrecy.  They deny outsiders access to their backstage regions for the 
purpose of impression management.  Unfortunately, the prominence of the mass media in 
recent years, the focus of the news media on the behaviors of public officials, and the 
ability  of  electronic media  to publicize  non-performance behavior,  are  making  the 
appearance of control exceedingly difficult for police to maintain. 
Backstage behavior comprises a bulk of news items found within mass media, and 
of the varied functions of the news media, perhaps none has greater importance then the 
role of a he  press in reporting on the backstage behaviors of public officials.  The 
constitutional right to  a  be  press allows the media to  serve as a  fourth branch of 
government by reporting on the actions of elected and appointed officials and holding 
their actions accountable to the public.  By monitoring the government, the media keep in 
check the actions of government officials and ensure that the power structure between 
government and the public remains  in balance.  Given the functions of a fiee press, it is 
the  responsibility of the news media to safeguard personal  liberties by  reporting on 
government wrongdoing and holding them accountable. As a result, this too often ensures 
that much of media reporting regarding public officials concerns backstage behavior of 
government misfeasance, malfeasance, or inefficiency.  To address this negative image, 
police often restructure their public behavior to meet the demands of media technology. 
Media and Reflexivity 
One of the defining features of modem society is the  extent to which media 
technology allows for the reflexive monitoring of public behavior, ultimately altering the 
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patterns of social life (Giddens, 1990).  Reflexivity represents a process wherein social 
actors alter their public behavior according to the information Ithe$  receive about their 
conduct.  Often, the re-shaping of behavior is anticipatory and based upon presumptive 
responses to personal  action.  Each  day,  individuals and  organizations script  future 
actions according to the evaluations they receive or are likely to receive regarding their 
past actions.  For public figures, these evaluations frequently stem fiom media coverage 
of their daily actions and spark changes in their overall performance.  Media,  thexefore, 
serve  as a  social  force that  not  only  shapes public opinion,  but  also personal  and 
collective behavior. 
i 
I 
As public figures, the ability of media to portray police functions contributes to 
police reflexivity (Manning, 1997).  Images of police work serve as commentary on their 
performance, fiom the visually dramatic to the vicariously mundane. Of course, reporters, 
camera crews,  and newsroom editors play a significant role in the production of the 
police image.  Operating under their “fourth estate’’ mandate, members of the news media 
often bring  back-stage behaviors to  the  forehnt.  At  times, they  may project  their 
interpretations of police work onto the public, or they may (inadvertently) suggest that 
non-routine performances constitute the rehearsed norm.  Recognizing this, police often 
respond to their media image by reforming their strategies to address the issues portrayed. 
They may regroup backstage, applying changes to their scripted responses; all of this in 
an effort to regain control of their character.  In essence, police today understand that 
who  they  are - at  least  in the  public  eye - is  in part  a product  of media  imagery 
(perlmutter, 2000).  As a result, they take steps to maintain this popular image through 
the reflexive shaping of their public behavior.  One police sergeant I met  during my 
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attendance at an international police media-training conference described the process of 
reflexivity brought about by new media technology as follows:  4  I 
The VCWCamcorder is affeCting how we do our job.  Our 
city has a big festival every year, similar to Mudi gras or 
New Years Eve in Times Square.  Last year, I was working 
the  event with  some other officers when  a  map  began 
causing trouble.  He eventually became  aggressive and 
resistant.  Sometimes the only way to restrain a guy is to 
use physical force, which we began to do.  Then, I noticed 
people in the gathering crowd  filming the ‘incident with 
their camcorders, and I immediately signaled ‘cameras’ to 
the other officers, imagining how it would war  on the 
local news. Because the public doesn’t understand police 
procedures, we ended up using less force and ultimately put 
ourselves in danger (Author notes). 
Mass media, therefore, have brought  a  new dimension to contemporary policing;  a 
dimension that concerns itself with imagery as much as reality.  Given that media create 
the standard of reality upon which all public performances are compared (Perlmutter, 
2000), much social action is conducted with an acute awareness of “how things might 
look.”  Serving as public figures and media icons, police must  actively work to uphold 
not only the law, but also their image.  They must anticipate the impact of new media 
technology on  police performance, and they must restage their operations to fit the whims 
of their audience.  And a review of the social history of policing and the evolution of 
police administration reveals an increasing sensitivity among police to the influence of 
media on their legitimacy and authority.  Perhaps a commentary on the reflexive power 
of new  image producing technology, the development and proliferation of new  media 
preceded each stage in the evolution of policing performance. 
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Police & The Press: Performer Meets Critic 
Early American police departments were marked  by  conuption as they became 
connected with  the  political  machines  of  American  politics  (Reiss, Jr.,  1992).  The 
prevailing police strategy at the time called for close and personal ties to the community 
and  a  decentralized organizational  structure.  While  this allowed  police  to  become 
integrated into neighborhoods, the lack of organizational control over officers resulting 
hm  decentralization contributed to  police  inefficiency,  disorganization and political 
corruption welling and Moore, 1988).  The latter half of the nineteenth century found big 
city police  departments ruled principally by  political machines and  special interests, 
where police corruption and involvement in vice became unfortunate realities (Reppetto, 
1978). 
During  this  same  time,  a  new  breed  of  journalism - described  by  Walter 
Lippmann  (1914 [1968:14]) as one possessing “a distinct prejudice in favor of those who 
make . . .  accusations” -  became nationally prominent.  While journalism had  always 
influenced American politics, advances in printing technology at the turn of the century 
made  it possible for reform journalists to communicate with  a larger audience.  New 
printing techniques and cheaper distribution attracted readers previously unable to afford 
elite publications (Shapiro, 1968).  As such, this new “muckraking” journalism catered to 
the masses by exposing the improprieties of the politically, socially and economically 
powerful.  For police, it also marked an end to the heyday of the detective dime novel 
(  1  860- 19 10) that inaccurately portrayed American law  enforcement as law abiding and 
just public figures.  In fact,  some American dime novels focusing on heroic or clever 
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detectives were  actually reprints and  translations  of  European  classics and  were not 
grounded in American tradition (Inciardi and Dee, 1987). 
I  , 
Among the chief themes of this new muckraking journalism was the dishonesty of 
politicians,  the  greed  of  big  businessmen,  the  bribing  of  public  officials,  and  the 
I  exploitation  of  wage-earning  employees.  Subsequently,  not  a  few  publications 
highhghted the malfeasance of local law enforcement that was so  widespread at the time. 
In  1907, Cosmopolitan accused the New York Police Department of ‘‘standing publicly 
as partner in and sponsor for the most widespread and destructive form of vice known  to 
that city,” noting that public awareness of police graft “fully explains the disgust of those 
who  declare  municipal  government  in  the  United  States  to  be  a  failure”  (1907 
[1971:331]).  In  1909, McCZure’s Magazine noted that “the purchase of the police in 
Chicago  . . . is  fieely  and  hnkly for  sale  to  the  interests  of  dissipation”  (1907 
[1964:400]).  In total,  the mid  nineteenth century  through the  1930s saw  number of 
reformers called for change in the organization and structure of policing, and newspapers 
provided extensive coverage of the refomers’ demands, calling for investigations into 
incompetence and conuption of city police. 
I 
Keystone Comedies: No Laughing Matter 
The  emergence of popular cinema during the early years of big  city policing 
became an equally veritable threat to the legitimacy of the police.  Upon its introduction 
into society at the turn of the century, few law enforcement officials would consider the 
motion picture to be public enemy no.  1.  Yet,  from 1912 -  1920, the Keystone Film 
Company would come to represent a public nuisance that police officers simply could not 
ignore.  Owned  and operated by actor/writer/director Mack  Sennett, the Keystone Film 
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Company traded in exaggeration, pandemonium, and outright indignity.  Many of the 
Keystone films  dealt with "the pretensions of a society that was tberit on elevating itself", 
utilizing slapstick and the burlesque as central comedic techniques (Lahue and Brewer, 
1972:44). 
enforcement. 
And  among  the  most  popular  targets  for  comedic  ridicule  was  law 
One of the ht  standards to emerge Erom  the new production company featured 
two incompetent detectives whose investigations only created more trouble,  as in the 
films  $500 Rewurd  (1911)  and At it Again (1912).  By  far the most  popular of the 
Keystone comedies featured a band of bumbling police officers whose cinematic ruison 
d'etre was  public mockery.  The Bangville  Police  (1913)  finds the Keystone Kops 
responding to a burglary call by foot after their dilapidated patrol car explodes.  The next 
year, I.  the Clutches of a Gang (1914) had the Kops mistakenly 'arresting  the mayor on 
kidnapping charges, only to have the crime solved without the aid of the police force.  In 
short, among the first images seen by moviegoers at the beginning of the century were 
those of law enforcement at work, yet these images failed to portray city police in even a 
remotely favorable light. 
Police Refom: Performance Restaged 
Clearly, mass media were among the key social forces that put police reform on 
the national  agenda.  Newspapers provided extensive coverage of reformer demands 
regarding  police  administration,  and  they  called  for  investigations  examining 
incompetence and corruption of city police.  Portrayals of police in entertainment media 
damaged  the image of  urban  police  and  contributed to  the  impetus  for  widespread 
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change. Richard Sylvester, who was responsible for transforming the National Chiefs of 
Police Union into the International Association of Chiefs of Police, complained that: 
In  moving  pictures  the  police  are  sometimes  made  to 
appear ridiculous,  and  id  view  of  the  large  number  of 
young people, children, who attend these moving picture 
shows, it gives them an improper idea of the policeman 
(Quoted in Walker, 197758). 
At a 1914 meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, officials criticized 
media portrayals of law enforcement, as many police chiefs faced daily public criticism 
hm  jokes,  newspaper  cartoons,  and  motion  pictures  such  as the  Keystone  Cops. 
According to Fogelson (1977:65): 
The mass media, particularly the movies, often  portrayed 
policemen at best as well-meaning imbeciles, incapable of 
carrying out the simplest order, and at worst as out and out 
grafters,  ready to fleece everybody in sight. 
In short, the development of new  media technology at the turn of the century 
exposed police corruption and inefficiency, causing a growing number of reformers to 
call for change in the organization and structure of policing.  The  culmination of these 
efforts resulted in the formation of the National Commission of Law  Observance and 
Enforcement,  which published recommendations  for a new  model  of policing  in its 
(1931) Wickersham Commission Reports on the police.  The  new  model was to be a 
bureaucratic,  hierarchical  structure  of  policing  based  upon  the  principles  of 
professionalism (Walker, 1977).  Among the top advocates for police professionalism 
were August Vollmer -  the author of the report on police -  and his protCg6 Orlando W. 
Wilson.  As police chief in Wichita, Kansas,  Wilson hired both more qualified and  higher 
educated officers while upgrading standard training procedures.  Further, he incorporated 
new  technology  into  the  everyday practice  of  police  work.  By  1939, Wilson had 
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achieved  national  prominence  and  became professor in  police  administration at  the 
University of California at Berkeley (Johnson, 1981).  Recogriizing the need for tight 
organizational control and a public image suggesting strict adherence to the law, Wilson 
I 
called for a new model in police administration. Impressed by the successes of J. Edgar 
Hoover in reforming the image of the Bureau of Investigation, he began a strategy of  I 
reform following a path similar to that of the FBI  (Kelling an4 Moore, 1988). 
Hoover & the Bureau: Media Power in Practice 
When J. Edgar Hoover became Director of the Bureau of Investigation in 1924, 
the legitimacy and integrity of federal law enforcement were held in  question, and the 
public image of the Bureau was less than favorable.  In the preceding years, the Bureau 
had been involved in numerous  raids on alien “radicals” and merfibers of the Communist 
Labor Party using blank warrants, denying the right to counsel, and engaging in other 
illegal practices.  While previous efforts to seize and deport alien radicals boosted the 
popularity of federal law enforcement, the Red Scare had died down following the First 
World War,  and continued raids by the Bureau were perceived as an abuse of fedd 
power. 
During the Harding Administration, federal law enforcement became a symbol for 
political corruption.  The Bureau had become an agency of presidential cronies.  Agents 
were appointed based on political merit instead of professional ability.  Then,  in 1922, 
Attorney General William J.  Burns ordered Bureau agents to burglarize the offices of 
politicians who were critical of the Harding Administration.  News accounts at the time 
referred to the Bureau as a “goon squad” whose special agents “were some with criminal 
records”  (Theohaxis and  Cox, 1988). At  the same time, newspapers were filled with  a 
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stories about official conuption surrounding the Teapot Dome scandal.  Both former 
Attorney General Daugherty and Bums, who was Serving as BGeau Director at the time 
I 
that  the  alleged comption occurred,  were implicated  in  the  scandal.  Finally, both 
Daugherty and Bums faced accusations of viola-  prohibition laws under the Volstead 
Act.  The image of the Bureau was in dire need of reform.  / 
Theorhark and Cox  (1988) provide a detailed description of the successes brought 
about by Hoover in improving the image of the Bureau of Investigation and restoring 
legitimacy to the agency.  At the time of Hoover’s appointment  as  Director  of the Bureau, 
public  opinion  was  largely  against  the  existence  of  federal  law  enforcement. 
Conservatives  felt that the federal government should not be involved in police work, and 
liberals felt the Bureau to be a threat to civil liberties.  Hoover recognized that he needed 
to  change  the  public  image  of  the  Bureau,  and  upon  appointment  as  Director, 
incorporated a series of guidelines into his employee manual of instructions.  First and 
foremost, Bureau employees were to present themselves with an air of professionalism by 
giving “due regard to their personal appearance and presentability.”  Agents  were to 
abstain fbm  consuming alcohol, both on and off duty.  Agents were forbidden to accept 
any rewards or gratuities, and all employees were to report indiscretions by fellow agents 
directly to Hoover himself. 
Of the changes initiated by Hoover, perhaps none achieved greater success than 
Hoover’s ability to control the image of the Bureau in both the news and entertainment 
media.  According to William  C.  Sullivan (1979:80), former Assistant in Charge of 
Domestic Intelligence, “the FBI’s main thrust was not investigations but public relations” 
as Hoover made every attempt to use the media to the Bureau’s advantage.  His employee  a 
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manual contained a detailed protocol of the Bureau’s media strategy.  Employees were 
forbidden to provide to the press any Bureau information or to disclose any information 
obtained in his official  capacity to an individual not authorized by the Bureau.  He issued 
a directive that no news story emanating fkom the bureau was to be released except over 
the director’s signature.  Finally, all speeches by agents were to be edited by the director. 
These policies ensured that Hoover alone would determine what Bureau infomation 
would be released. 
Hoover also engaged in the selective disclosure of information to reportem who had 
previously presented the Bureau in a favorable light, placing them on  “the list of persons 
to receive various releases and documents issued by the Bureau’’ (Theoharis and Cox, 
1988).  He later hired one these reporters,  trained in media formats,  to serve as a Bureau 
publicist  (Powers,  1983).  Hoover  withheld  information  regarding  the  declining 
membership  of  the  Communist  Party  during  the  era  of  McCarthyism  because  the 
prevailing  anti-Communist  fears  contributed  to  public  support  for  federal  law 
enforcement (Poveda, 1982).  Finally, Hoover’s declaration of “Public Enemy No. 1” 
represents a  pseudo-event  timed  and  released  to  the  news  media just  prior  to  the 
offender’s  imminent  apprehension,  thus  creating  the  appearance of  expediency  in 
successful law enforcement (Clarens, 1997). 
At  the same time that  Hoover  exercised tight  control over the news media, he 
recognized  the  public’s  near  obsessive  fascination  with  crime  and  violence  as 
entertainment.  His  goal was to  “attract audiences initially through fantasy, and then 
retain them with scientific language and the dissemination of facts” (Potter,  1998:126). 
The Bureau’s Crime Records Division supplied information to pulp literature, detective 
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magazines, comic strips, and radio shows.  Critical of Hollywood for glorimg crime, 
Hoover  petitioned  Hollywood to  abstain  hm  glamorizing  such  gangsters  as John 
Dillinger.  Eventually, the Hays Commission, which regulated the content of motion 
pictures, would issue the following guideline: 
No motion picture on the life or exploits of John Dillinger 
will be produced, distributed or exhibited. . .  This decision 
is based on the belief that the production,  distribution or 
exhibition of such a picture could be detrimental to the best 
public interest. (Quoted in Clarens, 1997:121) 
Following the success of  Warner  Brother’s  (1935) pro-Bureau  film  G-Men,  Hoover 
began issuing new  regulations regarding the appearance of  Bureau agents that were based 
upon the image of the G-Man  as depicted by the film’s star,  James  Cagney (Theahark 
and Cox,  1988).  Finally,  upon  the  1948 reissue of  this  successful film, Hoover 
authorized the use of the Department of Justice seal along side the Warner Brother’s logo 
(Clarens,  1997).  Clearly, Hoover mastered the art of impression management and, by 
responding to the demands of media formats, was able to create and maintain a favorable 
image of the Bureau. 
Professionalism, Protest, Prime Time 
Administratively, Wilson and other police reformers at the state level restructured 
the organization of local law enforcement upon  the Bureau’s  administrative model of 
professionalism and centralized command of officers.  They also identified crime control 
as their primary mandate.  All of this, of course, was in sharp contrast to the popular 
image  of police  as “daw’,  “ridiculous”,  “corrupt”, and  primarily “nominal”  crime 
fighters (Lahue and Brewer, 1972). Among the strategies pitched to the public during the 
reform era of policing were police performance based upon limited discretion, preventive 
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patrol, and strict enforcement of the law.  According to Kelling and Moore (1988), no 
better characterization of this model can be found than television’s Sergeant Joe Friday, 
I 
whose “just the facts” mantra exemplified the impersonal adherence to law enforcement 
and an emotional detachment from social crises that was prevalent at the time.  Finally, 
like Hoover, the reformers set out to sell their brand of policing to  the public through  I 
mass media. 
To an extent, this new image of the contemporary crime fighter resonated among 
the public.  Crime shows became a dominant and popular genre of prime time radio and 
television  during  the  195Os,  with  police  officers  figuring  prominently  as starring 
characters (Dominick, 1978, Surette, 1998).  These new police ‘perf~rmer~’  represented 
heroic figures whose dramatic actions, methodological detective work,  and dependence 
upon  violence  proved  extremely effective in  solving crime.  The reformers  failed, 
however, to properly promote local law enforcement and therefore could not parallel the 
successes in public relations achieved by Hoover and the FBI.  According to Kelling and 
Moore  (1988),  the  approach  of  the reform  movement  was  more  like  selling  than 
marketing or promotion: 
Marketing refers to  the process of  carefully identifying 
consumer needs and then developing goods and services 
that meet those needs.  Selling refers to having a stock of 
products or goods on hand irrespective of need and selling 
thm. The reform strategy had  as its starting point a set of 
police tactics (services) that police promulgated .  .  .  for the 
purpose of establishing internal control. (Kelling & Moore, 
1988:  1  10). 
By the 196Os, the strategies adopted by the reform movement contributed to the 
already  growing  social  conflict  within  the  nation’s  urban communities.  It  became 
apparent that police had different arrest policies according to race, and arrests of civil and  0 
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a  political protestors were viewed as the use of police to serve the interests of the pow& 
members of society (Quinney, 1970).  Finally, an emphasis on policing technology, such 
as preventive  patrol  and  calls  for  service,  created  a  physical  barrier  between  law 
enforcement officers and the communities they served. 
I 
The rise in media technology during the 196Os, especially television, coupled with 
domestic civil unrest, did much to undermine the image of police.  Previously symbols of 
order and control, the public were now exposed to unrehearsed performances of law 
enforcement that resembled the antithesis of control. Images of police officers using their 
batons against the public “did not make good press to say the least” (Geller, Goldstein, 
Nhocks,  & Rodriguez, 1994:7).  The  National  Commission  on the  Causes  and 
Prevention of Violence (1969)  argued that the presence of media during civil disorder 
may have caused police to “play to the television audience”, thereby exacerbating public 
tensions and the appearance of official impropriety.  The  report went on to note that prior 
to the disorder in Watts, Detroit and Newark, “police were trained to act as individual 
pups  of two and three. This training was clearly inadequate to deal with the massive 
disturbance which required a well disciplined force acting in unison” (p.  104).  Yet it was 
these very disturbances that threatened the legitimacy of police by bringing images of ill- 
trained officers right into the living rooms  of so many Americans. 
To be sure, news media were aware of hundreds of fieedom protests occurring 
during the  1960s that did not involve violent encounters between police and the public. 
The visual bias of the new television format, however, meant that news editors would not 
dispatch  camera  crews  unless  violence  was  already  in  progress  (Epstein,  1973). 
Therefore, the ability of new  media technology to  expose the backstage behaviors of  a 
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police  live  and  in  action proved  to  once again undermine the  appearance of  police 
professionalism.  It became clear that any strategy of police reform required command of 
the police image, much in the way that Hoover commanded control over the image of the 
Bureau in film,  print and radio during his tenure as Director.  Police input into the news- 
making process was to become a starting point and an area of central importance during 
1 
the transition between the reform and community-policing eras (Ziembo-Vogl, 1998). 
The Police Strike Back 
By the mid-to-late 198Os, police departments across the country  began to discover 
that they must welcome media coverage as a means of repairing the police we.  For 
one, police began to enter the arena of entertainment media, serving as  consultants  on law 
enforcement dramas  or -  more fiequently -  allowing camera crews to accompany officers 
during a patrol ride-along.  The recorded footage of these police patrols then become part 
of television proganmdng known  as "reality" television.  Not only popular among the 
public (Cavender and Fishman, 1998), these programs are also popular among officers 
themselves who feel that such programs help the public understand and identify with 
police  (Hallett  and  Powell,  1995).  At  the  same  time,  as  an  incentive  for  their 
cooperation, the police are given full editorial control of any video footage taken of their 
department and am therefore in a position to present the most favorable of representations 
of their department to the public. 
Police have also taken steps to use this same reality-based media technology to 
create their own video footage of police performance for use on local news broadcasts. 
For example, many departments now have mounted video recorders within the interior of 
their patrol cars for the purpose of  documenting dramatic or even questionable police- 
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citizen  encounters.  While 
nevertheless represents a tool 
closed-circuit  video  is  not  part  of  “mass”  media,  it 
that may enhance or maintain the police image, since video 
I 
footage of dangerous or controversial police-citizen disputes may be distributed to local 
media  in  an effort to  sustain the credibility of  their  public performances (Sechrest, 
Liquori, and Peny,  1990).  Other departments have secured their own weekly programs  I 
on local radio, a weekly “locked-in” time slot on the local television news,  and  have 
incorporated  department computer web  sites into their  public relations strategies by 
constructing web sites to communicate directly with their demanding audience. 
Of come, all of these public relations strategies place demands upon  the police in 
terms  of  time  and  personnel.  Therefore, police  departments nationwide began  to 
establish media relations units charged with the mandate of disseminating information to 
public  while  simultaneously  exercising  organizational  impression  management. 
Recognizing that  maintaining  or  restoring  public  confidence is  critical to  effitive 
policing,  many police departments began  incorporating media skills as part  of their 
training protocol in an attempt to deal with “ambush”  interviews, to properly handle 
difficult situations, and to successfully generate positive media coverage of department 
practices (Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 1995). 
Conclusion. 
This  chapter presented an illustration of the occupational relationship between the 
police as street performers and actors as stage performers.  Time and again, police have 
had to restructure their performance according to the requirements of an evolving media 
technology  for the purpose  of  maintaining  favorable reviews.  Such restructuring of 
behavior based upon mediated images received represents a practice of media reflexivity, 
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where mass media today serve as an important source of information regarding public 
opinion surrounding the quality of police performances.  Yet, while early police did not 
consider mass media a top priority among the many social voices to be addressed, police 
today recognize the potential for ham that may result from a failure to effectively deal 
with their media image.  Indeed, media today are considered essential for building citizen 
,I 
support of law enforcement and for the successful implementation of effective policing 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POLICE & THE NEWS 
0’ 
It’s .  . .  a tenuous relatior@ip .  .  .  [Tlhere’s been instances 
where you bang your head  against the wall trying to get 
information,  and  other  instances where  they  have been 
accommodating, and you’re like, ‘Wait a minute, this is a 
surprise!’ 
-Broadcast news reporter 
City  of Morganville 
(Author interview) 
The News-making Process 
On any given day, members of law enforcement are prominently featured in both 
the headlines of newspapers and in the flickering video clips of broadcast television. 
As the most visible representatives of local government, their actions are of great 
interest to  the media  audience.  Moreover, the  multi-faceted  aspect of police work 
coupled with the ever-popular drama of crime ensures  extensive media coverage of police 
performance.  As such, stories about crime and descriptions of police work constitute a 
majority of news items across local and national media formats (Graber, 1980).’ 
News organizations require  journalists to provide accounts of community events 
on a routine basis (Tuchman, 1978).  This  requires a high level of dependence upon and 
cooperation with government officials, including the police, who comprise the bulk of 
news  sources  and  provide the necessary news  accounts (Gam,  1979).  To  ensure a 
constant supply of news items and authoritative sources, journalists maintain an index of 
’ It is dificult to provide an  approximate estimate of the extent of news coverage of police functions. In an 
extensive review of crime stories across local and national printhroadcast news, Grab  (1980) found that 
crime and justice averaged 25% of all stories in newspapers, 20%  of local television stories, and  13% of 
national television stories. In the Chicago Tribune, stones about individual crimes received nearly three 
times as much attention as the presidency, Congress, or the economy. While stories specifically about 
police activities represented only 10.3% of the total Tribune crime stones, Graber (pp. 47) indicates that the 
“typical” crime story contains routine stock elements, including “the work done by the police.” 
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voices and viewpoints for both news and editorials that may be readily accessed at  any 
given  point  in  the news-making  process.  This journalistic dependence upon  public 
I 
officials works  to  the benefit  of  government  agencies by  routinely  affording them 
privileged  status in  the marketplace  of  ideas,  allowing them  to  Erame  news  events 
according to their organizational needs (Bennett, 1990). 
While the norms of news production typically favor powafbl institutions and 
sustain their ideological hegemony,  the dynamics of  the  news-making  process shift 
during times of disruptive events, such as accidents or scandals.  Molotch and Lester 
(1  974) suggest that access to news agencies by government sources fluctuate during news 
coverage of non-routine events.  Routine events are news items based upon the purposive 
accomplishments of social actors.  They are marked by  the fact that the people who 
undertake the happening are also those who promote them into events.  In this sense, 
routine  events resemble  news  items  of  what  Goffman  (1959)  refers  to  as Scripted 
dramaturgical performances.  According to Molotch and Lester, the majority of stones 
appearing in the news constitutes routine or scripted events2. Accidents, however, differ 
hm  routine news events in  that the underlying happening is Unintentional, and those 
who bring it to public attention are different fiom those responsible for bringing about the 
event.  Accidents rest upon miscalculations that lead to a breakdown in the customary 
order of public performances and more closely resemble news items of what Goffinan 
(1959) refers to as back region or non-scripted behavior. 
This  does not imply that the bulk of news consists of routine or even typical occurrences.  Surette (1998) 
asserts that “newsworthiness” is measured, m part, according to the “law of  opposite^" whereby the most 
infiequent occurrences are most likely to become news items.  As it is used here, routine implies that 
official responses to events are scripted, planned, and therefore “routine.” Thus, one would not refer to a 
news item about a terrorist attack as routine but rather news coverage of the “purposive accomplishments” 
of responding officials as routine. 
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During times of accident or scandal, those lacking habitual access to the news 
media are often brought to the forehnt by reporters who abandon their index of routine, 
official  sources and instead rely upon alternative voices: 
I 
In  their  realization  as  events,  accidents  are  far  less 
contingent than are routine events on the event needs of the 
pow&.  Given  the  inherent  drama,  sensation,  and 
atypicality  of  accidents,  it  is  difficult  to  deny  their 
existence;  and  typically nonimportant  groups  can  more 
easily hold sway in the temporal demarcation process [of 
news construction] (Molotch and Lester, 1974:lW-110). 
Thus, representatives fiom women’s,  civil rights,  and  youth groups become the key 
spokespersons in the media during times when business is not as usual. 
[Tlhe presence of ‘unindexed’ social voices in a given story 
simply may reflect the press’s inability to apply the index 
norm.  For example, when official opinion is in disarray for 
any of a variety of reasons, the journalistic process may be 
relatively more  chaotic.  With  this chaos may  come a 
decline in the familiar ‘official’ narrative structure, opening 
the  way  for  anomalous  news narratives  told  through 
disparate Social voices (Bennett, 1990:107). 
These voices challenge the official interpretative fiame of the accidental event, often 
suggesting that atypical events are more indicative of the routine and commonplace.  It is 
during times of accident and scandal when the loss of information control to alternative 
news sources poses a threat to the legitimacy and authority of public officials. 
Police are routinely key participants in the news-making process and represent the 
primary  sources for  the production of crime news (Sherizen,  1978; Fishman,  1980; 
Chibnall,  1981; Barak, 1988; Ericson et al.,  1987, 1989, 1991; Chermak,  1994).  As a 
result, they maintain privileged status as the key definers of the crime problem  (Hall, 
Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, Roberts, 1978). News organizations are dependent upon the 
police for a constant supply of crime information that comprises a large portion of news. 
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For  this reason, news  agencies often assign reporters to a "police  beat"  so they may 
obtain  on-site  information  about  the  most  recent  crime  incident.  In  turn,  police 
organizations are dependent upon  the news  media to publicize  crimes,  request public 
cooperation  with  police  investigations,  and  lobby  for  additional  law  enforcement 
resources.  Frequent and direct access to news media often works to the advantage of 
police agencies who receive favorable media coverage,  coverage that content analyses 
suggest is in sharp contrast to the less than favorable coverage of courts and corrections 
(Graber,  1980; Chermak,  1998)? 
I( 
Police organizations, however, are not immune to accidents or scandal,  and news 
reporters may turn to "unindexed" and non-official sources during allegations of police 
misconduct,  else  simply  turn on them,  rendering  police  organizations vulnerable to 
intensive public and  media  scrutiny.  For example,  Lawrence  (1996)  examined news 
coverage of police use of force in the Los  AngeZes Times between 1987 and 1992 to study 
the impact that two prominent media  stories of police  abuse of force had on reporter 
reliance upon police  as official and  indexed news  sources.  She found that both the 
occurrences of accidental events and conflict among officials regarding the interpretation 
of those events provided license to news organizations to devote more attention to non- 
official interpretations of the causes of police use of force.  Alleged victims, their families 
and  attorneys, witnesses to  alleged  acts of brutality, and  community  activist groups 
Although media evaluations of the criminal justice system are rare, Graber's (1980) content analysis of 
the Chicago Tribune  suggests not only that police are evaluated more favorably in the press than the courts 
and correctional system, but that stories are more likely to indicate police performance as stable or 
improving than declining. More recently, Chermak (1998) reported results from a content analysis of more 
than 2,500 crime stones from both print and visual media. He concluded that most crime stones reflect 
positively on police performance by portraying them as crime-fighters and emphasizing the danger of 
police work. 
3 
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became  key  media  spokespersons  during  such  accidental  events,  often  providing 
challenging frames to official interpretations of police misconduct. 
The police-media relationship, therefore,  is  one that  is routinely  amicable in 
nature but may sour at any given moment. Charged with the mandate of keeping watch 
on govemment officials, reporters often feel uneasy about their dependence upon police 
agencies, for they do not want to serve as uncritical publicists for police practices. Thus, 
reporters  may temporarily abandon their dependence upon police during times of scandal, 
allowing other interested  groups  an opportunity  to  be  critical of  police  authority. 
Recognizing this, police are often suspicious of the news media and maintain a level of 
mistrust in their daily interaction with reporters (Chibnall, 1981; Garner, 1984). 
When faced with unfavorable media coverage, police agencies have traditionally 
adopted a reactive approach to dealing with news reporters by either withholding certain 
facts, cutting off access to particular reporters, or establishing a level of organizational 
secrecy (Ericson et al.,  1989).  In  this manner,  police have traditionally dealt with the 
media only informally and on an ad hoc basis,  untrained and unprepared to deal with 
media coverage of backstage behavior.  Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989)  summarize 
the sometimes-tense police-media relationship as a negotiation over the control of police 
news content. 
Unfortunately, police often  feel at a disadvantage in negotiations over the image 
of police in the media.  For one, police often feel that the news media have a bias against 
them.  (Reiner,1992).  A  survey  of  200  police  officers  conducted  by  Niederhoffer 
(1967:227) revealed that 95% of police respondents felt that newspapers, “seem to enjoy 
giving an unfavorable slant to news concerning the police.”  In addition, police feel that 
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the  news media have a  misunderstanding of  the role  of  law  enforcement in  society 
(Ziembo-Vogl, 1998), sensationalize violent crime incidents (Shunom, 1999), and fail to 
I 
assess organizational and budgetary constraints when reporting on the police.  Finally, in 
the words of Hubert Williams, former Chief of the Newark Police and now head of the 
Police Foundation, “the media’s mistake is to look at events, not aprogression of events”  i 
(quoted in Skolnick and McCoy, 1984543):  I 
Police-media relations reached a turning point in the late 1960s when, for the first 
time, images of civil disturbances in Watts, Detroit, Washington, D.C. and Chicago were 
broadcast across  the nation. Not only were police ill-equipped to handle protest on such a 
widespread scale, they were ill-prepared in coping with both media coverage of non- 
routine events as well as media coverage of unscripted police performance~.  With crime 
then the number one issue of concern among the public, President Johnson assembled a 
commission  to  investigate  current  criminal  justice  practices  and  provide 
recommendations for improvement. 
In  addressing  the  need  for  improved  policecommunity  relations,  the 
Commission’s (1967) Task Force Report: The Police encouraged police departments to 
establish an open dialogue with the press and other media, particularly through public 
information officers. 
Citizens who distrust the police will not easily be converted 
by  information programs they  consider to  come fiom  a 
tainted source.  However, even for these groups, long-tenn 
education based upon honest and fiee dialogue between the 
police and the public can have an effkct (p. 159). 
Commentators have suggested that negative coverage of police organizations adversely effects police 
performance by reducing oficer morale. Recently, a deputy police commissioner blamed the news media 
for an increase in the local murder rate, suggesting that negative coverage of police practices rendered the 
force less aggressive in their crime-fighting efforts (New York  Times, 1 1/5/99  A1 B6). 
4 
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Not  long after, the National  Commission on the  Causes and  Prevention of Violence 
(1  969) criticized media coverage of recent urban riots as being sensational, but added that 
the inability of law enforcement to communicate effectively With reporters, especially in 
I( 
times of crisis, was a contributing factor. 
The press  obtained much  factual  information about  the 
scale of the disorders -  property damage, personal injury, 
and  deaths  - from  local  officials,  who  often  were 
inexperienced  in  dealing  with  civil  disorders  and  not 
always able to sort out fact hm  rumor (p.  107). 
The  commission  went  on  to  recommend  that  law  enforcement  open  channels  of 
information to the news  media. 
Regular news conferences must be held .  . .  if they are  not, 
the press will  follow the sensational reports and fan the 
rumors.  Members of  the press,  as feasible,  should be 
permitted to . . .  share in [official] evaluations in order to 
provide the facts to the public quickly and authoritatively. 
Regular  formal  contacts  with  the  press  should  be 
augmented  by  hquent  background  briefings  for 
community leaders because rumors  flourish at all levels (p. 
113). 
In  1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 
report,  Police  advocated  that  police  agencies  promote  an  aggressive policy  on  of 
presenting public  information rather than merely responding to media inquiries.  To 
achieve this, police agencies should: 
Provide regular liaison between the agency and the media 
through an officer or unit, depending upon the size of the 
agency and the nature and frequency of local news media 
demands (p. 44). 
By the mid-l980s, police departments across the  country were reforming their 
organizational strategies.  Recognizing the limitations of preventive patrol  and reactive 
policing, police began to adopt a community-oriented approach based upon proactive 
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departments were encouraged to establish a media relations unit sked  by individuals 
trained in media relationships, with each unit having a well-developed media relations 
policy  (Illinois  Criminal  Justice  Information Authority,  1995).  To  date,  media  are 
considered essential for effective policing and  are referred to  as one of the “big six” 
groups  necessary  for  the  successhl  implementation  and  maintenance  of  police- 
community partnerships (Trojanowicz and Buquerowr, 1994). 
I 
I 
Media Relations Units & Public Information Officers 
A  media  relations  unit  is  an  office  within  the  police  organization that  is 
responsible for handling communication with the news media.  These offices are staffed 
by either civilian Public Information Officers (PIOs) having an educational background 
in journalism and  public relations,  or by  sworn  officers who  may  or may  not  have 
training in media communication.  These offices are thought to establish formal  relations 
with  members  of  the  news  media  so  that  law  enforcement  may  better  serve  the 
community through education of police practices and efforts.  Media relations offices 
also serve the interests of the police, who are in a better position to shape the content of 
police-crime news and exercise impression management. 
One of the first police-press offices was established in  1919 in Scotland Yard 
where  communications between  the  police  and  the  press  were  made  twice  daily. 
Journalists had been placing bribes to police for information, and it was reasoned that 
establishing formal ties with reporters would  curtail this  practice.  Of  course, police 
officials also hoped  that  by  providing the press with  information, they  could reduce 
opportunities for alternative interpretations of criminal events (Crandon, 1993). Through  a 
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and reporters relied upon leaks for crime news.  Between the 11945  appointment of Sir 
Harold  Scott  as Commissioner and  the  late  1960s, policemedia relations in  Britain 
fluctuated hm  the “golden age” of crime reporting to the eulogizing of the police in the 
press (Reiner, 1992). 
Then,  in 1972 Sir Robert Mark was appointed Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police.  Appointed at a time when the force was faced with scandal, Mark  decided that 
his force should have a relationship with the press marked by ah unprecedented level of 
openness.  Under his new policy, the police were to openly provide information to the 
media unless restricted by judicial order, to protect individual privacy, or to ensure the 
security of the state.  Police were to issue press cards for the purpose of identifying 
I 
accredited journalists, and officers likely to deal with the media on a regular basis were 
recommended to receive training in media relations (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). 
Mark’s  policy of openness with the media led  to the establishment of  formal 
police-media relations units, and his policies would serve as a model for police-media 
relations offices on an international scale.  In the early 1980s, a series of reports on the 
reorganization of the Metropolitan Toronto Police called for the establishment of a public 
affairs department whose responsibility would include the  development of improved 
relationships with the media.  The department was charged with the task of providing 
information “consistent with the legitimate needs of the media” as well as the distribution 
of  press  releases  and  the  development of police-media liaisons (Hickling-Johnston, 
1982). 
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Until recently, few  police agencies within  the United  States have had  formal 
media relations units or public information officers dealing specifically with news  media. 
As a result, little is known about the prevalence, responsibilities, training, and strategies 
of police-media relations offices and their PIOs in the United States.  This dissertation 
documents the prevalence of media strategies of police organizations that have adopted a 
proactive approach to dealing with the news media  More specifically, it focuses  on the 
role of the police media relations offices and public information officers in managing and 
shaping policdcrime news. 
Previous Research on  PIOs 
Traditional  studies  of the  crime news-making  process  suggest  that as news 
sources,  the police are highly selective in production of the hal  news product and are 
capable of exercising tight control over the interpretation of crime-related news events. 
For  example,  Sherizen (1978:205)  argues,  “only  the  crimes  that  meet  the  criteria 
established by bureaucratically and occupationally determined factors as  well as meet the 
monopoly official sources have over primary information are considered for selection as 
crime news.”  He suggests that crime news is police generated information, with law 
enforcement serving as the initial and primary crime news gatekeepers.  Maintaining 
privileged status as the primary source for crime information, Hall et al. (1  978) similarly 
suggest that the control police maintain over the content of crime news allows them to - 
in essence -  lobby for wider power for the purpose of adequately responding to the very 
issues they have placed on the public agenda.  Moreover, Chibnall(l981) contends that it 
is  the police oficer who is in a superior negotiating position with regard to the news 
selection process, because it is “the reporter’s world which is drawn towards that of the 
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that  discourse of  crime  is  essentially the  prerogative  of  police.  People  wishing 
knowledge about crime and its control are, accordingly, dependent upon official sources 
to provide reporters  with the necessary  incident information. 
While the police routinely maintain privileged status in the crime news-making 
process, they are by no means the only social pup  vyiqg to define social problems 
through news media.  With national headlines charging police with racism, excessive 
1 
force, and officer misconduct, it is clear that the tight hold on news that police have 
occasionally slips.  Unanticipated news items frequently come to the attention of beat 
reporters from sources operating outside of official channels.  Many times, these news 
events describe law enforcement engaging performances never intended for public view. 
When  this happens,  police  may  be  less forthcoming  with  incident information and 
reporters may be less willing to rely upon official interpretations.  At such times, non- 
official voices appear as routine and critical news sources working to project their own 
definitions of social events.  In short, previous research examining police-media relations 
focuses  upon  the  dynamics of  the  news-making process  during  the  Occmence of 
“routine”  news  events while  neglecting  the  presence  of  critical  voices  during  the 
appearance of un-staged police performances.  Yet  the news is not  so much a terrain 
exclusive to official definitions as it is a battleground where interpretations compete. 
Police are certainly at an advantage, but they are by no means immune to sneak attacks 
by opposing groups. 
One objective of the present research study is to document the means by which 
police struggle to maintain control over the interpretation of crime news events and 
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management, media relations offices and public information officek have emerged as a 
significant development in an attempt by  law enforcement to police their public image 
during times of both  routine  and  un-anticipated police practices.  To  date, however, 
research  examining the  role of PIOs and police media  strategies is limited.  Guffey 
(1 992) surveyed 34  police departments from a national samnle and interviewed 17 police 
chiefs for the purpose of eliciting proposals to improve police-media relations and, by 
extension, coverage of police practices.  Results fkom his survey indicated that all  police 
departments had  an appointed media spokesperson for the department,  although some 
worked only on a part-time or as needed.  Among the suggested proposals for improved 
media relations are the designation of a public information officer in all departments, the 
adoption of a media education-training program  for all officers, the development of a 
thorough media relations policy, and PI0  training in conflict resolution techniques. 
Surette and Richard (1 995)  surveyed PIOs  in Florida on  their hctions  within  the 
police  organization  and  their  training in  media.  They  found  that  half  of the PI& 
surveyed had prior experience working in the mass media,  and all received in-service 
training upon appointment.  Their primary responsibilities are to handle inquiries from 
the news media, to arrange media interviews with other agency personnel, to distribute 
press  releases,  and  to  conduct  press  conferences  and  serve  as  the  department 
spokesperson.  The authors found  that  much  PI0 time  is spent handling  non-media 
related tasks.  Thus, while PIOs  may be full-time employees, they deal with media often 
on a part-time basis.  The authors conclude that much of the work of the PIOs  surveyed is 
reactive in nature and does not entail prepackaging proactive news creation. 
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Mawby (1997) surveyed the 43 Home Office police forces in England and Wales 
as part of a research project investigating police public relations.  He found that 78% of 
forces reported having a media strategy whose stated objective is the promotion of the 
reputation of the force through both  public infomation and  public relations.  Sixty 
percent  (60%) of the media relations offices were staEed with  between one and  five 
employees, with 93% providing in-force media training.  Finally, Chermak and Weiss 
(1999) examined the efforts made by police departments in the United States to promote 
community  policing in  the  news.  They  surveyed PIOs fiom  239  law  enforcement 
agencies and  found  that  80% of the  departments had  at  least  one  hll-time  official 
responsible for media relations.  Each PI0  had  at least 50 hours of training in media 
relations.  To promote the police, PIOs  relied upon press releases and direct contacts with 
reporters.  Their study also surveyed media managers about their receptiveness to PI0 
initiated  stories of police innovations and  found  that  reporters were  able to provide 
coverage of police programs about 76% of the time. 
While these studies provide a first look at  police attempts to confonn to media 
demands, each approach is limited in scope.  For example, Surette and Richard (1995) 
administered their survey solely to PIOs working  for  Florida law  enforcement while 
Mawby’s  (1997) study surveyed law enforcement exclusively in the United Kingdom, 
thus  limiting the  ability  to  generalize their  findings  to  PIOs to  the  United  States 
nationally.  Guffey’s  (1992) study,  although  national  in  scale, was  designed to  elicit 
recommendations for improved media relations.  It did  not examine the various media 
strategies adopted  by police departments or the responsibilities and  training of police 
PIOs. Finally, Chermak & Weiss (1999) surveyed police PIOs on a national scale but 
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focused primarily on  police  attempts to  promote community-policing initiatives.  In 
addition, their method of data collection was limited to survey responses and did not 
include qualitative field data. 
If 
In  sum, the establishment of formal  police-media relations offices within the 
United States is a recent occurrence (Surette and Richard, 1995).  As such, there is still 
much to learn about the responsibilities of police-media relations office,  their public 
information officm, and the methods by which police promote their image through  mass 
media.  Research investigating the media strategies of police PIOs,  their  stafT training 
protocol, and their overall effectiveness of PIOs  remains limited.  This study documents 
the strategies used by police organizations to create a favorable public image and advance 
their organizational  goals in an era dominated by mediated police-citizen interaction. 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the role of police in the crime news-making process.  In 
doing  so, it  made  an  important  distinction between  routine news events and  those 
involving unanticipated accidents and scandal.  Routinely, police occupy a privileged 
position as primary news sources regarding crime information, and they occasionally use 
news coverage to their advantage, promoting new policing initiatives, requesting citizen 
assistance in crime prevention, or presenting their organizational ideologies to the public. 
The  news-making  process  shifts,  however,  during  the  occurrence of  accidents and 
scandals, which constitute non-staged performances that require journalists to abandon 
their dependence upon official sources for information. During these times, non-official 
voices that challenge police perspectives become part of the news-making process.  The 
police-media relationship, therefore, is routinely amicable but may change at any given 
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time.  To cope with unfavorable media coverage, and to  more effectively promote the 
police  image  as new  image-producing  technology  develops,  police  have  begun  to 
establish media relations offices staffed by trained public  information officers.  Today, 
media relations offices comprise an important component of modem policing. 
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CHAPTER4 
RESEARCH METHODS 
I need somebody . . .  to walk through  the police department 
and figure out [how to] sei1 it .  .  .  So strategically, I’m kind 
of looking for somebody to hand me  something that says 
‘here’s what  . . .  to do.’  Nobody’s proven to me that [we] 
can’t do an-g  different as opposed to doing something 
more. 
-Urbandale Police Chief 
(Author interview) 
Questions & Hypotheses 
Media Strategies 
Ideally, organizations are goal oriented, as goals provide the fiamework mud 
which  decisions  and  activities  are  directed  (Simon,  1976).  In  order  to  achieve 
organizational success, it is necessary for organizations to adopt a strategic model that 
will strive to guide administrative  behavior.  Among the strategic models that often prove 
necessary is one that addresses communication with and through the mass media.  For 
police,  media  communication has become  increasingly  important  as it  represents  a 
primary means by which law enforcement communicates with  constituents. As police are 
increasingly  featured  in  the  headlines  of  the  news  media,  organizational  strategies 
targeting  media  communication  should  successfully  guide  communicative behavior 
during routine events and -  perhaps more importantly -  during scandals when  non- 
performance behavior  is brought  to  the forefront.  Many  successful businesses and 
corporations adopt various media strategies during times of routine business and times of 
market crises. In fact, many of these strategies are reproduced in business texts and made 
available for trade view (Gottschalk, 1993). 
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Little is known,  however, about the media  strategies of police organizations. 
How many police departments have written media strategies? What is the nature of police 
media strategies?  What  are the communication objectives, and  how  do management 
situations  dictate  the  nature  of  police-media  relations?  wfio, within  the  police 
organization, communicates with the media,  and under what  conditions?  Are  media 
strategies effective in improving police-media relations and  in  guiding administrative 
behavior during times of non-routine events?  This research seeks to uncover the media 
strategies that most effectively allow police communicate with the news media during 
both times of routine events and accidents or scandal.  In doing so,  it tests the following 
I 
hypothesis: 
1.  The adoption of media strategies and PIOs by police departments represents 
an effective means of exercising impression management in terms of: 
(a) Greater satisfaction with department image 
(b)  Better preparation to communicate with news media 
(c) More proactive contacts with news media. 
Media Training 
The ability to deal effectively with media is related the amount of knowledge one 
has about the mass media and media formats.  Therefore, a person or organization that 
anticipates receiving fiequent media exposure should learn as much  as possible about 
media communications (National League of Cities, 1993).  In  an address delivered to a 
conference of police officials, O.W.  Wilson -  then Superintendent of Chicago Police - 
expressed  his  concern  regarding  the  inability  of  police  officials  to  communicate 
effectively with the public through the mass media: 
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[Tlhe police are not a scholarly group, skilled in presenting 
the police point of view.  The literature in consequqnce is 
principally devoted to the case against the police'; little has 
been written in their defense . . .  Small wonder that those 
who read the papers . . . conclude that the police are evil 
(Wilson, 1963:  176). 
I 
It stands to reason that training in media skills and formats is essential to effective 
police public relations, and police officials are beginning to advocate and initiate officer 
training  in  media  skills  (Garner, 1984,  1987;  National  Highway  Traflic  Safety 
Administration,  1992; Vance,  1997).  Many departments are even hiring civilians with 
educational and work experience in media to serve as department spokespersons (Surette 
& Richard,  1995).  Yet  little is known about the content of police training in  media 
relations, or about the efficacy of hiring civilian media specialists.  What is the nature of 
police training in media formats, and  who within the police organization receives training 
in media relations?  How important is media training to the success of media strategies 
and the performance of police PIOs?  Are PIOs with educational and  work experience  in 
media more effective in proactively promoting their agency's agenda and image?  This 
research tests a second hypothesis: 
2.  There is a positive association between the amount of police training in media 
relations and the ability of a department to exercise impression management, 
as measured through: 
(a) More proactive contacts With media 
(b) Greater success in havhg police story suggestions realized 
(c) Better media image. 
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Effectiveness 
Recognizing the importance of impression management to their law emforcement 
objectives, police  agencies have begun to adopt a more open  and  direct approach to 
,I 
media communication.  This approach includes the formation of a written media policy, 
the implementation of in-service training in media skills for police  officials,  and  the 
appointment of a PI0 (often with a background in media relations) to both handle media 
inquiries and market the police  organization.  The  goal  of  this new  approach is  to 
improve the working relationship between police and members of the news  media, to 
better Mom  the public of police initiatives, to offset potentially damaging news items, 
and to shape a favorable media image of police. 
Given the sometimes-volatile role of the news source stemming hm  the “fourth 
estate” mandate of the press, it is likely that under certain conditions, police PIOs and 
their media strategies will be of little utility in offsetting negative publicity or presenting 
the police organization in a manner favorable to the police administration.  While news 
reporting typically reinforces the status quo by affording public officials routine access to 
media,  journalists have autonomy to reinterpret or alter their source considerations at a 
given time, allowing alternative voices to enter the forum of public discourse (Molotch 
and  Lester,  1974; Gam,  1979; Bennett,  1990; Lawrence,  1996).  This is particularly 
likely to occur during times of elite conflict and official debate over the interpretation of 
accidents,  or  when  officials  themselves  are  implicated  in  scandal  (Bennett,  1990; 
Lawrence,  1996).  Thus, a reporter from the Los Angeles Times noted that police are 
critical of the news media because,  in the view of police, “stories on police shootings 
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often quote eyewitnesses critical of the police more prominently than they  quote the 
' police version of what happened" (Shaw, 1987:152).  e 
How  effective are PIOs and  their media strategies in  improving police-media 
relations?  Do police feel that reporters are receptive to law enforcement input into the 
I 
policdcrime news-making  process?  To  what  extent are police initiatives (i.e.,  press 
releases, interviews granted, invitations for ride-alongs, story suggestions) regarding the 
content of policdcrime news realized through  media coverage?  Do police officials feel 
better equipped to deal with negative media coverage of  accident or scandal situations 
given a formal media strategy and spokesperson? Have certain media strategies proven 
more successful than other strategies? The final hypothesis tested by this research states 
that: 
3.  Police departments will face greater challenges in  promoting their image 
during times of elite conflict, scandal, or official debate. 
That is, the effectiveness of police PIOs and media strategies will vary according to the 
prevailing political, organizational and situational climate. 
Survey Data 
Given the limited available information regarding police media relations offices 
and PIOs in the United  States, this study administered a  self report mail  survey to 
municipal  law enforcement agencies nationwide to  obtain information regarding the 
nature and quality of police media relations. The survey was sent to departments serving 
areas with a population of 100,000 residents or greater, since these departments are more 
likely to  have  fi-equent contacts with  the news  media  (Skolnick  and  McCoy,  1984; 
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Chermak and Weiss, 1999).  A list of departments that comprised the sampling &e 
was be obtained hm  the 1999 National Directory of Law Enforcehent Administrators, 
published by the National Public Safety and Information Bureau.  This  directory contains 
over 37,000 department profiles covering eighteen levels of jurisdiction (i.e.,  municipal, 
county, federal, corrections) and includes such information as municipality population,  I 
number of serving officers, and the name of the acting department chief. 
The purpose of the survey was  to gather information regarding the strategies 
employed by various police departments to promote and  enhance their image through 
media and their perceived eff’ectiveness,  as reported by  police officials.  Survey items 
identified, among other factors: (1) the presence and nature of a formal department media 
strategy; (2) the prevalence of hll-time police PIOS, (3) PI0 background characteristics, 
including educationallvocational training in media, journalism or public relations; (4) 
specific goals of police media relations offices and PI&;  (5) the various methods by 
which these goals are achieved, and (6) the perceived quality of police-media interaction, 
the police image, and the public information office both before and after the adoption of 
the current media strategy. 
At  this point, a word  should be said  about the use  of self-report surveys to 
evaluate departmental behavior.  Traditionally, self-report surveys have been criticized 
for their inability to establish reliability andor validity of findings, for their inability to 
adequately measure behavior among a target population (e.g.,  “true” delinquents rather 
than “school” delinquents), and skepticism about the willingness of respondents to report 
wrongdoing or unlawfbl behavior (see Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis,  1981). Fortunately 
for this study, the total popuiation -  municipal police departments -  was known,  leaving  e 
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primarily  concerns  about  reliability and  truthfulness.  Undoubtedly,  assessments of 
departmental performance may vary with  the rank  of the respondent  completing the 
0 
survey  and  the  experiences  that  come with  the  respective  roles.  By  chance,  one 
department  submitted  two  surveys,  each  completed by  a  diffaent  member  of  the 
,I 
department occupying a different rank (one a chief, one his PIO).  A test of reliability 
between the two completed surveys on fourteen different evaluation-based items yielded 
an alpha index of .9423.  Finally, regarding the truthhhess of survey responses, each 
respondent was informed of complete confidentiality regarding department and  personnel 
names and ranks.  As the purpose of the survey specified its intent to gather information 
for the improvement of police-media relations, respondents were encouraged to provide 
critical, yet truthfbl  responses. 
All surveys were addressed to the highest-ranking official within the department, 
asking Mer  to respond to the survey personally or to have the survey completed by a 
member of the department who could accurately represent the views of the top police 
0 
official.  Each respondent was  asked to provide a complete evaluation of department 
police-media  relations  and  was  assured complete  confidentiality of  all  information 
provided.  A  pretest  of  the  survey instrument  was mailed  to  all  municipal  police 
departments serving areas having a population of 90,OOO  -  99,999 residents (N=31) and 
revealed questionnaire items requiring minor revision.  The final survey was mailed in 
the spring of 2000 and yielded a response rate of 76% (194/255).  Of the respondents, 
48% were the department PIOs, 19% were chiefs themselves, 4% worked directly under 
the chief, and the remaining 29% was comprised of various ranks.  A copy of the survey 
instrument is provided in the research appendices.  a 
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Data analysis 
Univariate analyses will assess the prevalence of police media relations offices 
and  PI&,  police  media  policies,  and  police  media  training  among  municipal  law 
enforcement agencies nationwide.  Bivariate analyses of the survey data determined the 
relationships between independent and  dependent variables.  Specifically, chi-square 
e*)  coefficients assess the relationships between various survey items.  As a result of 
little  covariance  among  key  independent  variables,  multivariate  analysis  proved 
unnecessary to control for the independent contributions of factors predicted to influence 
media power.  For example, the crime rate was not found to be significantly associated 
with any other independent variable thought to influence impression management, such 
as the presence of a police PI0  or whether police media training is offered to police staff. 
t 
Site Observations 
Information  garnered  fiom  the  national  survey  was  used  to  identify  police 
departments to serve as ethnographic case studies.  While the case study approach has 
been criticized for its lack of representativeness  or generalizability, it proves usefbl for its 
explanatory power and ability to clarify previously reported events (GAO,  1990). As a 
complement to survey data, it contributes to  a more comprehensive perspective on a 
given  phenomenon  by  allowing the  researcher to  document  social processes in  the 
context of actual situations (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973).  For this project, the goal of 
case study research was to document the various community events that -  through their 
extensive coverage in the news -  require police to incorporate various media strategies to 
their routine law enforcement practices.  Specifically, do police have iterative or planned 
responses  to  various media  events?  If so, who within the  department shapes these  a 
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responses? To what extent do city officials, such as mayors or city attorneys, determine 
the content of police-crime news?  In what ways do social  media)  events fi-ame 
police behavior, influence the flow of information accessible to reporters, and result in 
information being withheld hm  the public through official “gate-keeping” channels? 
Finally, what are the daily patterns of police PI0 work,  and how do non-routine events  I 
impact the nature of their work or their work product? 
To  identify possible departments for case study research, responses to various 
survey items were used to comprise a scale assessing the strength of department “media 
power.”  The selection of case sites was purposive, favoring agencies reflecting strong 
variation in the extent to which they meet the demands of the media market. Specifically, 
three response criteria were used to  assess department media power:  (1)  the perceived 
quality of  police-reporter  interaction; (2) the perceived  quality of  public  opinion 
surrounding the department; and (3) the perceived quality of the department’s image as 
projected in media coverage. Media power, therefore, may be summarized as follows: 
MEDIA POWER =  (police/media interaction) + (public opinion) + (image) 
Ordinal responses to each of these assessments were assigned a numerical code (poor =  0, 
fair = 1, good  = 2, excellent = 3).  Departments with total scores of less than 6  were 
coded as “low media power” agencies, as at least one of their answers indicates responses 
of less than “good.”  All other departments were coded as “high media power” agencies. 
Table 4.1 presents an overview of  “media power” variance  among municipal police 
departments within the United States. 
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Table 4.1. a  Media Power" Variance Among Municipal Police Departments 
VARIABLE  FREQUENCY  PERCENT  CUMULATIVE 
PERCENT 
Image 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
Public Opinion 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
Interaction 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
- 
24 
99 
59 
- 
15 
94 
73 
- 
7 
96 
76 
Media Power 
Low  28 
Medium  125 
High  41 
'- 
13% 
54%  I 
32% 
- 
4% 
54% 
42% 
15% 
64% 
21% 
- 
13% 
67% 
100% 
- 
8% 
60% 
100% 
- 
4% 
58% 
100% 
15% 
79% 
100% 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 59 
0’ 
One of the concerns in conducting a self-report assessment of police performance 
is the potential for selection bias among police respondents.  Specifically, the possibility 
existed that a chief pleased with media coverage is likely to hand the survey off  to a PIO, 
where a chief dissatisfied might be more inclined to fill out the questionnaire hidherself. 
Figure 4.1 presents a comparison of perceptions of the police media image according to 
rank.  It  reveals  an equal proportion  of  chiefs hm  f&,  good,  and excellent  image 
departments serving as survey respondents.  Because few departments evaluated their 
practices as less than successfd, there was much confidence regarding the validity of low 
media power responses, since respondents had nothing to gain or lose by attempting to 
save face.  A total of 28 agencies (15%) comprised the “low media power‘‘  departments. 
The low power sites selected for site visits were chosen -  in part -  as a response to their 
open-ended survey  responses, which  indicated  concern  over  their  inability to  work 
effectively with the media and a request for study findings  when finished. 
Identifying “high media power” case sites, however, proved more of a challenge, 
as responses tended to cluster around the high-end of the scale.  For example, 54% 
(N=99)  of  departments reported having  a “good”  media  image,  while  another  32% 
(N=59) indicated having an “excellent” image.  Responses to questions targeting public 
opinion and the  quality of police-reporter interaction were  similarly distributed  in  a 
skewed fashion.  Moreover, a total of  41 departments (21%) received a maximum score 
of 9, while the remaining departments had scores ranging between 6-8.  To narrow the 
list of possible “high media power” departments to select as case studies while increasing 
confidence in the validity of responses, additional items that  appeared to substantiate 
department assessments (e.g., newspaper clippings favorable of departrnent practices;  0 
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Figure 4.1. Police Perceptions of Their Department’s Media Image, According to Respondent Rank 
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SOPS  detailing  media  protocol;  the  breadth  of  open-ended  responses  designed  to 
substantiate  self-evaluations) were  reviewed  to  provide  a  mor;  focused  sample of 
departments.  For example, one of the “high media power” agencies selected for study 
aflixed to the questionnaire a copy of their department media policy (numbering some 20 
pages  long).  Such  documents were  considered  as evidence  of  the  strength of  the  / 
department’s self-assessment.  Ultimately, the two departrqents that exhibited the most 
evidence of “high media power” gamered scores of 6 on the media power scale. 
A total of four police agencies were selected to  Serve as case studies for site 
observations,  with  only  one  of  the  initially  approached  departments  declining to 
parti~ipate.~  All departments agreed in advance to four day site Visits,  allowing the 
author to observe PI0  work patterns, police-media interaction both within the department 
and  in  the  field,  and allowing  for  the  review  internal  training  and  work-related 
documents.  Case study evaluations, therefore, entailed the review of multiple sources of 
information,  including  administrative documents and  standard operating  procedures, 
police press releases and the resulting news products, transcripts hm  interviews with 
police PIOs, chiefs,  news  editors and  reporters,  and  personal  field notes of  various 
observations.  All case site observations occurred during the Fall 2OOO.  Approximately 
100 hours of field observations was conducted across the four research sites and included 
interviews with PIOs, police chiefs, and  local news editors, beat reporters, and media 
camera crew.  Table 4.2 provides a summary of the four case department characteristics. 
Below is a detailed description of each case site. 
This  department was to sene  as one of the “low media power” case sites. In the months prior to receiving 
my request, the department was involved in  a high-profile political event that resulted in the appointment of 
a new chief, as well as a new PI0  staff.  The department, therefore, felt it best to forgo participation in case 
study research during their current circumstances. 
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Media 
Population  Crime*  Training  Opinion  Relations  Image 
Department  City  Violent  PI0  Staff  # Hours  Public  Media 
Morganville  1  ,OOO,OOO+  29 1  4  16  Fair  Fair  Fair 
Union Creek  500,000+  1202  2 
Spring Lake  500,000+  1235  3 
NfA  Fair  Fair  Fair 
NfA  Good  Good  Good 
Urbandale  400,000+  2192  6  40+  Good  Good  Good 
~~ 
‘Number of violent crimes per 100,000 city residents. Uniform Crime Reports (1999). 
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Urbandale Police Department 
Describing themselves as “one of the leading law  enforcement agencies in the 
~~untry,”  the Urbandale Police Department is also a leader in terms of media power. 
Located within a jurisdiction having a population of roughly a half-million residents, the 
department is nevertheless housed in one of the largest media markets nationwide.  On 
average,  its PI0 staff (comprised of three full-time sworn officers and three civilian 
support stail) field media inquires from 27  different reporters representing as  many as 24 
media outlets.  To meet the demands of this concentrated media market, the PIOs  receive 
40 hours per year of formal media training through external coursework. Here,  they learn 
to rehearse media sound bites, parade charged suspects, and plan ahead for “the big one”, 
a euphemism for the inevitable police scandal. Moreover,  because the city is home to a 
large Hispanic constituency, the PI0  staff is almost entirely bilingual, allowing them to 
provide daily sound bites and press releases in both English and Spanish to accommodate 
local Hispanic media  Finally, the PI0 office maintains its own  news library, containing 
department-related paper  clipphgs and  videotapes of  local  news  broadcasts that  are 
recorded by the 13 televisions and video recorders set up within their office.  As part of 
their daily function, the PIOs review the new additions to their library, critiquing the 
quality of their performances by monitoring both the sound-bites given and the image(s) 
projected by their on-screen presence. 
I 
In terms of their media strategy, their approach to communicating with members 
of news media is two-fold.  On one front, the PI0 staff serves as media spokespersons for 
the  department,  providing  reporters with  information  about  crimes  and  other  law 
enforcement related activities.  Therefore, as explained to me by the senior-ranking PIO:  a 
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We usually respond to scenes where media is present.  It is 
to  our advantage  to  get  a  first hand  knowledge ,of the 
situation, so that we can report it accurately.  That’s why 
we are on-call 24/7.  Naturally, there are times when it’s 
not practical to respond; however, more times than not, we 
are there, especially if the scene is a major one.  (Author 
interview) 
To  avoid  the  impression that  they  are mere  talking  heads,  Urbandale PI&  do not  I 
themselves handle media appearances exclusively; instead,,  they may defer comment to 
the crime scene commander or responding officer while providing the rank and file with 
logistical assistance.  Regardless of who within the department communicates, the goal is 
to provide media with assistance at each scene where reporters will likely be  present. 
On a second brit,  Urbandale PIOs engage in pactive and notably create public 
relations to “sell” the image of the department, its crime prevention initiatives, and to 
increase the “community” aura of Urbandale policing.  During my stay at the department, 
one Urbandale PI0 (“Daryl”) made a “mystery guestdeejay” appearance on a popular 
morning radio show.  Listeners were given an opportunity to call into the station and 
place a yedno question in an attempt to guess the celebrity identity.  Winners received 
two fiont-row concert tickets with limousine service to the show.  When a caller quickly 
identified “Daryl” by name  and  occupation, I was  told that  this should come  as no 
surprise, as his fi-equent media appearances allowed him  to have been previously been 
voted “one of television’s sexiest men” by a local news morning show (George Clooney 
was apparently the odds on favorite). 
The Urbandale Police Department had been involved in a high profile news event 
that  placed  the department at  the  center of international media coverage, politically 
divided the city’s leadership, and ultimately led in the resignation of the department’s 
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chief.  Interestingly, five months into the new chief‘s administration, the city issued its 
final report on the incident, concluding that “the [Urbandale] Police Department, which 
has been criticized by some for over-reacting, actually handled the . .  .  demonstrations 
I 
with professionalism and restraint”  (Newspaper #002209).  While the report did criticize 
some aspects of police conduct, it also criticized members of the city leadership: ‘Wo 
elected city official should ever interfere, directly or indirectly, with police officers or 
their commanders at the scene of a disturbance” (report quoted in Newspaper #002209). 
This report -  issued during my stay at the department -  served as a final chapter on this 
politically charged event, providing Urbandale officers with a sense of closure. 
Despite recent events, survey responses provided  by the Urbandale PI0  stafT 
indicate a high level of confidence in  their media performance. That is,  they report 
favorable police-reporter interaction and, in general, a positive media image.  To be sure, 
part of their positive image may be the result of a six-year decline in Part  I Offenses 
within their jurisdiction and, more specifically, a 39%  decline in reported homicides 
between 1997-1999  (US.  Department of  Justice, 2O00).  Nevertheless, their jurisdiction 
possesses the highest violent crime rate of the four case sites, providing the PIOs with 
many events to address through media.  During the four-day period of my site visit, I 
accompanied the PIOs  to several breaking crime scenes, including a hit-and-run (possible 
homicide scene) and a triple stabbindattempted murder involving Victims as young as 
five-years of age.  I also watched as the PI0  staff prepared and conducted two crime 
prevention press conferences and prepared official responses to two additional incidents 
that occurred during my stay: the discovery of a murder victim and failed suicide attempt 
by  a juvenile.  Later, when  the driver of the hit-and-run  vehicle was  identified  and 
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66 
apprehended, I watched  as the PI0 staff consulted with the homicide unit, released a 
suspect mug shot, and notified local camera crews of the unofficially scheduled suspect 
walk-through  fiom  police  headquarters  to  the  county  jail,  as  learned  in  training 
coursework.6  Finally, I was able to monitor PI0 behavior during downtime in between 
news cycles when officers prepared human interest or crimestopper stories, followed up  I 
on previous press releases, or consulted with the Chief on uwoming public appearances. 
Spring Lake Police Department  , 
Also  located  in a  city with  a  half  million residents,  the  Spring Lake Police 
Department serves a media market that  is  about  half that  of Urbandale Police,  With 
approximately 16 beat reporters employed by  9 different media organizations.  As  a 
result, their PI0 staff is significantly smaller, consisting of one full-time lieutenant who 
works exclusively on fielding mda  inquiries and responding to crime-related events. 
Two additional officers are responsible for producing the department’s “crime-stoppers” 
media campaign, which airs weekly on a local broadcast affiliate. Finally, one additional 
staff member  drafts official departmental reports regarding police operations, budgets, 
and other administrative matters for release to both the mayor’s office andor local media. 
Although the city’s population is slightly larger than that of Urbandale, its violent 
crime rate is nearly 50% less.  It has similarly experienced a sharp decline in Index 
offences and homicides -  both down roughly 23% in  the past three years. This  does not 
IF According to the PI0 staK  a recent Court of Appeals decision criticized law enforcement for staging 
certain media events, such as the recommended parading of suspects in front of cameras.  Apparently, a 
suspect successhlly sued local law enforcement for unduly detaining him because camera crews had yet to 
arrive to document the suspect in handcuffs and being transported to the local jail.  When news  media 
finally arrived, a camera operator complained of not getting a “good-shot”, causing law enforcement to 
subsequently conduct a second walk-through.  The Circuit Court decision, within whose jurisdiction the 
UPD  is situated, declared staged walk-throughs unduly burdensome on  criminal suspects. 
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mean, however, that the PI0  believes his office to be adequately staffed to address media 
coverage of crime within the city,  for he alone is on-call 24 hok  each day and is 
responsible for handling all requests for infomation himself.  The  Spring Lake Police 
Department also dispatches a PI0 to handle all attention-grabbing crime scenes.  While 
the PI0 had much downtime during my four-day visit, we were called to the scene of a  I 
hostage standoff during the last evening of my stay that begap at midnight and concluded 
at approximately 6am the following morning.  By the end of my  observations, the PI0 
had been working for nearly 36 straight hours,  going home only to  shave and change 
clothes for his next media appearance.  Just hours after the hostage situation, the Spring 
Lake PI0 was relieved to receive a call on his car-phone while in route to a local high 
school where shots were rumored to have been fired that the school’s PI0 would be 
handling the case. 
In marked contrast to the high level of formal media training received by the 
Urbandale PI0 staff, the  Spring Lake does not provide its PI0 staff with training in 
media communication, instead approaching media relations on more of an ad hoc basis. 
As an  example, the Spring Lake Police had received much  criticism within the  local 
media just prior  to my  visit.  The department had  responded in not gear to a rally 
consisting of some 300 protesters marching in support of organized labor.  On the day of 
the  event,  the  recently  appointed chief suggested in  a local  paper  that  some of  the 
protestors were dressed like anarchists and that, given this, the level of police response 
was both appropriate and displaying of “restraint” and that “I think our officers did a 
splendid job” (Newspaper #001005). Yet  the  department quickly changed its opinion 
after extensive and damaging media attention showed unarmed community protestors met  0 
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by police presence dressed for combat.  Less than two months later in  the department’s 
own final report, the chief noted that “squad integrity was lost fkquently throughout the 
day” as officers and  sergeants  failing to  act  as a planned  unit.  In  addition,  the 
department’s  report  suggested  that  officers  deployed  so-called  bean  bag  bullets 
‘inappropriately,”  and  that  problems  with  the public address  communication system 
prevented protestors hm  hearing police orders (Official document #001010). 
, 
Despite  this  incident,  the  Spring  Lake  Police  reports having  “a  very  good 
relationship with the media overall” and satisfaction with  both its media image and public 
opinion surrounding the quality of the department.  This opinion perhaps stems in large 
part from the department’s high degree of community policing initiatives.  And it is their 
community policing initiatives that largely shape the mpe  of the department’s proactive 
media initiatives.  Known as a progressive department in the area of policecommunity 
partnerships,  the  department  hosts  a  bi-weekly  “Chiefs  Forum”  task  force  with 
representatives hm  an array of local community groups in attendance.  The meetings 
(one of  which I attended) are not only broadcast on a local public access channel, they are 
also open to the public who are provided with an opportunity to address the chief directly. 
Finally, and in addition to the locked-in, weekly “~~i~ne-st~ppers”  segment broadcast on a 
local  network,  the  PI0 often  appears  on the  local  news  interacting  with  various 
community organizations. While watching television in the hotel lobby the evening prior 
to  beginning  my  observations,  I noticed  the  department  PI0 on  the  evening  news 
participating in a game of wheel-chair basketball to promote an awareness of the abilities 
of the disabled. 
/ 
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, Morganville Police Department 
Admittedly, media relations surrounding the Morganville Police Department “are 
not that good at this time.”  According to a lieutenant who heads the public information 
office, members of the  local media fkequently ‘kat us up  about how  bad we  are,” 
producing a media image that is tarnished and, they feel, somewhat undeserving. Despite 
having reported  to receive  16  hours of media training per  year,  I  learned  through 
interviews with the PI0 staff  that none of their current employees underwent any formal 
training in media communication skills, and that external yearly training (totaling an 
average of 16 hours of instruction) had not been attended in  several years.  As such, the 
PI0 staff indicated difficulty finding “qualified people who know how to deal with the 
press.”  Their survey responses suggest a media image somewhexe between “paor” and 
“fair” while stating that they are taking steps to improve relations with reporters through 
a more open media policy. 
Media relations are not a priority for the Morganville Police Department; as such, 
they admittedly have no media-related strategy or approach to improve or enhance their 
image.  While they do produce a weekly crime prevention video, which airs on a local 
channel, they do not dispatch a PI0 to handle every media-covered incident, though they 
do require that a PI0  be on-call at all times.  Moreover, proactive contacts to media with 
story suggestions, press releases and news tips are admittedly lacking.  In fact, it was very 
difficult to observe police-media relations firsthand while in Morganville,  as the PI0 
office decided not to dispatch spokespersons to the several crimes that occurred during 
my stay in the city.  In addition, the department has recorded phone line, updated daily, 
which  provides reporters with information about ongoing investigations.  Thus, it was 
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difficult to observe any police-media encounters (even mediated via phone) because this 
recorded message service trumps any live interaction. 
Approximately  nine  months  prior  to  my  visit,  the  Morganville police chief 
“abruptly retired” after serving for eighteen months.  According to a newspaper account, 
“Controversy has plagued  [the  Chiefs] tenure,”  which  included allegations that the  I 
1,400-member  police  force  had  been  engaged  in  “excessive  force,  cronyism  and 
unscrupulous  recruiting”  (Newspaper  #o00902).  The public  information  office, 
therefore, had much to work toward with regard to impression management despite the 
12%  decrease  in  index  crimes  over  the  last  three  years  and  a  9%  decrease in 
murder/manslaughter (U.S.  Department of Justice, 2000).  Yet the PI0 staff was of€en 
reluctant to openly speak with reporters, whether the story was about official misconduct 
or a routine crime investigation.  Instead, they operate in secrecy, complaining that the 
amount of information they provide to reporters “will never be  enough.  With more 
accessibility, they will just up the ante.”  Still, the newly appointed chief expressed his 
commitment to be more open with  members of the news media.  In  fact, my  visit 
coincided with a police-media forum where local reporters sat down with Morganville 
officials to express their concerns over the department’s media policies.  Approximately 
thirty-five reporters, assignment editors and camera operators were in attendance. 
Union Creek Police Department 
The  city  of  Union  Creek  is  one marked  by  a  strong mayoral  figure,  who 
ultimately determines the approach with which the police staff approach media relations. 
City administration exercises tight control over public records requests, which greatly 
slows down the  flow of information while the city’s  legal  department reviews each 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 71 
application.  Therefore, neither the chief nor the PI0 complained of inadequate stafing, 
the absence of media training, or overly aggressive reporters.  Instead, the Chief -  who 
completed the survey -  complained of a poor working relationship with reporters, a poor 
media  image,  and  therefore,  a  lack  of public  support for the  department in general 
resulting fbm  the policies and politics of the city administration. 
The mayor  is currently serving his third tem that  he won  handily,  while the 
previous election saw him run unopposed.  He therefore has strong public support that 
provides him  an opportunity for strong leadership and agenda setting.  As a political 
appointee of a popular mayor, the Union Creek Police Chief has a difficult job.  As one 
Union Creek newspaper reporter explained to me: 
The mayor has had six chiefk  in eleven years . . .  Chief 
tenure trends are getting shorter.  It’s shitty.  The chief‘s  in 
a tough spot.  I think the mayor has publicly embarrassed 
the chief before.  And there are all these rumors that he’s 
going to resign or get fired. (Author interview) 
As an example of what he called “political posturing,” the reporter relayed the following 
experience of what he felt was the mayor’s use of a police scandal for political gain. 
TV  news had a case on tape, a big car chase.  The  guy gets 
out, the cop cuffs him, and it looks like the cop was beating 
this guy up.  In  the end,  the cop was  suspended but no 
criminal charges were filed.  The prosecutor decided not to 
file criminal charges.  [When  I interviewed the chief the 
morning after the video aired],  he said, ‘Well, you know, I 
think  there  is  racism,  there  is  a  problem  with  police 
brutality,  and in this example you  saw  on the news last 
night, it’s going to show that there is a problem.’  And  it 
struck me: it’s 12 hours after the car chase video has aired, 
internal  affairs  hasn’t  even  gotten  a  panel  together  to 
investigate, I would think that the mayor would say, ‘Well, 
we’re  investigating it, and we’re going to see if there is a 
problem  and  deal with  it,  if not  . . .,  Well,  the  mayor 
doesn’t  do that.  The  mayor  says right  away  ‘presumed 
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guilty,’  which I just thought was  interesting.  I wouldn’t 
expect a mayor to do that. (Author interview)  I 
The  department  employs  one  full-time  PI0 and  one  back-up  spokesperson 
responsible for fielding media inquiries fiom the thirteen different news organizations 
within the city.  Although new to the position, the Union Creek PI0  was excited about 
her job, remarking about the tremendous responsibility she felt representing the  1,800 
men and women who serve in the department.  In tum, local reporters expressed respect 
for the Union  Creek PIOs, recognizing the role that city politics play.  One broadcast 
reporter  indicated that ‘‘things  have gotten bette?‘  since the  current PI0 took  charge 
despite city politics: 
[She] is very reachable; she can be reached 24 hours a day. 
me  Union Creek]  PI0 is very good at getting back to you 
. . . I  think  that  police-media  relations  have  improved 
dramatically in the last few months.  I think that was the 
case  a time  ago where  nothing  was  released  unless the 
mayor gave his approval, but I think that has dramatically 
improved.  If you call the PI0 and say, “hey,  thm  was a 
double murder last night,  what happened?’  She will have 
the information for you in a timely fashion.  When  it comes 
to  routine  police  cases  and  investigations,  things  have 
improved dramatically.  When it comes to, we want to see 
someone’s personnel files or we want to see files that the 
administration would have to give their stamp of approval, 
or  fkedom  of  information  act  requests  take  a  while. 
(Author interview) 
Despite the tight reign placed on the department and its public information officer, it is 
the Chiefs firm belief that “virtually everythmg we do should be public record,”  and the 
department takes steps to be as open with reporters as possible despite city politics. 
The timing of my visit to the Union Creek Police Department made it difficult for 
me to observe the Union Creek PI0  at work.  In fact, on the morning of  my first day, the 
Union Creek PI0 received notification (via her paging system) that a jury had returned a 
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verdict on a case involving a Union Creek officer shot and killed in the line of duty. 
While the city prosecutor’s office was handling all public information responsibilities 
regarding this case, the police PI0  was nevertheless at the courtroom for the unsealing of 
the verdict, both out of curiosity and to provide assistance to any police commenting on 
this (potentially) capital case.  Therefore, my first day was spent in a courtroom, waiting 
for reporters to arrive while observing the Union Creek PIO,  who was herself observing 
the prosecutor’s office respond to the outcome of this highly publicized trial.  When  the 
verdict came back “guilty,” this not only ensured a bifurcated case, but also that this story 
would dominate the news for the duration of my  visit,  providing the police PI0 with 
somewhat of a temporary respite from her usual duties. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ROUTINE EVENTS 
I 
I was  recently at a big policing convention a few months 
ago  where  many  officers  hm  small-town  departments 
were in attendance.  When  the officers were sitting around 
talking about police-media relations, they were surprised to 
hear how we  do business in our department.  One of the 
officers actually said to me,  ‘You mean yoy actually call 
media and tell them about crime in your city?‘‘ 
-Public Information Oj5cer 
Urbandale  Police Department 
(Author notes) 
Although  a common  measure  of police  success,  a city’s  crime rate does not 
necessarily make or break a police department’s media image.  Rather, stories about 
crime have become rather “routine” news events that more often focus upon victims and 
suspects than about justice system personnel (Graber, 1980).  Moreover, the typical crime 
story often reflects positively upon police by portraying them as crime fighters actively 
pursuing a case or making an arrest  (Chermak, 1998).  Of come, perceptions of the 
police image do vary  inversely with extremes in  the  crime rate,  yet  the  covariance 
between  these two factors does not rise to the level of statistical significance. 
To be  sure, table 5.1 presents a cross-tabulation of police municipality violent 
crime rates (in quintiles) and police assessments of their department’s media image.  As 
is evident, police perceptions (Le., “fair“ and “excellent”) do co-vary With extreme crime 
rates (i.e.,  “low” and “high”), as departments in low crime communities are less likely to 
assess their image as fair than departments in higher crime municipalities.  Similarly, 
I 
departments in lower crime municipalities are more likely to report an “excellent” image 
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Perceived Image  Violent Crime Rste Level in Quintiles 
Low  _____+  Med.  _____+  High 
Excellent  45%  44%  34%  22%  23% 
(14)  (14)  (1 1)  (7)  (7) 
X2=1 1.3  18 (Not significant) 
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than are departments in higher crime municipalities.  Nevertheless, chi-square analysis 
does not reveal a statistically significant relationship, and  this hoids true whether the 
crime rate is divided into quintiles or deciles. 
This finding is not too surprising, given what content analyses have indicated as 
the  inconsistency between crime statistics and crime within  the news  (Davis,  1951; 
Fishman, 1978; Hall et al.,  1981).  With little fluctuation among city papers and evening 
broadcasts regarding the proportion of crime stories reported each day, and high and low 
crime communities appear indistinguishable in the headlines of local news (Gerber and 
Gross,  1976;  Dominick,  1978;  Graber,  1980).  Simply put,  violence  in  the  media 
represents a constant that -  despite actual varying crime rates -  homogenizes the police 
media image. As such, it fails to significantly influence the quality of the police media 
image.  Moreover, while other predictors similarly co-vary as expected with extremes in 
the crime rate (i.e., media training is less likely to be offered in low crime municipalities 
and more likely offered in higher crime municipalities), the crime rate was not found to 
be  significantly associated with  any  other independent variable thought to  influence 
impression management, such as the presence of a police PI0 (Table 5.2) or whether 
andor what kind of media training is offixed police staff (Table 5.3).  Therefore, some 
other variable or variables must contribute to the quality of the police image.  Perhaps it 
is not crime itself as much as the manner with crime is communicated. 
1 
Making Crime Routine 
With criminal justice research describing much of everyday policing as leisurely, 
peaceful, and bureaucratic (Wilson, 1968; Reis Jr., 1971 ;  Sykes and Brent, 1983; Walker, 
1983; Goldstein, 1990; Skolnick, 1994), it is somewhat inappropriate to refer to the actual  a 
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PI0  Violent Crime Rate Level in Quintiles 
Low  _______,  Med. -  High 
No 
Yes 
27%  27%  20%  27% 
(4)  '  (4)  (3)  (4) 
X2=4.2  15 (Not significant); *5 cells have less than  the expected counts 
*Percentages  represent rounded figures and may no  total 100% 
4 
4 
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Training  Violent Crime Rate Level in Quintiles 
Low  _______+  Med.  --b  High 
Xw.430  (Not significant) 
*Percentages  represent rounded figures and  may not total 100%  - 
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occurrence  of  criminal  or  tragic  events  as  “routine.”  Yet  for  members  of  law 
enforcement, temporal fkequency is not a defining feature of routine events.  Rather, it is 
the anticipatory nature of criminal events that qualifL them as routine.  That is, routine 
events represent expected occurrences that elicit planned responses. Crimes, crashes, and 
natural disasters qualify as routine events within the law enforcement community because 
they  initiate  an  array  of  rehearsed,  staged  and  planned  behaviors  on the  part  of 
responding officials. 
Similarly, members  of the news media treat  crimes  and other  “nonspecialized 
emergencies” as routine and anticipatory events (Tuchman, 1973: 11 1).  After  all, it is the 
job of the news team to convert the rare or unusual occurrence into a daily feature new 
item.  To do this, reporters are largely dependent upon police to make crime routine. 
They regularly contact police departments requesting any information that they may use 
as part of the news product.  Table 5.4 presents a summary of the fi-equency of police- 
media  interaction  nationwide  across  mid-to-large  sized  departments  suggesting  that 
police-media interaction is highly frequent.  Most departments (93%) communicate with 
the  news  media  at  least  once a day regarding  crime in the  community, while many 
departments (62%) are in contact with media more than once a day. Moreover, as table 
5.5  indicates, police field media requests fkom  numerous  crime reporters  (mean=17) 
representing a range of news outlets (mean=lO).  For beat reporters, then, police-media 
interaction proves an occupational necessity, since law  enforcement is responsible for 
providing media with the dramatic ingredients for much of their daily work product? 
’  Much of the daily work product of news organizations involves the relayhg of crime narratives. Content 
analyses of local and national news formats indicate that crime-related stories typically account for 25% of 
all newspaper articles and 20% of all local broadcast features (Dominick, 1978; Graber,  1980; Lotz, 191; 
Surette, 1998). 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not '  80 
i 
Table 5.4.  Frequency of Police-Media Interaction (N=194) 
Frequency  Percent  Cumulative Percent 
Not at All  .5  100.0 
Monthly  2.6  99.5 
Weekly  4.1  96.9 
Daily  30.6  92.8 
More than Once a Day  62.2  62.2 
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Table 5.5. Number of Police Department Media Contacts In An Average Week 
Newspaper  Television  Radio  Total 
Reporters 
Mean  5  8  3  16.6 
S.D.  4.0  6.1  2.7  11.0 
Outlets 
Mean  10.2 
5.3 
2.8 
2.3 
3.0  4.2 
S.D.  2.4  2.1 
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when they are able to provide reporters with news about successful performances.  At 
other times, police request media assistance to promote crime prevention initiatives or 
ongoing investigations.  Even during times of alleged inefficiency or misconduct, they 
may  seek out media to present their perspective or news kame.  As explained by one 
police official, “The media are going to find out anyway, so we may as well give them 
our infomation up hnt. That way, at least the information is coming fiom us” (Author 
notes,  9/30/00).  For all of  these reasons,  police may  decide to  initiate contact with 
members of the media.  The most common reason for police to call media is to provide 
crime incident information.  Nearly half of all departments (49%)  contact local media 
daily to provide reporters assistance With  crime coverage (figure 5.1).  Thuty percent 
(30%) of departments issue press releases on a daily basis to both facilitate and routinize 
the crime news-making process, while nearly 80% issue press releases at least once per  a 
week (figure 5.2).  Finally, an equal percentage of departments (34%) hold monthly news 
conferences or regularly meet with news editors and media managers to provide input 
into crime news product,  to contribute to media coverage of police practices, or to air 
concerns over coverage of recent breaking events (figures 5.3 and  5.4). 
While police represent a primary  joumalistic source for crime-related information, 
reporters do not rely exclusively upon first-hand police accounts to leam about crime in 
the  community.  They may  become  aware  of  a  crime through  altemate or indirect 
channels,  only  later  contacting the police  for  verification of events.  For  example, 
reporters frequently come across crime information through the fkequent monitoring of 
police scanners.  Local news desks rely heavily upon police scanners for information, 
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Figure 5.3. Department Frequency Scheduling a News Conference (in Past 12 Months) 
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particularly  about  “breaking”  events.  This allows an  assignment editor  to  quickly 
’ dispatch a reporter and camera crew to capture the required  visuals without the delay that 
may  occur while  waiting  for  official  notification.  Therefore,  news  bureaus  afford 
scanners as much attention as the more reliable and trustworthy local news wires.  One 
1 
police officer described a recent mix-up  caused by an  assignment editor relying too 
heavily upon the wrong fkquency on a police channel: 
The media constantly monitor police scanners.  And once, 
they came across our training channel, a frequency we use 
when practicing and preparing for emergency operations. 
We were on  the scanner talking about bombs, hostages and 
so forth,  and the media began  calling our  office &tic, 
wanting to know what was going on! (Author notes) 
On many occasions, reporters leam of incidents within the community before 
such events come to the attention of police, either Erom eyewitnesses or fiom non-official 
sources that choose to notify media instead of law enforcement.  It is not uncommon  for  0 
PIOs to learn of events &om the media calling to verify eyewitness infomation or simply 
guaranteeing that police are aware of events. On one particular morning, an Urbandale 
PI0  working two breaking events (a triple stabbing and the discovery of a murder victim) 
was tipped off by a reporter about yet a third incident.  A twelve-year old boy tried to 
hang himself in his home with a dog leash because of trouble he was having at school. 
Ordinarily, police would not release information of this type to reporters, both because of 
the nature of the event and the age of the individual. But because the information did not 
originate from law enforcement, the PI0 had no control over the gate-keeping process 
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This  process of media disclosure ensures reporters that the police will reciprocate 
the favor through generous sound bites, visuals, and additional official details about the 
incident.  It also suggests that the police as gatekeepers model describing the crime 
news-making process is only partially accurate (e.g.,  Surette, 1998).  Whereas  this model 
suggests a direct, one-way flow of crime information from the PI0 to the crime reporter, 
police  are frequently at the  receiving  end  of the news-construction process, working 
feverishly to follow-up on tips provided by media for the purpose of releasing “official” 
idormation.  Police by  no  means  maintain  exclusive control  on the  type of stones 
received by media.  Rather, they merely provide official copy  for reporters who may 
either use police information or work around it. 
Nevertheless, police remain a primary source for crime news, and this demand  for 
information has required many police agencies to incorporate public information as part 
e 
of their law enforcement agenda.  To accommodate beat reporters, police often resemble 
the reporters they serve. That is, they too must routinize infrequent andor unpredictable 
events (i.e., crime, accidents, and natural disasters) by classifling them along dimensions 
of “newsworthiness” or “right to know” in light of their professional and organizational 
needs (Tuchman, 1974).  Then, in  an effort to standardize information, police issue press 
releases or devise other methods of communicating consistently with media.  Note the 
steps taken by two smaller sized departments to routinize media inquiries: 
As things turned out, reporters decided to drop the story about the murder victim from the items scheduled 
for the mid-day broadcast in  favor of the attempted suicide, against the personal judgment of the PIO. 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 89 
We  have  a  recorded  [telephone]  ‘news  line’  with 
information on police cases, recorded throughout the day 
and night for reporters.  Also a media alert pager system to 
notify  media  of  major police  and  fire  actions. (Survey 
respo=) 
I 
We  have  a  very  good  and  much  used  [telephone] 
code-a-phone system that media uses several times a day. 
(Survey response) 
In sum, police-media interaction is highly fi-equent., as  police represent one among 
many potential crime news gatekeepers.  They serve as official sources regarding crime 
information in the community, providing details regarding government responses  to local 
events. Like reporters, they make the infkquent “routine” by providing the media with 
regular accounts of irregular events.  Of course, police do not readily welcome their role 
as providers of community crime information, for they recognize the propensity for news 
to present rare occurrences as the norm, generating fear thugh  sensationalism. 
Because we have a low crime rate, a violent crime is big 
news.  Just  by  this fact,  the tendency  to  sensationalize 
crime only comes natural.  Not much one can do to deal 
with this situation. At  least violent crime is not handled 
routinely  like  some  more  crime-ridden  communities. 
(Survey response) 
In  fact, when survey respondents were asked about their biggest complaint regarding 
media  coverage of their department, the most  il-equent response  centered on media 
sensationalism  of  violence  in  the  community  (see table  5.6).  Nevertheless,  they 
recognize their role as the primary source for crime information, and they are becoming 
more  adept at routinzing the  dissemination of information.  Police do  not, however, 
always represent the initial filter in the crime news-making process; nor do they maintain 
a “monopoly” on crime information (Sherizen, 1978).  Rather, they decide which details 
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of your department?” 
COMPLAINT  PERCENT (N=193) 
“Sensationalize violent crimes . .  .”  35% 
“Biased in cases of alleged misconduct” 
“Do not report on department successes” 
“Don’t understand role of police .  .  .” 
“Interfere with ongoing investigations” 
“Other” 
16% 
13% 
6% 
- 
5% 
25% 
*Most fiequent “other” response focused upon “being quoted out of context.” 
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to  verify to media while negotiating internally regarding which “official” infomation 
$  should be withheld.  e 
Police Policies for Working with Media 
Media policies have become part of police standard operating procedures (SOPs), 
dictating the nature of media communication during both routine events and emergency 
situations.  Specifically, these policies stipulate the type of information available for 
release,  the parameters of  media access  during crime scene investigations, and when 
necessary, the chain of command to be followed regarding the release of information or 
statements to members of the news media.  92% (N-177)  of sampled departments have a 
written media policy as part  of their agency’s  standard operating pro~edure.~  Yet  as 
figure 5.5 indicates, the incorporation of media policies into police SOPs  is a relatively 
recent  occurrence.  Few  departments (4%)  had  formal  guidelines regarding media  e 
communication prior to the (1  973) publication of the National Advisory Commission on 
Criminal Justice Standards and  Goals.  Drafted in the aftermath of the televised urban 
unrest  of the late  1960s and  early  1970s,  this federal report recommended  that  law 
enforcement agencies incorporate an aggressive media policy into their daily operations. 
Following its publication, police departments across the nation quickly adapted to the 
demands of media,  devising guidelines to make media communication both necessary 
and routine.  In less than ten years, the number of agencies incorporating media into their 
operating procedures  increased  three-fold;  by  the  close  of  1990,  over  40%  of  all 
departments had adopted formal guidelines to communicate with (and through) media. 
Of the departments  that have not incorporated a media policy into their SOPs,  all but two serve  cities with 
populations less than 500,000 residents. 
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While only 25% of respondents identified a specific event prompting the formation of 
their department’s policy, most of these (28%)  adopted their current media policies to 
comply  with  national  accreditation  standards  set  forth  by  the  Commission  on 
Accreditation for  Law  Enforcement  Agencies (CALEA).  Established in  1979 with 
funding hm  the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA),  and comprised 
of representatives from organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP)  and the National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA),  this Commission drafted 
standards to  improve the  quality  of  law  enforcement nationwide.  Included  in  the 
Commissions’ present standards  are minimum requirements for local law  enforcement 
regarding police-media policies and procedures.  Among the other factors prompting the 
adoption of media policies, 26%  of departments indicated a change in police personnel as 
the primary factor contributing to the policy formation, while 22%  identified increased 
police-media interaction as the primary contributing factor.  Finally, such factors as “state 
law,” “the 1968 riots” and other “newsworthy events” complete the categories of factors 
leading to the establishment of more formal police-media relations. 
Because an overwhelming majority of responding departments failed to identify a 
specific event that prompted  the adoption of a standard media policy,  one can only 
speculate into the causes that brought about a heightened sensitivity toward the news 
media among police officials. Recent high profile events, however, may have sparked an 
increased sensitivity to media among  police officials whom otherwise felt immune to the 
threat of extensive media coverage.  For example, the 1991 beating of motorist Rodney 
King -  caught on tape and televised internationally -  as well as the subsequent trial and 
aftermath that it produced, may have triggered the formation of media policies in at least  a 
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some departments slow to respond to the threat of changing technology.  Nearly half of 
all media policies (51%)  have been  adopted in the years  following the Rodney King 
incident. In addition, the much publicized 1999 shooting of Haitian immigrant Amadou 
Diallo in New York City -  in which plain-clothed officers shot an unarmed man forty- 
one times and placed the NYPD within the national media spotlight -  may have had a 
similar impact on police officials, though again,  there was no specific mention of this 
incident in open ended responses.  Whatever the actual causes, the past quarter century 
has experienced a growth in news media technology that has been  accompanied by a 
realization among police that interfacing with media is both politically necessary and 
fkequently desirable for community support and effective policing.  Recognizing that 
their image is shaped by the news media and that any given official action may quickly 
become  public  and  newsworthy,  police  have  adopted policies  to  ensure  that  their 
performances are anticipated, rehearsed, and otherwise routine. 
Routinizing Communication 
As prominent figures in  the news,  police have become increasingly sensitive to 
the  importance  of  media  power,  and  their  media  policies  represent  significant 
administrative steps to incorporate media relations into the basic policing framework. 
Nevertheless, departments differ in the manner with which they routinize the release of 
information to the mass media  Many departments still possess a level of media distrust, 
and they restrict the flow of information, releasing only the most basic of investigative 
details.  Others take steps to ensure the accuracy and consistency of official information 
by streamlining communication through one designated police figurehead. Finally, some 
departments encourage frequent  media  communication across all departmental ranks, 
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hoping that the open and proactive relationship with reporters will translate into favorable 
I  media coverage. 
One  of  the  ways  in  which  a routine  news  event  becomes  an  extraordinary 
headache  for law  enforcement  is  when  department  representatives  are unavailable, 
1 
unwilling, or unauthorized to provide reporters with the necessary incident information. 
Therefore, police departments take steps to routinize communication by appointing a PI0 
or other representative who fields all media requests for information, providing reporters 
with official statements and sound bites while handling news  coverage of breaking and 
developing events.  Not all departments, however, require this spokesperson to appear at 
all  major  crime  scenes or to  field  all  media  inquires.  Instead, they  leave media 
communication to the discretion of the responding officer who  may  or may not  feel 
comfortable with reporters. 
This  practice  of  discretionary  communication  is  essentially  anathema  to 
routinization and can quickly become problematic, for not only does it leave the police 
vulnerable to alternate event interpretations fiom eyewitnesses, victims, and defendants, 
it also alienates reporters fiom the department and creates tension between  the police and 
media. This  proved to be the case during my stay at the Morganville Police Department - 
one of the “low media pow&  sites -  where neither the on-call PI0  nor the rank and file 
officer communicated with media at the scene of a late night homicide.  Instead, the PI0 
relegated all media duties to the commanding officer that denied media access to the 
scene.  The following morning, newsroom editors placed angry calls to the senior public 
information officer -  audible over the office speakerphone -  complaining that, “Once 
again, the [Morganville] Police Department is not cooperating with media!” 
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such  responsibilities exclusively to PIOs,  a policy  that  lik+se  igenerates problems. 
Given that reporters and their camera crews arrive at an incident several minutes before 
the PIO, the absence of any authorized spokesperson at the scene created an “Wormation 
gap” which, according to one broadcast reporter, becomes increasingly volatile as news 
deadlines approach.  This was the case with the Union Creek Police, the  other “low  / 
media power” department: 
A rank and file officer on  the street is not allowed to talk to 
us at all.  when  you anive at a car accident and  ask  a 
[vnion Creek] patrolman for information, all you  get is, 
“Call  downtown,  call downtown.”  And  I  think  that’s 
wrong .  .  .If he’s on the scene, he should be able to say that 
car one crashed into car two.  I don’t  see anything wrong 
with that.  Hit happens at 5:45pm that’s a bad thing.  Cause 
you  have  to  go  on the  air  in  fifteen minutes.  (Author 
interview) 
As among the most visible of government officials, police maintain routine and direct 
access to news reporters, providing them with an opportunity to serve as the primary 
definers of social events.  If, however, they decide to avoid media communication as 
specific issues develop, they allow for nonsfficial voices to become the primary definers 
of social events (Molotch and Lester, 1974; Bennett, 1990; Lawrence, 1996).  One print 
reporter working in Union Creek described to me the steps he takes to circumvent on-the- 
scene infomation gaps created by the Union Creek Police: 
You  have your own sources, your own contacts.  I mean, 
the kids who I grew up with are cops.  You  try and get 
information hm  them  and  ask, ‘hey man,  what’s  going 
on? What’s going down?’  Then you go to the PI0  and tell 
her, ‘This is what I heard.’  That’s how you do it. (Author 
interview) 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not Of  course,  these  second-hand  sources  may  provide  reporters  with  inaccurate, 
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management all the more challenging for the department. 
Frustration experienced by journalists at the scene of an incident, coupled with 
their attempts to  complete a news story with non-official news  sources,  threatens to 
damage to a department’s image.  Results fiom the national survey indicate that only 
28% of police departments authorize line officers to communicate with  media.  Given 
I 
that these officers are typically those first to arrive at a crime or akident, their inability to 
provide media with information agitates reporters and relinquishes department control 
over the construction of events, at  Ieast until a higher-ranking official or PI0 arrives on 
the scene.  The outcome is one where police lose total control of their own image, and 
results fiom the national survey appear to bear this out. 
While survey results did not reveal a significant association between line officer 
communication and the quality of police working relationships with reporters,  results did 
reveal a significant association between a department’s perceived media image and line 
officer  communication (x2 =  7.494, p<  -05). As seen in table 5.7, those departments that 
authorize responding officers to speak with journalists are more  likely to  assess their 
media image as “excellent” (42% v. 29%) and less likely to assess their media image as 
merely “fair” (4% v.  18%).  Moreover, table 5.8 shows that the quality of a department’s 
self-reported media image tends to improve with each additional rank (Le., persons other 
than the designated PIO)  authorized to speak to reporters (x2  = 14.044, p< .05).  And 
given that the crime rate does not significantly contribute to the quality of the department 
image, all of this suggests that a policy encouraging openness with media at all ranks may 
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and Line Officer Authorization to Communicate with Reporters 
PERCEIVED IMAGE  LINE OFFICER AUTHORIZATION 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
No 
17% 
(22) 
29% 
(37) 
Yes 
5 6% 
(30) 
40% 
(22) 
~~ 
X2=6.894,  pC.05 
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with Reporters 
PERCEIVED IMAGE  ADDITIONAL RANKS AUTHORIZED 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
One 
23% 
(8) 
53% 
(18) 
24% 
(8) 
Two 
12% 
(8) 
70% 
18% 
(6) 
Three 
3.8% 
(2) 
56.6% 
(30) 
XL14.044,  p,.05 
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prove beneficial for the department’s image and may help to ensure that routine news 
’ events remain as such.  a 
Strategic Communication  I 
Of course, while the quotidian is able to communicate at a basic level by relaying 
necessary information, strategic communication through media requires a higher degree 
of planning and awareness on the part of the communicator.  It calls for one to move 
beyond  the mechanics  of  language  and  toward  an understanding of  situations and 
contexts, audiences and their opinions, and media demands or formats. To be  sure,  a 
communicator may have any number of message objectives falling along a continuum 
finm the most basic of goals to the most complex: a need to inform the public, a desire to 
influence attitudes, perhaps even a hope of aflecting behavior.  Those speakers  most 
adept at  achieving their personal  or professional goals are those  with  an  ability to 
integrate multiple communication objectives into their messages while delivering them 
through  numerous  forms of media (Gamett, 1992). 
While the adoption of police media policies was in  response to an increasing 
sensitivity toward  the  appearance of control,  few  department policies make  even  a 
passing reference to  the  police  image,  public  relations,  or impression management. 
Rather, the language of the typical policy reveals the basic,  single objective approach 
regarding media communication -  “inform the public”.  The policy, therefore, merely 
establishes guidelines regarding the release of case information, and  it provides little 
guidance on how to communicate in a strategic manner that both provides information 
and  also targets  audience perceptions.  Note  the  language  in  the  following police 
department media policies: 
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It is the policy of [this] department to cooperate fully and 
impartially  with  the  public  and  authorize  news  media 
representatives  in  their  efforts  to  gather  factual,  public 
information  pertaining  to  activities  of  the  police 
department,  as long  as these  activities  do  not  unduly 
interfere  with  department  operations,  infiinge  upon 
individual rights, or violate the law (#117). 
Only information which [sic] violates constitutional rights 
of the victim  or  the accused, interfixes with  an  ongoing 
investigation or is legally privileged may be withheld fiom 
the public (#347-A).  I 
Members of  [the Department] will assist the media with 
information,  as  long  as  the  information  does  not 
compromise  the  investigation  of  a  police  incident;  or 
detract fiom the ability to successllly prosecute a case in 
court; or violate an individual’s legal right to privacy (see 
Section 706.05); or jeopardize the safety of any officer or 
citizen (#RO1 -  1  1-00). 
This single-objective approach to police-media interaction may be contrasted with less 
fi-equent, but nevertheless more strategic, approaches to media communication that not  a 
only  address  the  importance  of releasing  timely  and  accurate information, but  also 
display an  overt  recognition of the role media  can  have  toward  public  opinion  and 
impression management. 
Most  citizens  have  little  contact  with  law  enforcement 
officers and their opinion of the police is often formed by 
the  mass  media’s  portrayal  of  our  functions.  The 
maintenance of good press relations is therefore a crucial 
element of public relations.  Officers and employees must 
maintain good rapport with the media and deal with them in 
a courteous and impartial manner.  It must be remembered 
that the media has a legitimate hction in our society and 
the  public  trust  of  the  police  can  be  enhanced  through 
proper dealings with the media (#1098-5). 
The mission . . .  is (1) to coordinate the release of accurate 
and  timely information to the news media  and the public 
and (2) to promote the positive image of [the Department]. 
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The  goals  of  [the  Department]  are  to  maintain  public 
support . . . by  keeping the  avenues of  communication 
among the  department,  news  media  and  citizenry open. 
The objectives .  .  .  are to utilize the media when attempting 
to  stimulate  public  interest  in  departmental  programs 
involving the  communityi  [and  to]  promote a  feeling of 
teamwork between the police and media (#3800). 
[Officers shall] assume a pro-active approach in contacting 
the news media with information about the Department that 
might  not  otherwise  come  to  their  attention,  but  is 
newsworthy (#302.3). 
A policy emphasizing cooperation with the press will ostensibly produce a level 
of trust and cooperation between police and the media that manifests as positive coverage 
of police practices.  Because only a small number of  departments (N=15)  report not 
having a written media policy as part of their standard operating procedure, chi-square 
measures produced a model unstable for tests of statistical association?  Nevertheless, 
numerous survey questions asked those departments that do have written media policies  a 
to  assess their helpfulness in achieving positive policemedia relations, with responses 
given on a Likert-type scale ranging hm  “not helpfd” to “very helpfid”.  Table 5.9 
presents a breakdown of the survey results. Police responses appear to indicate that a 
policy stipulating “the release of information” translates into favorable media coverage. 
For example, nearly half (49%) of all departments feel their policy proves ‘tery helpful” 
in preparing them to speak with reporters.  At the same time, 46% feel that their media 
policies prove very helpful in creating both a ‘’positive relationship” with reporters and an 
“ability to present a favorable image” of the department.  As explained by one police 
Specifically, 33% of the cells had less than the expected counts. By convention, chi-square analysis 
9 
requires no more than 20%  of the expected cell frequencies to have counts less than expected counts 
(Babbie, Halley, and Zaino, 2000). 
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Policy  Media  Controlling  Addressing  Presenting a  Creating  Promoting 
Misconduct  Image  Relationship  Strategies 
Helpfulness  Preparedness  News Leaks  Allegations of  Favorable  Positive  Policing 
w/  Reporters 
Not Helpful  .6%  9.5%  4.4%  -  -  1.2% 
(1)  (16)  (7)  (2) 
1.1%  20.1%  8.1%  3.4%  4.6%  2.3% 
(2)  (34)  (13)  (6)  (8)  (4) 
Helpful  14.3%  29.6%  27.5%  15.4%  15.4%  19.2% 
(25)  (50)  (44)  (27)  (27)  (33) 
Very Helpful  49.1  %  15.4%  26.9%  46.9%  45.7%  36.6% 
(86)  (26)  (43)  (80)  (80)  (63) 
c 
E: 
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official, a policy that emphasizes cooperation with the media creates “an attitude of trust” 
that inevitably results in a favorable police image.  e 
Nevertheless, information as the primary means of impression management may 
limit the ability of officials to influence’their  department’s image at given times during 
the news-making process, particularly during times of crisis or scandal when the direct 
targeting of audience perceptions becomes necessary.  Thus, while  almost half  of all 
police  departments feel  that  their  media  policy  proves  very  helpful  in  presenting a 
favorable image,  only 27% of departments feel their policy proves  “very helpfbl” in 
“addressing allegations of misconduct”.  Moreover, 13% of departments feel their policy 
proves Zess  than helpful in dealing with publicized allegations of misconduct.  At  such 
times,  news  leaks become  an important  issue,  for  PIOs  are reluctant  to  overwhelm 
reporters with potentially damaging infomation.  Instead, police let information trickle 
out, a  practice  that  prolongs  the  story,  multiplies  the  damage,  and  increases the 
probability  that  journalists  will  tum  to  non-official,  inside  sources  for  additional 
information (Jones,  1993).  Indeed, 30%  of departments believe their media  policies 
prove to be Zess  than helpful in controlling news leaks, while 1O?h of this figure feels 
their policy is “not at all” helpful. 
It appears, then, that during routine events when  the police image is less at risk, 
the single objective approach to media communication maintains or even establishes a 
positive departmental image.  Yet, when reporters must become police themselves and 
call into question the actions of law enforcement, policies that adopt this single objective 
approach do not always prove successful at effective impression management.  In  fact, 
the  limitations  of  the  “inform  the  public”  approach  to  impression  management  are 
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media policies.  One police official responding to  the nationd siwey noted that his 
department’s media policy “is a mislabeled policy,  as it actually pertains to release of 
records, not media relations in general,” while another indicated that the his department’s 
policy “doesn’t  detail how to create a favorable image.”  Instead, survey respondents 
suggest that,  “a  favorable image comes  hm  the department’s professionalism as a 
whole.”  That is,  “the media policy does not create a favorable image;  the underlying 
philosophy, actions of employees, and  the public  infomation office staff create the 
image.” 
Public Information Officers 
In an effort to improve police media relations, the public information officer 
(PIO)  has emerged as a key figure in police administration.  Today, 89% of municipal 
law enforcement agencies have an employee whose primary responsibility is to serve as a 
media public idormation officer.  Employed predominantly as sworn officers (75%)  and 
serving directly under the chief, PIOs represent the central source of information about 
department actions,  and  they  act  as spokespersons for the  entire police force.  Their 
objective is  to  facilitate the flow  of  information hm  the department to  the media, 
avoiding information gaps that may cause reporters to depend upon less credible sources. 
Therefore, larger departments or departments in higher crime jurisdictions require their 
PIOs to be on-call around the clock, as crime is not likely to stop during the evening 
hours. Having a police representative readily  available to provide official and consistent 
information prevents what one large city chief referred to as “rumors,  lies or innuendos.” 
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As  the primary  source  of  information  on  department  operations, the  PI0 is 
responsible for  all  routine  communication  with  members  of  the  media  The  PI0 
distributes daily crime incident  infomation to  reporters, prepares  departmental press 
releases about agency events, responds to the scene of a police-related event where local 
media may gather, and arranges or provides assistance at police news conferences.  To 
accommodate media inquiries for information on crime incidents, the PI0 fields calls 
e 
hm  beat reporters inquiring about any  new events or developments on prior occurrenc~ 
that may have transpired during the last news cycle.  (“No blood and guts today, Gail. 
We’ve  got a bunch of crime prevention press conferences, but no exciting stones. If1  see 
any blood dripping through the vents, I’ll call you”).  Depending upon the size of the 
media market, PIOs may receive anywhere hm  10-30  inquires each morning, and more 
should there be a breaking event or an event attracting media attention from other cities 
or jurisdictions. 
When a crime or accident does  occur, the PI0 does not  always represent the 
initial department gatekeeper.  Instead, the onduty dispatcher who is responsible for all 
field  communication  uses  hiher discretion  as to  which  calls may  generate  media 
attention. Following this initial screening, the dispatcher notifies the on-duty PI0 via 
phone or pager regarding the nature of the incident.  Once provided with this basic and 
initial  information,  the  PI0 will  decide whether  the event  is newsworthy enough to 
warrant official notification of media.  Of course, news desks monitor the same police 
frequencies as the dispatcher; therefore, assignment editors often come  across police- 
related  events without notification from the PIO.  During my  visit at  the  “high media 
power” Urbandale Police Department, their public information office received a call fiom 
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dispatch regarding a potential police-related media event.  Minutes before, there was an 
accident  with  the  department’s  mounted  patrol  unit.  According  to  a  police  radio 
transmission,  an  officer’s  horse  became  dislodged  hm  its horseshoe,  causing  it  to 
stumble and fall. The horse landed upon the foot of a pedestrian, while the officer fell 
onto the street.  Because the pedestrian suffered little more thah  a sore foot and was 
extremely understanding of the situation, the senior PI0  decided that the story was not 
newsworthy to warrant notification of the press.  Nevertheless, a local network filiate 
overheard the story on the police scanner and decided to dispatch a film crew.  Later, the 
newsroom  called  the  PI0 for  information  to  complete  the  story,  requesting  filler 
infomation such as the name of the horse.  To this, the media-savvy PI0  responded, 
“Mr. Ed,  of course!” 
On  routine days, the news occurs in cycles, and it is the responsibility of  the PI0 
to meet the deadlines of the various news formats.  The PI0  spehds  the morning hours 
prioritizing calls,  first  responding to  inquiries fkm broadcast  reporters who  require 
information for the rapidly approaching noon broadcast. The heaviest volume of calls 
occm in the hour just before  airtime, typically  the  llA.M.  hour  in preparation  for 
noontime broadcast.  The  late afternoon is similarly spent  preparing  reporters for the 
evening news broadcasts, again with an abundance of calls placed just prior to going live. 
During  the  midday hours,  then,  the  PI0 finds much  quiet  time,  allowing  for the 
preparation of more proactive image building through the development of police human- 
interest stories, news “pseudo-events” (i.e., press conferences), or preparations for formal 
media interviews with the Chief. 
e 
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During my stay in  Urbandale, the public information office scheduled a news 
*  conference to promote a gun safety lock program, and they used their downtime to work  e 
through the necessary logistics.  The department had acquired 2000 gun safety locks for 
free distribution to gun  owners. The purpose of the news conference was to specifically 
1 
publicize  the  availability  of  the  trigger  locks  while  more  generally play  up  the 
department’s efforts toward crime prevention.  Mer  fielding the routine morning calls 
placed by reporters (and using the opportunity to plug the news  conference), the senior 
PI0  began briefing his swabout  the staged event, working to ensure that all members of 
the press would get a gun-lock packet and that a table would be set up with an array of 
firearms and the gun locks as a visual.  The senior PI0  also provided assurance to the 
newly appointed and nervous Chief who was anxious about the codefence operating 
smoothly.  The PI0  reassured him by indicating that all reporters received an advance 
copy of his  statement should he stumble over words, and that the public information 
office  was adequately prepared for the event.”  Of course, there remains no guarantee 
that such highly planned staged events will make it onto the airwaves or in the press, as a 
separate joint news conference with a state attorney general was “bumped”  Erom  the 
headlines by a local violent crime. 
In  addition  to  providing reporters  with  information  on breaking  crimes  and 
ongoing crime prevention  campaigns,  the PI0 serves as liaison  between the police 
organization and the public.  She  not only interprets the drama  of police work to the 
public  through  media,  but  also  emphasizes  to  fellow  officers  the  importance  of 
The press conference was carried out according to plan, with each news station carrying the event on the 
evening broadcast. Yet, an unexpected turn of events occurred approximately one month later when the 
national wires reported that “Gun Locks  Given Away By Police May Not Work”  (News staff and wire 
reports). 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not communication through -  and cooperating with -  the media.  For example, in the days 
prior to my visit at Urbandale, officers in a neighboring departmeqt were involved in a 
high-speed pursuit caught on videotape by news helicopters above.  As the chase came to 
a close, the choppers captured an aerial View  of the police using what appeared to be 
excessive force against the suspect.  When I arrived a few days after the incident, local 
media were still airing and discussing the videotaped pursuit.  When  I asked a  PI0 how 
he would respond to media coverage of suspected excessive force, his response revealed 
the important balance that must be struck between the needs of the public and those of the 
department: 
As a PIO, you  have to understand both sides .  .  .  [Tlhis  is 
what is seen  on television, and we understand how it looks. 
Once we can get  this basic understanding  across,  then I 
think we can get into what it’s like to be a cop .  .  .  Let [the 
public] know about the dangers, the split second decisions 
that come with being a cop.  The stresses, the hufnanness, 
the dangers of that particular situation, that we,  too,  are 
people.  You  try to help the audience feel what it’s  like to 
be in your shoes.  Help them  to imagine putting on the suit, 
strapping on the leather belt and the gun, what that feels 
like.  Getting into  that police car.  What  that  feels like. 
Hearing that  radio.  What  that  feels like.  And  I’m  not 
talking about watching television cops, movie cops.  I’m 
talking about what it’s really like. And it’s  our  job to paint 
that picture.  And we want to do our best, we owe it to our 
officers to do our best, to make sure that the people sitting 
at home watching television or reading the paper ...  will 
stop and think  for a second ’you how  it is a complicated 
scenario here,  it is. .  .If we get them to do just that, get 
them to think  that much then I think we’ve done our job, 
being fair to all parties. (Author interview) 
To  achieve a mutual understanding among the police, the media,  and  (through more 
balanced coverage) the public, many departments are relying upon their PIOs to establish 
police “media academies” where reporters can participate in special tactics police training  m 
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while  camera crews  obtain the  necessary  visuals.  Several PIOs  fiom  various sized 
departments have described their attempts to increase media -  and therefore public -  a 
appreciation for police work: 
Reporters  in  general understand  very  little about  police 
work.  As a result, media coverage is quite shallow.  Our 
public information office is engaged in ongoing efforts to 
explain the How’s  and  Whys of our department. We  are 
setting  up  demonstrations  for  media  in  areas  such  as 
firearms. (Survey response) 
The PIO.. .encourages media personnel to ‘ride along’ with 
police staff.  We have scheduled numerous ride alongs and 
will continue to do so  to help educate both the media and 
officers working the streets. (Survey response) 
. 
We have instituted a media academy.  This is where we put 
on  a oneday academy  for media  only.  We  teach them 
about  different  aspects  of  our  department.  (Survey 
response) 
At the same time, newsroom editors and beat reporters are eager to share their on-the-job 
pressures with the police for the purpose of improving the police-media relationship, and 
they lobby PIOs to initiate a forum where they may have an internal voice.  As a result, 
departments are beginning to allow media representatives to speak with new cadets at the 
police academy to provide them with an understanding of their needs and duties as the 
fourth branch of government.  The “low media power” Morganville Police Department, 
eager to improve their relationship with local media, held  a media forum with over 30 
members of  the  local media  and  associated press in  attendance.  Among  the issues 
discussed  was  the  establishment  of  a  symbiotic,  police-media  academy.  During  the 
meeting, the following negotiations occurred: 
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Assistant Chief: “Some of the thoughts that the Chief had 
in mind were to have an opportunity to maybe bring in 
some of the command officers from the different areas that 
you can talk to, and they can talk to you,  so that there’s a 
little less of the ‘I don’t talk to media’ attitude on our side, 
and  a little more undqtanding on your  side as to what 
their job priorities are when they’re  at a  scene that you 
want to get  infomation ... or when  you  call them at  a 
district station about something they may  or may not feel 
codortable talking to you about.” 
News Representative #1: “Maybe not just have cops come 
and talk to us about their jobs, but could you maybe bring 
us in and let us talk to them about our jobs?” 
Assistant Chief:  “I think that’s what he’s envisioning, that 
give and take so that we don’t have that impact out there of 
not knowing, ‘Can we release this?  I’m on the scene of a 
homicide.  The end of a pursuit -  what am  I supposed to 
say or not  say when you  guys arrive?’  Those kinds of 
issues.  But not just that, also a better understanding, like 
you said, of what you  do and what your needs  are, and what 
a deadline means and why you’re asking the questions that 
you’re &.bg?” 
News Representative #2: “You guys should come and visit 
us, and see what it’s like, too.” 
Public Information Officer: ‘You’re right.  [We] should go 
there and sit in your chair for a half-aday or a day. 
Assistant Chief:  “I think that’s a good idea.  Some of the 
people who  might most benefit fiom that  are our newly 
promoted sergeants, to kind of get a feel for what you do 
out there.  And they’re still babies, so you could get a lot of 
information out of them!’’  (Author transcription) 
The PIO,  then, represents a liaison that works  at both public information and 
public  relations.  Public infomation  entails supplying the public  with accurate and 
truthfir1 information through media communication, while public relations requires PIOs 
to proactively promote department actions and build the department’s image. Chi-square 
analysis did reveal a significant association between the presence of a police PI0  and the 
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level of department proactive contacts with media (X2=.6.781,  p< .05).  For example, as 
seen in table 5.10, when “proactive contacts,, was measured in tms  of the frequency 
with  which  departments  (1)  issued  press  releases,  (2) held  meetings  with  media 
managers,  and  (3)  “initiated”  contact  with  media  for  “any  other  reason,”  those 
departments employing a PI0  were less likely to be “low” proactivity departments (18% 
v.  41%)  and more likely to be “high” proactivity agencies (52% v.  41%).  Nevertheless, 
proactive contact with media does not translate into a more favorable media image (see 
table 5.11).  In fact, it appears that higher levels of proactivity actually represent a form 
of reactivity to a pre-existing ‘‘fair‘‘  media image. Moreover, the presence of police PI& 
alone  do  not  guarantee  a  more  favorable  media  image  or  an improved  working 
relationship  with  reporters. Tables  5.12 -  5.14  present  chi-square  analyses  of  the 
association between the presence of a police PI0  and police perceptions of their (a) 
media image, (b)  working relationships with reporters,  and (c) level of public opinion 
surrounding  the department. All of this suggests that while public information is a task 
that  is often (though by no  means  always) straightforward, public relations requires 
finesse and an overt recognition of how the routine crime story may be used toward the 
benefit of law enforcement through positive media coverage.  Such a task requires a keen 
understanding of media demands, formats, and deadlines,  as well a level of comfort 
required to communicate with media on a regular basis.  As a result, some departments 
recruit individuals with prior work experience (30%) or a college degree (27%) in media 
or public relations.  More likely, departments require their employees to receive (78%) 
training  in  media  communications  skills  and  public  relations  for  the  purpose  of 
impression management. 
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PROACTIVITY *  PI0 
Low 
Medium 
High 
No 
41% 
(9) 
18% 
Yes 
18% 
(30) 
3 1% 
41% 
(9) 
X2=6.78  1, p< .05  * Frequency issuing press releases, meet w/ media, initiate contact 
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~  ~  ~  ~~ 
PERCEIVED IMAGE  LEVEL OF PROACTIVITY 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
Low  Medium  High 
8% 
(3) 
41% 
(16) 
14% 
(8) 
60% 
(35) 
26% 
(15) 
16% 
(15) 
50% 
(48) 
34% 
(32) 
X2=3  .7 18 (Not significant) 
c 
c 
P 
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IMAGE  PI0 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
No 
14% 
46% 
Yes 
4% 
54% 
- 
40%  42% 
X2=4.363 (Not  significant) 
c 
c 
UI 
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of Their Working Relationship with Reporters 
~  ~  ~~ 
WORKING RELATIONSHIP  PI0 
Low 
Medium 
High 
No 
14% 
(3) 
46% 
(10)  __ 
40% 
(9) 
Yes 
54%  - 
(90) 
42% 
(70) 
X2==4.363,  (Not significant)  c 
c 
a! 
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of the Level Public Opinion Surrounding Their Department 
PUBLIC OPINION  PI0 
Low 
Medium 
High 
No 
5% 
(1) 
55% 
(12) 
40% 
(9) 
Yes 
8% 
(13) 
~~ 
X2=.288,  (Not significant)  c 
c 
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In  one of his  first writings on the  importance  of  understhding mass media, 
Marshall  McLuhan  (1951:~)  alludes to Edgar  Allan  Poe’s  tale,  “A  Descent  Into the 
Maelstrom.” In  this story, a sailor facing a tumultuous sea is able to save himself by 
studying  the  patterns  of  an  otherwise  dangerous  whirlpool  rather  than  htilely  and 
instinctively attempting to avoid the current. As McLuhan explains, “it was..  .his  rational  I 
detachment as a spectator of his own situation that gave him the thread which led him out 
of the Labyrinth.”  Like McLuhan,  whose work  represents his attempt to understand 
media,  police  have  become  sailors  themselves,  actively  learning  the  patterns  and 
practices  of  a  demanding media  market.  Specifically, PI&,  their staff,  as well  as 
members of the broader police organization are receiving media skills instruction to learn 
the  art  of  impression management.  According  to  survey rebults,  69%  (N=133)  of 
municipal police departments provide some form of media skills instruction to their staff. 
The  goal  of  police  media  training  is  to  provide  officers  with  a  better 
understanding of -  and a greater respect for -  mass media.  At the same time, it attempts 
to show PIOs and their staff how they can “take charge of all types of contact with the 
media”  while maximizing their  effectiveness when  communicating with  and  through 
media (Rosenthal, 1997:ii).  To achieve this, media training seminars encourage PIOs to 
think as though they were the reporters they serve.  This  requires them to become familiar 
with  the strategies and  formulas used by reporters in the production of a news story as 
well as an awareness of media fonnats, patterns, deadlines, and perhaps most important, 
“the illusions of TV” (Jones, 1993  :xi). 
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diffient departments and personnel rank.  Of those departments that incorporate media 
training into their department protocol (N=133), 40% provide line officers with training 
in media communications, with personnel training varying with rank.  Thus, 60% of 
i 
sergeants, 62% of commanders, and 71% of PIOs (typically liehtenants) receive some 
form of media training.  Moreover, the variance in the number of training  hours received 
is high, ranging fkom a minimum of 1 hour of training per  to year to as much as 40 hours 
l 
of training per year. This  suggests that the percentages of police personnel trained listed 
over-represents the actual extent of in police-media training nationwide, as half of all 
police departments provide less than 5 hours of media training per year (mean=l 1 hours; 
mode=l hour). 
Table 5.15 details the content frequency of police media tqahhg provided, which 
covers instruction covering routine and non-routine media events, including instruction 
regarding  interviews for  print  media,  arranging press  conferences,  and  controlling 
information leaks,  coverage of  officer misconduct,  and  other  somewhat  scandalous 
events.  The most fiequent forms of media instruction concern communication training 
for emergency situations -  learning to routinize the unexpected -  and instruction on how 
to conduct a television interview.  That the two foxms of instruction are equally prevalent 
among training courses suggests that much  of the TV  interview training focuses upon 
“live” interviews during breaking events.  This  proved to be the case at a four-day media- 
training seminar that I attended during my field research.  The seminar, sponsored by a 
large  organization  of  police  executives,  provided  many  tips  regarding  media 
communication during emergency situations, with special attention paid to television 
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Writing a  Arranging  Negotiating  Conducting  Conducting  Managing  Managing  Media 
Press  a Press  Press  Print  Television  Info.  Coverage  Relations 
Release  Conference  Coverage  Interviews  Interviews  Leaks  of  During an 
Misconduct  Emergency 
53%  42%  42%  63%  84%  30%  35%  84% 
(67)  (53)  (53)  (79)  (107)  (38)  (45)  (107) 
c 
h) 
0 
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following a high profile school  shooting.  Inundated with  capera crews hm  local, 
national and cable news organizations, the PI0  provided the following advice regarding 
television appearances: 
Try  to  set up  the media  command  station in  a  location 
where  the  crime  or  disaster  Scene  will  not  constantly 
become  the backdrop.  The  public  doesn’t  need to be 
reminded with visuals of  the scene.  I ended up  leaming 
this halfivay through the day. Mer  holding hourly press 
conferences in fiont of school, somebody pointed out to me 
that the school mascot was visible on the marquh behind 
me, just above my shoulder.  Well, the school mascot is a 
‘patriot’,  and  a  cartoon  image  of a man  armed with  a 
musket  and  ready  for battle  just wasn’t  an appropriate 
backdrop. (Author notes) 
In  general,  police perceive  media  skills training  workshops to  be helpful  in 
providing assistance with everyday media relations.  As seen in ,Table 5.16,  police find 
training to be helpfbl in allowing them to present a more favorable image of their agency, 
in preparing them  to communicate with media, in enabling them  to promote policing 
strategies, and in establishing more positive relationships with reporters. In fact, less than 
5% of respondents indicated that training proved less than helpll in these areas, while no 
respondent suggested training to be unhelpful  in  presenting a favorable image of the 
department.  Police perceptions of training effectiveness shift, however, with regard to 
less anticipated (ie.,  non-routine) media  events.  Thirteen percent  (13%)  of police 
respondents perceive training to be less  than helphl in preparing them to handle media 
coverage of alleged misconduct, while almost half report training ineffective in helping 
departments to control news leaks.  Moreover, as seen in table 5.17, police media training 
is significantly associated with department proactivity through such activities as initiating 
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~~~ 
Training  Media  Controlling  Addressing  Presenting a  Creating  Promoting 
Helpfulness  Preparedness  News Leaks  Allegations of  Favorable  Positive  Policing 
Misconduct  Image  Relationship  Strategies 
w/ Reporters 
Not Helpful  -  10.9%  2.6%  -  0.8%  0.8% 
(13)  (3)  (1)  (1) 
1.6%  24.4% 
(2)  (29) 
Helpful  i7.w  39.5% 
(22)  (47) 
45.0%  16.0% 
(58)  (19) 
Very Helpful  36.4%  9.2% 
(47)  (1 1) 
6.8% 
(8) 
28.2% 
(33) 
41.9% 
(49) 
20.5% 
(24) 
48.5%  45.0% 
(63)  (59) 
40.0%  38.9% 
(52)  (5  1) 
3.1% 
(4) 
17.3% 
(22) 
47.2% 
(60) 
3 1.5% 
c  (40) 
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PRO  ACTIVITY *  MEDIA TRAINING 
Low 
Medium 
High 
No 
3 1% 
(19) 
28% 
(17) 
41% 
(25) 
Yes 
15% 
(20) 
31% 
54% 
(72) 
~ 
X2=6.968,  p<  .05  * Frequency issuing press releases, meet w/ media, initiate contact 
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contact with news reporters through news releases and  meetings with media managers 
I  (X2=6.968,  pC.05). 
Despite the rather favorable assessment of the various aspects of media training, 
many  aspects  of  media  training  were  unassociated  with  a  favorable media  image. 
I 
Specifically, the  amount  of media  training received, the extent of  staff  trained,  and 
training in conducting print interviews and holding press conferences proved unrelated to 
a more positive department image.  Only instruction in conducting television interviews 
was associated with  the quality of a department’s media image,  according to survey 
results.  Table  5.18,  which  presents a  cross-tabulation  of  the  association  between 
television  interview  training  and  a  department’s  media  image,  suggests a  positive 
association between  the  two  variables.  PIOs  that  receive  media  skills  training  in 
conducting television interviews were therefore more likely to assess their department’s 
media image as “excellent” (39% v.  10%) and less likely to rate their image as  “fair“ (8% 
v.  25%). 
Several police officials, responding to the national survey, expressed concern that 
“not  enough  time  is  spent  during  training”  on  tips  directly  related  to  impression 
management, while one criticized training for not being “realistic” enough to adequately 
train officers for factors that may tarnish the police image.  “Media training has served to 
educate  Department personnel  to  the  needs  of the  media  (Le.,  sound  bites,  visuals, 
timeliness,  etc);”  but  when  it  comes  to  learning  the  much-needed  skills of  basic 
impression  management, “much of the media  training I’ve  encountered doesn’t touch 
upon this.” 
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IMAGE  TELEVISION TRAINING 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
No 
25% 
(5) 
65% 
(13) 
10% 
(2) 
Yes 
53%_ 
(57) 
39% 
(42) 
X2=9.637, p<.05 
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Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the effectiveness of various administrative strategies on 
improving the police media image during times of routine news events.  Routine events 
represent expected  occurrences that elicit planned behavior responses.  Despite their 
infrequency  relative  to  property  crimes,  as  well  as  their  geographic  variability, 
sensational violent crimes constitute routine events that police must address both in the 
news and  on the streets.  As police  (arguably) have  limited control over the  latter, 
successful impression management requires a concerted effort at addressing the former. 
With actual crime is not significantly associated with the police image, it is not crime 
itself so much  as much  as the manner with  crime is communicated that  significantly 
influences the police image.  Results hm  the national survey indicate that media policies 
encouraging officer communication with media improves the police image.  Not  only 
does a willingness to communicate suggest that routine events are as they appear, it also 
prevents reporters fiom seeking out alternate voices that may be  less favorable of routine 
police performance.  In fact, overall departmental openness appears more important that 
the presence of an official police spokesperson or PI0 who is often last to arrive at a 
crime scene and therefore cannot comprehensively manage the news.  The presence of 
PIOs is positively associated with the level of a department’s proactive contacts with 
media, but press releases, police-initiated calls to media, and other staged events do not 
comprise the bulk of routine news making and therefore cannot overshadow street-level 
“live” performances.  Finally, as such crime scene performances are more often captured 
live and  on  camera,  it is not  surprising that  police training  in  conducting television 
interviews emerged as the only significant media-training variable.  Of course, many of 
I 
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the nuances of what contributes to the police media image cannot be captured With survey 
4  data alone.  The next two  chapters, therefore, take  a more direct approach by focusing 
upon  four  case  study police departments: two of which report  satisfaction with their 
means of impression management,  two of which complain of poor performance reviews. 
I 
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CHAPTER 6 
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT  I 
The challenge becomes .  .  .finding the good story, finding 
the story that  showcases the good work that the men  and 
women  of this department  do,  and  [then]  making that  a 
story.  There's no damage when there's no story about the 
department on the news, but  there's also no benefit. You 
have to market yourself. 
- Urbandale PI0 
(Author interview) 
I 
Police image builders have a number  of factors with which they must contend, 
such as budgetary and personnel constraints, fluctuating population characteristics, and 
movements within local political climate.  Still, what places the media as central among 
these determinants is that it is primarily through  media that the public learns about police 
handling of these and other crime-related variables.  Police may use the media to tout 
new  policing initiatives, to request citizen assistance in preventing community disorder, 
and  to  project  the  fiiendlier aspects of  their job through human-interest  stones.  As 
impression  management  contains  elements  of  public  relations,  marketing,  and  self-  (7 
promotion, it requires departments to use their proactively to promote aspects of policing 
other than those that are crime-incident related that will enhance the department's image. 
Real examples of positive media coverage are plentifbl: a father-son team workkg for the 
department; an  arrangement between a community college and the police whereby auto 
body  students restore retired  vehicles  for police use  as custom vehicles;  an  off-duty 
officer saving a  diner's  life.  The  raw  material  is out  there;  it  simply needs to  be 
packaged, marketed, and delivered to reporters who can convert it into a news segment. 
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Of course, this requires that police communicate positive policing stories both internally 
I -  across ranks -  and externally to news media.  As one broadcast reporter told me: 
[One] thing that I find hstrating is, there are a lot of great 
people that work at the po)ice department.  A cop saw a kid 
walking to school with his toes sticking out of his shoes. 
His mom couldn’t af€ord new shoes. He took the kid to the 
store, went and bought the kid a new pair of shoes cause he 
sees him  everyday.  There are so many untold stories out 
there, so  many positive public relations stories for [police] 
to build up their image.  And I think it’s very frustrating 
because it’s not all negative.  I don’t know why they don’t 
promote this stuff, but I tell them over and over again,  ‘I 
wish you would.’  And I think a lot of times, it’s the guys 
and women out on the street who don’t think they’re doing 
anything out of the ordinary.  So if they don’t tell the PIO, 
the PI0 doesn’t know to pass it along.  I how  for a fact it 
goes on  everyday. I’m  sure it happens. (Author inthew) 
These views regarding the need  for increased departmental proactivity  of non-crime 
related  stories  were  echoed  by  a  big-city  police  chief,  who  was  critical  of  his 
department’s public information office for not  actively seeking out  positive policing 
stories: 
You know, we’re buying six more of these radar trailers 
that you just park out there and it flashes your speed at you, 
plus we’re starting a neighborhood radar program where .  . 
.  we’ll send them a letter telling them to slow down.  So, 
there’s  two  different  programs  right  out  of  traffic 
operations, two  different  things  . . . Had  [the  Tdic 
Division] called up here and talked to the PIOs  and said we 
want to [promote] this, then they would have jumped on it 
and set up [a press conference].  But . . .  unless I hear about 
it,  or they call the PIOs and  say they want  to do it,  [it 
doesn’t get done]. (Author interview) 
Still, many PIOs  maintain that news editors are unwilling to abandon their fourth 
estate mandate and give credit when credit is due.  They complain that media are ratings 
and  sales driven and have little interest in positive policing stories that do not contain 
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some form of drama.  While reporters do not discount claims that “if it bleeds, it leads,” 
they do suggest that there is always room for police input into the news-making process. 
According to one assignment editor, “It helps when departments prepare news releases, 
because we can work off of those and it makes our  job easier.”  Especially on particularly 
slow news days, assignment desks cannot rely exclusively upon police scanners for leads 
and must call the PI0 looking for information on local events to convert into a possible 
story.  The task then becomes one for the public information staff, who must  have an 
index of ideas to convert into possible news stories. 
As the purpose of case study research was to overcome the barriers of limited 
intexpretation  inherent  in  survey  responses, much  information about  successfid  (and 
unsuccessful) impression management stemmed  fiom first-hand observations of PIOs at 
work  and interviews with PI0 staff, police chiefs, and  crime beat reporters.  While the 
intent of case study research was not to “prove” GofEnan’s  (1959;  1974) theoretical 
model of social performances, the relevance of his writings to contemporary policing 
became  quite clear  as various  department  figureheads inevitably  incorporated  many 
aspects of dramaturgy into both their language and behaviors.  Moreover, the topic of 
this inquiry -  the manner with which police adapt to the performance demands of today’s 
mediated  environment - suggests  that  Gofhan’s  model  serves  as an  appropriate 
evaluative guide.  As such, an  analysis of departmental behavior will proceed  using 
much of the terminology employed by GofEnan is his discussions of the dramaturgy of 
everyday life.  For policing, those departments in my research successfd at impression 
management were those well versed in the three requisite skills that comprise the art of 
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routine impression management:  dramaturgical loyalty, discipline, and  circumspective 
fi.aming.  I 
Dramaturgical Loyalty 
If  the dramatic aspects  of  the theater  are part  of  everyday public  life, then 
impression management requires that each social actor adopt a stance of dramaturgical  i 
loyalty to the role she  must perform.  “Dramaturgical loyaltf‘ requires actors to maintain 
character roles at designated times and display a commitment to those -  cast and crew - 
responsible  for  maintaining  public  appearances (Gofian,  1959).  For police,  this 
requires recognition of media as part of everyday policing.  As it is no longer possible for 
the public to perceive the police without the influence of some medium (Kidd-Hewitt and 
Osborne, 1995), officers must become committed the police-media fhmework.  That is, 
they must recognize the pedormance nature of law enforcement and serve their public 
(the audience) through  cooperation with reporters (the critics). 
Dramaturgical loyalty and  successfid impression management  are inextricably 
linked.  This became readily apparent during case study research where the degree of 
dramaturgical loyalty varied  with  the department’s media  image.  Each  department 
employed hll-time PIOs, had functioning public information offices, and had garnered 
numerous and firmly established contacts within the local media. Yet  they differed with 
regard to their acceptance of and commitment to certain occupational obligations.  Two 
departments in particular, equally staffd and  equipped to handle media relations but 
reporting different degrees of media power, displayed clear distinctions in the extent of 
their dramaturgical loyalty:  the Urbandale Police Department and the Morganville Police 
Department. 
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agencies selected for case study research.  Its public information office consists of six 
fbll-time employees: three PIOs, one film  industry liaison”, one researchedfact checker, 
and one administrative assistant.  Each PI0 is highly trained in media relations, receiving 
on average 40 hours of external media training instruction per year. The PIOs are then 
responsible  for  relaying  their  training  skills  to  other  high-ranking  officials,  and 
sometimes to new recruits: 
I  [teach]  a  class  to  help  the  new recruits  and  new 
supervisors  understand  the  similarities in  the  roles  [of 
police and media] and to understand how certain negative 
actions will play.  To understand why it’s better to be open 
and honest and up-fi-ont.  I don’t think it’s  long enough. I 
get two hours with each group. But one of the things I’m 
trying to relay is it’s  not  a good  idea when  you’re  at a 
scene, when you’re besieged by media, it’s  not a good idea 
to say, you know, all right you guys  stand back qnd we’ll 
put you over here.’  I’m  trying to get rid of some of the 
negative or adversarial way of thinking.  We’re  also still 
evolving in the training aspect, but we have done on and off 
training with the staff. (Author interview) 
Not  only were  the Urbandale PIOs highly trained  in  media relations, they were  also 
selected to serve as on-camera personalities for calculated, political reasons.  “Barry,” the 
department’s senior ranking PIO, who in addition to his career in law enforcement has  an 
extensive background in stage, explained the selection of the Urbandale staff  to me: 
I took command of this office about six years ago.  Before 
then, the attitude here was that media were the enemy, and 
should be kept at an arm’s length.  I wanted to change all 
that.  Perhaps it’s partly due to my training in theater, but 
when I revamped the PI0 office, I wanted to select a cast 
”  The film industry liaison “is responsible for the issuance of film permits for all types  of commercial 
photography, film, and video activities on .  . .  public property.” The liaison also encourages the motion 
picture industry to use the city as a location site while ensuring “an accurate depiction of our department” 
in the movies. 
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that would be trusted by the audience watching the news  in 
their living room.  I wanted my  staff to appear realistic. 
When I met “Daryl,” I found him to be both articulate and 
easy on the eyes.  That he is also Aftican-American I found 
to be an asset. I also appointed “Juan,” who is an Hispanic- 
American.  So, between the three of  us, we had a cross 
section of the population.  And  I f-I  that the public has 
become familiar With  our staff,  they recognize us  on the 
television, and they know to trust us. (Author interview) 
Finally, the Urbandale researchedfact checker was formerly a city PI0 and has a degree 
in public relations.  She was responsible for drafting department press releases and other 
forms of proactive communication.  Staff members expressed fondness for their jobs, and 
the office  perceived their media image and the quality of police-mrter interaction as 
favorable. 
As an initial indication of the department’s commitment to the media relations 
paradigm, the Urbandale public information office is located on the ground floor of their 
police headquarters, just  adjacent to  the building’s  lobby.  The office is,  therefore, 
completely accessible to reporters and  members of the public who  avoid having to 
ovexwme the  hurdles  of  signing in,  producing  identification, and  obtaining visitor 
badges.  Not just a minor detail, the relevance of the office location became apparent 
during the first day of my visit when their computer scanner was discovered inoperable in 
the hours before the 11 o’clock news.  Earlier, Urbandale police officers apprehended a 
suspect on a hit-and-run charge that left a five-year-old boy in critical condition.  The 
arrest of the suspect was to become the evening headline,  as visuals of school ground 
crash-scene lead  the  5  o’clock  news.  With  the  scanner  not  functioning, the  public 
information office had no way to collectively e-mail the suspect mug shot to local news 
desks.  To ensure that media obtained their much-needed visual of this recent Urbandale 
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success, the PI0 taped the mug shot to the inside of the office window, allowing for 
camera crews to enter the lobby at any time during the night to  in tssence -photograph 
the photograph.  This  they did with much appreciation, with one cameraman explaining 
to me how this little thing makes such a big difference. 
I 
Not only does their office location reflect the department &mmitment to media, it 
also serves to foster the development of positive policdreporter (Le.,  pdormedcritic) 
relations.  Reporters frequently ate lunch in the public information office, either out of 
occupational  convenience or  in  response to  a  previously  scheduled  request  for  a 
lunchtime interview.  On one particular aftmoon, a local radio reporter arrived early for 
a  midday  press  conference  to promote  the  department’s  renewed commitment to 
preventing  domestic  violence.  Arriving  at  lunchtime,  she  came  into  the  public 
information office, asked what they were having for lunch, and:subsequently placed her 
order.  She proceeded to eat lunch with the office staff, joking around and telling stories. 
Less  than an hour later, she asked the chief to comment on  a city report that was critical 
of the department’s handling of a highly publicized political protest.  When I questioned 
her about the inherent conflict between fiaternking with the cops while simultaneously 
scrutinizing them, she pointed to one of the benefits that results fipm the department’s 
dramaturgical loyalty: 
I tell them up fiont when they’re the story.  And I told the 
PI0 staff that I  was going to ask [the Chief] about the 
report  following  the  press  conference.  When  the 
department is the story, I just say to them, ‘all right guys, 
you hcked up.  What can you tell me?’  And they give me 
what they can. (Author notes) 
Similar to Urbandale, the Morganville Police Department public information staff 
consists of  three  hll-time PIOs,  plus  additional administrative  staff available when 
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accommodate the demands of news  reporters.  In terms of perspnnkl, then, Morganville 
and Urbandale are relatively ~imilar.'~  Yet unlike the Urbandale Police Department, the 
Morganville  Police  were  classified  as a  low  media  power  department.  And  like 
Urbandale, whose commitment to media relations was clearly visible, many of the causes 
of Morganville's poor image were clearly apparent.  I 
I 
Unlike Urbandale, the Morganville media relations office is located on the top 
floor of the headquarters high rise, some twelve floors above the'public  and just adjacent 
to the chiefs office.  Its inaccessibility was not merely impressionistic but literal, and it 
created numerous problems for reporters trying to obtain crime information.  The newly 
appointed chief explained the situation as follows: 
Before the  administration  changed  . . . there  Was  very 
limited access  [for reporters].  I guess everything was  a 
challenge for the media  to get  any information hm  the 
police department. And I could kind of tell that because I 
met with many of the media police reporters .  . .  So . .  .  we 
tried to transition hm  that to the point where we opened 
the headquarters and building up  a little bit  so  [reporters] 
could go to public counters, [so]  they don't have to wait in 
the lobby.  But  we  [had] a problem with reporters . . . 
[Tlhey were wandering around sensitive areas, [causing us 
to again close the building]. So [reporters] developed these 
relationships with various officers on the streets . .  .  and I 
think that  was  kind  of  counter-productive,  too,  because 
media were reacting on mor  information, and it ate up a 
lot of administrative time trying to answer press questions 
on rumors. (Author interview) 
~  ~~ 
'* To my surprise, I was informed only during my visit that the current Morganville PI0 staff  had not yet 
received media skills training despite previous communication I had with the PI0 office indicating 
otherwise.  Apparently, it was a former Morganville PI0 who received 16 hours of training  per year.  The 
failure of the Morganville Police Department to maintain a consistent level of officer training is in itself 
indicative of a lack of dramaturgical loyalty if not budgetary funds. 
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*’ 
Moreover, unlike the Urbandale media relations staff that encouraged casual encounters 
between PIOs and reporters, at Morganville, no such interaction was witnessed. Instead, 
they  consistently referred to  reporters as “the  enemy  and  approached  policemedia 
interaction with an air of resentment.  They admittedly found ways to limit the amount of 
infomation they provide to reporters, only to express puzzlement when further  inquiries 
fiom reporters come in: 
I will release enough information to media to meet  their 
immediate needs, and I say to myself, ‘that’ll hold them ‘til 
tomorrow.’  But when they call back the next day and ask if 
there is any new idormation and I tell them ‘no,’  they get 
mad.  They constantly want information!” (Author notes) 
And  while  the  establishment  of  a  police-media  liaison  serves  as  a  symbol  of  a 
department’s  dramaturgical  loyalty,  Morganville  PIOs  repeatedly  voiced  their 
occupational allegiances: 
Sometimes I get confused who I work for.  But I try to let 
my officers know that I work for them, not the media.  And 
the media should make no mistake about the fact that I 
work for the police department first and foremost.  I am an 
officer. (Author notes) 
In  fact, Morganville PIOs do not particularly like their jobs. The position is a rite of 
passage,  a  test  of  endurance that  officers must  undergo  on  the  path  to  becoming 
lieutenant. As one former Morganville PI0  told me: 
I didn’t want [the] job .  .  .  It’s neat when friends say, ‘Hey, 
I saw you on TV,’  but I don’t give a shit about that.  I’m  a 
cop.  A street cop.  We take round pegs fiom round holes 
and try to jam them in a square hole, and it doesn’t work. 
And that [was] me.  I know law enforcement.  This [was] 
something totally opposite of my personality.  I [felt] like a 
round peg in a square hole.  Did I make an effort? Yeah, to 
some extent, but not as much as I probably could have.  I 
wasn’t excited about the job . . .  And as a lieutenant, I’ve 
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had six assignments in six years,  Well, I’m  not going to 
really learn my job when I’m not going to be here that long. 
So,  it’s  more  than  media,  it’s  department maflagment. 
(Author interview) 
Dramaturgical Discipline 
I 
Of cow,  impression management requires more than a commitment to the 
theatrical framework.  Social actors must also be adept at convincing audiences of the 
authenticity of their performances.  This requires  a  high degree of  “dramaturgical 
discipline,” or what Gofban (1959) refers to as a show of intellectual and emotional 
involvement in the role that is being staged.  For Gof%nan, “the focus of dramaturgical 
discipline is to  be found  in  the management of one’s  face and  voice . . .  and an 
appropriate affective response” (p.  217).  It quires  performers to identify with their 
audiences in order to ensure a reciprocal bond.  As a result,  a performer often must 
“suppress his spontaneous feelings in order to give the appearance of sticking to  the 
affective line” (p. 217). 
Unfortunately, dramaturgical discipline is at odds with traditional police training 
that  describes  police professionalism  as uncompromisingly  stalwart  and  aflkctively 
neutral.  But  as police departments have made the shift toward a more community- 
oriented approach, they may find the display of humanness  advantageous in restructuring 
the police image.  Daryl, a PI0  working with the Urbandale Police Department, actively 
works to instill upon his audience the fact that he is one within the community. 
One of the things that’s been very important in the past six 
years is  try  to  move  away  fiom  simply being  a police 
officer; it’s in our television persona, it’s in the quotes that 
we give in the newspaper, it’s in what we do in the radio, 
and it’s  in what we do in the community.  We  try to go 
away from just a police officer’s persona.  We  try to let 
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people know  that Barry’s a father, that he’s  got a dog at 
home,  that outside of the uniform we’re  John Q.  Citizen, 
we’re just like the people we’re  trying to reach.  But by the 
same token, we’re highly trained law enforcement officers 
who  have feelings,  who  are emotional, who,  you  know, 
have the same concerns as our neighbors.  And I think that 
in developing relationships with the community, it becomes 
easier for the person who’s been seeing me on television 
for six years to say, ‘you know what, if Barry -  the person 
in the community I’ve grown to trust -  is explaining it in a 
fahion that I can understand, in  plain speak  and not  cop 
talk,  then at the very least I’m going to stop as a citizen and 
go, hmm,  I sort of understand.’  We get away from simply 
‘the facts’ in. .  .  presenting a story and in the bites that we 
give.  We  go  into,  ‘this is probably how  I’d  be feeling; 
these  are  the  things  I’ve  gone  through  in  similar 
experiences.’  And  that’s  why  I think it’s  very  important 
that  we’re  law  enforcement  officers  [serving]  as PI& 
rather than a person who has never worn the badge, donned 
the uniform, and  gone out.  I think that in showing both 
sides, showing that I am this person but this person also.  I 
think  that  helps  get  [our]  message  across.  (Author 
interview) 
I was able to witness firsthand the touch of affect and emotional display involved 
impression management when  I accompanied Barry to the scene of a triple stabbing. 
Apparently, a jealous bofiend  had stabbed his girlfiiend in the presence of  her youngest 
child (who was dependent upon a respirator).  The eldest child was then stabbed in his 
side as  he moved to protect his mother.  Finally, the boyfiiend proceeded to the bedroom 
where he stabbed the middle child, as she lay in her bed asleep.  As if the events of the 
crime were not unique enough,  the suspect was  a deaf-mute, which  slowed down the 
arrest, reading of the suspect’s rights, and questioning of the accused, meaning the media 
would have to wait for many of the story details. 
We  can’t  solve  a  crime,  because  we  already  have  the 
suspect.  But the family is very poor and has special needs. 
So we may as well use the media to help the family.  Also, 
we  can’t  release  any specific details yet  about  the case. 
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Investigation is still working and they  are having a tough 
time getting the guy to cooperate, especially since he’s a 
deaf-mute.  So,  we run a background on the guy and give 
that to the media to begin to paint a picture of the guy. Tell 
part of the story. 
At  the same time, Barry was quite cognizant of the need to present a usable sound bite 
that conveyed the seriousness ofthe case.I3 
I  start to  think about what  the drama is.  What I try to 
convey to  my  staff is to  get  across the human  element. 
Clearly, in this case, it is the nightmare the children must 
have  felt  watching  their  mother  stabbed,  then  getting 
stabbed  themselves.  We  all  have  nightmares  and  are 
relieved when we wake up.  But what if we can’t wake up? 
So this is what I go with. 
Ultimately, Barry gave them the drama they wanted providing media with the following 
sound bite: 
[The crime scene] looked like a war zone.  There was blood 
everywhere.  Imagine  the  horror  and  pain  that  these 
children felt.  Like a nightmare they can’t wake up fhm. 
And  one  of  the  children  was  on  a  respirator.  They 
[recently]  moved  here [from another state] to be closer to 
the hospital where the child is being treated. 
By contrast, reporters working the Morganville public information office describe 
their PIOs as emotionally cold, steadfastly stoic, and ~ncooperative.’~ 
They really are the worst I’ve ever had to deal with.  They 
could have a string of ten rapes and they don’t  want  the 
media’s help.  They don’t need it.  They are as arrogant as 
they  come . . . and  they want  to be  able  to  operate in 
l3 One element of the crime that generated a bit of humor (albeit in a dark sort of way) was the fact that 
because the suspect was deaf-mute, the couple communicated through writing. Therefore, the couple’s 
entire exchange leading up the stabbing was documented on a legal pad found atop the kitchen counter. 
Whether the written exchange was akin to a confession or would legally be treated as testimony against the 
self, was not the topic of conversation.  Rather, it was the fact that but for the tragic outcome, the legal pad 
presented a humorous  and ironic twist. 
l4 Despite the occurrence of at least two fatalities (one accidental, one criminal) during my visit in 
Morganville, I was unable to witness their PIOs  working a crime scene because, operating under 
discretionary communication, the PIOs  chose not to respond to the incident sites.  a 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not secrecy . . . If your  goal is to block  all information, then 
you  put in charge the biggest asshole you can find.  (Author 
interview) 
While  there is a  difference between  emotional coldness  and  outright  insensitivity, a 
failure to appear affiectively  moved by proximate events does not reflect positively upon 
responding officers or their department, for it fails to project what Goffinan refers to as 
the  “expressive  status  quo.”  The  balance  is  a  difficult  one, as the  elements  of 
dramaturgical discipline (namely, emotional drama) can border on sensationalism.  Thus, 
one Morganville PI0 expressed to her hstration at  being  asked questions similar to 
“how long was the knife?” following a stabbing or ‘%ow long did it take to dig ‘em  out?” 
following the collapse of a building.  Still, Morganville reporters suggested room  for  . 
improvement on the part of the Police Department: 
I think they need to have someone in their PI0 office who 
really understands the media . . .  And, you how, part of 
being  a  PI0 is giving  good  sound  bites  and  giving us 
interviews we can use.  And  so  you need  someone who’s 
very  articulate  and  on the  ball  and  can  disseminate 
information quickly and release it and speak well. (Author 
interview) 
These  sentiments were  shared by  a former  Morganville PIO, who  clearly recognizes 
problems with Morganville media relations: 
You  don’t just take somebody and make them [sic] a PIO. 
The person has to want to be a PIO. You can give them 
training,  but  that  doesn’t  necessarily make  them  a PIO. 
They have to be articulate. It has to be a balance, you have 
to have the tools to be able to do this job, and the bulk of 
cops on  the job don’t have the tools.  You have to have the 
cohesiveness that gives you the ability to be in fiont of the 
camera.  (Author interview) 
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Circumspective Framing 
“Dramaturgical  circumspection”  represents  the  most  shallenging  skill  of 
impression management.  Like an improvisational performance, it calls on the performer 
to  operate without the safety net of a script even while staging a routine performance. 
Occasionally, actors may  repeat  well-received  gestures or accentuate dramatic lines. 
“hey may also have to create new  lines or movements should a prop be misplaced or a 
line forgotten.  These same principles apply for the social actor, who must “adapt his 
performance  to  information conditions under  which  it  must  be  staged”  (Goffman, 
1959:218).  At times this may  call for the exploitation of present opportunities or the 
exercise of prudence and restraint.  At other times it requires actors to not only stage a 
performance, but to also provide its interpretative fknework (Goffinan,  1974). 
A “he”  is a conceptualization that provides meaning to performances.  Every 
public staging is subject to  numerous interpretations regarding its cause, motive, and 
impact.  Frames provide the context through which performances are viewed, interpreted 
and critiqued.  An idea developed by Goflinan as an addendum of sorts to his theatrical 
metaphor of social life, ‘‘flaming” has become central to the constructionist paradigm.  It 
asserts that those who operate outside of the setting attach meanings to situations.  Stated 
differently, “a ‘definition of the situation’ is almost always to be found, but those who are 
in the situation ordinarily do  not create this definition” (Goffinan, 1974:l).  Instead, 
outsiders use frames to simplie events by affixing meanings to situations that codorm to 
previously established or understood realities. 
As second-party storytellers, journalists provide interpretive frames to the events 
they  report,  transforming  slices  of  life  into  broader,  more  meaningful  news  items.  e 
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Gamson and Modigliani (1  989) argue that reporters apply a set of interpretive packages 
, that  contain a range of positions on various issues, with each frame presenting images 
and  symbols  for the purpose of generating a broader social metaphor.  Jones (1993),  a 
journalist for 30 years and now a media consultant to government officials, notes that 
news  stories most  typically revolve around one of the compelling “C’s”:  catastrophe, 
crisis, conflict, crime, corruption and color (i.e.,  human interest).  Since crime within the 
news has become routine, reporters must  select crime stories containing an additional 
compelling “C‘, or else ax  one to an otherwise mundane crime-related occurrence. 
Lule (2001)  suggests  that the news fiames conform to one of many  enduring cultural 
archetypes and that the news “story” is essentially that: a story that draws upon mythical 
staples in  an  attempt  to  interpret  or make  sense of  the world.  One  reporter, who 
explained why  the crime “beat” remains his favorite, explicitly stated this reporter-as- 
storyteller fiamework to me: 
What I look for are stories that are interesting at face value, 
but  also  [interesting] on  a  deeper  level.  What  does  this 
story say about  who  we  are as a city?  Who we  are as 
people?  As white people?  As black people?  Stories that 
can be used as metaphors for something bigger.  Obviously, 
not all crime stones are that.  Most of them aren’t.  Most of 
them [only involve] a stupid person or a bad person .  .  .  and 
that’s all there is to it, But I do think you see more of those 
[metaphoric] stones in  crime  stories  than,  say,  [a  story 
about] a city council meeting. (Author interview) 
For PI&  to successfully exercise impression management, they must possess an 
acute  awareness  of journalistic news  fiaming.  When officers  complain  about  their 
actions or words being reported  “out of context,” they  are expressing their frustration 
over having lost control of the news fiame.  They must recognize that news is not merely 
reported, but also interpreted.  Absent any attempt by the PI0 to provide the context of  e 
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crime information, the department risks losing control of both  information and  public 
opinion.  The challenge for the PI0 “becomes trying  to take that  negative thing and 
figuring out a way to put a positive spin on it so that.. .it’s not focused upon negatively” 
(Author interview,  9/15/00).  While  still providing  accurate, truW  and  complete 
information, the PI0 frames  the event  as part  of  a broader interpretive schema that 
adheres to the demands of media fomats. 
The Urbandale Police Department was adept at constructing positive interpretive 
fhmes of otherwise tragic news events, and they possessed a keen understanding of the 
requisite story ingredients: visuals, sound bites, drama, and theme.  Even when a story 
was unlikely to reflect badly upon the department, they managed to present a crime story 
as one of human interest.  As an example, a hit-and-run story became one of community 
heroism after a team of Urbandale PIOs deliberated at the crash scene and decided upon 
an interpretive news fia~ne.’~  The event began when an afternoon call came in to the 
Urbandale public information office regarding a hit-and-run  that  left a young boy  in 
critical condition.  Before  responding to  the  scene,  the  staff issued  a press  release 
containing the initial  information  (reported incident and  location) and  collectively e- 
mailed it to local news desks to ensure that media were notified.I6  . Upon anival, the 
senior PI0 quickly spoke with each officer on the scene to ensure accurate, complete and 
consistent information. 
Is Gofiinan refers to such deliberation as “circumspection in staging the show.” (p. 218). 
l6 In all likelihood, media were aware of the incident before the Urbandale PIOs,  as they monitor all radio 
communication between Urbandale Police and their dispatch bridge.  In fact, when we anived at the crash 
scene, members of the news media were already present and speaking with responding officers while 
awaiting an official sound bite from the Urbandale PIO.  a 
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Apparently,  a driver was speeding toward  a school zone when  he encountered 
afternoon traflic at the end of the elementary school day.  The driver became impatient 
with the gridlock and decided to circumvent the traf‘fic by bypassing all cars on the right. 
This resulted in the car careening upon the school sidewalk, where it struck a mother 
standing with her two children, pinning the 5-year-old boy undaneath the car.  After 
speaking with officers at the scene, the Urbandale PIOs leamed that ten witnesses had 
lifted up on the car so that the child could be pulled out fiom underneath.  The driver 
subsequently ran  hm  the  scene.  With  two  of  the  witnesses still nearby, the  PI@ 
(literally) huddled and decided upon the story’s Me:  “local heroes save the day.” While 
at the scene, the PIOs  explained to me their decision-making process. 
There are several angles here.  First, you  simply have the 
hit and run with the possible resulting homicide.  There is 
also  a  story  about  what  can result while  speeding in  a 
school zone.  This is a safety issue we can focus on.  Third, 
there is a story about good Samaritans lifting a car to save a 
boy.  . Clearly, this third angle has the drama the media 
want.  But ultimately, we can get three positive stories out 
of this one event. Today, we’ll  focus on  the heroism and 
how lucky the boy is that members of the community come 
together.  Especially in this high crime community, they 
need a story like this.  But tomorrow, we can focus on the 
fact that speeding in school zones will become a policing 
priority.  Finally,  if the boy does survive, and even if he 
doesn’t, we will most certainly make the witnesses the local 
heroes of the  month  and  gain  additional  positive media 
coverage when we give them  their awards.  I could push 
something else, some other angle, but decided on this one 
because I know the media,  and  media love heroes.  And 
picking a story angle like this allows much media coverage 
of the  heroes  and  encourages others to  act  accordingly. 
(Author notes) 
When  the stations went live and  questioned police about the condition of the boy, the 
Morganville PI0 responded by  saying, “He’s on his way  to emergency now, but you 
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know, I think the real story here is about our local heroes,” and he proceeded to direct 
, cameras to the “heroes” by his side, who were more than willing to take credit for their 
actions.  And reporters appreciate when PIOs serve as storytellers: 
Most departments only g&e you facts: time, place.  But we 
already know that.  We need something with drama.  And 
the &kbandale]  Department lrnows this.  So,  if they can’t 
give  us  specifics,  at  least  they  will  provide  some 
catchwords.  Ifthere is  a homicide, but details need to be 
withheld, at least they will provide an angle, such as, “this 
is the most violent homicide of the kind I’ve seen  since on 
the force” or “the crime scene was a mess.”  (Author notes) 
The newspaper’s metro-section headline featured the interpretive sound bites delivered at 
the scene: “Crowd of Heroes Lifts Car Off Boy.’’ 
HEROES LIFT CAR  TO  FREE  BOY 
Young pedestrians hit, injured 
When a car swerved out of control after a collision and ran 
down a mother and two children Thursday  . . . ,  a mob 
formed -  a mob of heroes, a dozen or more young men who 
lified a half-overturned car off 5-ym-old 
“They  may  have  saved  his  life,”  police  spokesman 
said hopefully. (Newspaper #002209) 
In contrast to the dramaturgical circumspection exhibited by  the Urbandale public 
information  office,  the  Spring Lake  Police  Department  did  not  display  the  skills 
necessary to provide a positive interpretation of an otherwise tragic event.  To be sure, 
unlike the events above that had already unfolded when the Urbandale PIOs  arrived, the 
incident in Spring Lake was still developing as local media arrived.  Given the timing of 
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the event and the unique factors of this otherwise routine (i.e.,  anticipated, planned and 
, rehearsed) police response, the handling of media relations was rather impressive.  Still, 
the  example  below  illustrates how  many  PIOs  overlook  opportunities to  “exploit” 
(Gofian’s  term)  the  good  work  di4layed  by  officers  for  the  purpose  of  routine 
impression management. 
The  event began  with  a late night  call  about  shots fired  at  a residence with 
hostages held inside. Upon aniving at the scene, ‘Ted,”  the Spring Lake PIO,  located the 
command center for details to relay to reporters and news  bureaus. With only minimum 
details available, Ted resembled a reporter himself. With a pad and pencil in hand,  he was 
eager to obtain any information to meet his own deadline of sorts: the arrival of the local 
media.  As was standard protocol, a command center officer used a laptop computer to 
document an official incident timeline of police maneuvers.  The following information, 
extracted hm  the on-site report, illustrates the quality of information available to Ted 
upon first arriving at the scene: 
23:48  Call-up  SWAT  [regarding  shots  fired,  possible 
hostage situation]. 
00:45 Grandfather shot granddaughter; four other children 
inside  house,  one  possibly  upstairs,  one  in  basement. 
[Grandfather]  suffers  fbm  dementia  according  to 
granddaughter.  Also according to granddaughter, she was 
downstairs,  heard  gunshots,  went  upstairs  and  yelled  to 
grandfather asking if he was okay.  Grandfather replied that 
he was having  a bad  dream.  Granddaughter knocked  at 
door,  and  (?)  shots were  fired  through  the door,  hitting 
granddaughter in the  shoulder.  The  victim  ran  outside, 
boyfiiend ends up  across the street; granddaughter rescued 
outside the house. 
Working off this timeline and additional information provided by responding officers, it 
was discovered  that  an elderly man suffering fiom dementia awoke confbsed  fkom  a 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 147 
dream and began firing a gun in his bedroom. His granddaughter, who resides with him 
along with her four siblings, knocked on his bedroom door to question what was wrong. 
Confused, he shot through  the door, striking her in the shoulder.  Somehow, she managed 
to exit the house and call for help.  a’en Ted and I arrived, the gradather was still 
inside the house with the remaining grandchildren,  and both  the SWAT  and hostage 
negotiation teams were on the scene.  Fortunately for Ted,  media would not arrive until 
just before their 5am  broadcast, giving him time to clarifL information.  In fact, the only 
reporter on the scene was  “Gordon,”  an  independent journalist who  monitors police 
scanners,  responds to crime scenes,  and  sells sound bites and  video  footage to news 
organizations for a fee.17  On this particular morning, Gordon was  going to  record a 
statement fiom the PI0 on his own  tape player and use a computer in the trunk of  his car 
to send the digital sound file to a 24-hour local news radio station.” 
By the time the television stations’ camera did  anive just prior to 5am,  many 
developments had occurred.  Police had learned fiom the victim’s  boyfriend that the 
suspect had a 25  caliber pistol, a 22 rifle, and a 12 gauge shotgun located upstairs, while 
in the basement was a safe containing another 12 gauge shotgun, an additional 22 rifle, a 
40 caliber handgun, and  an AK-47.  He was unable to confirm any history of mental 
instability, but stated that he had known  the suspect for about six years and had  seen  him 
”  As both Gordon and the PI0  informed me, independent reporters  are much appreciated in the local news 
community,  because my  times it is cheaper for stations to purchase! visuals from him than to dispatch a 
reporter and camera crew. 
It was also fortunate for Ted that he had built a good working relationship with Gordon, as this becomes 
important during developing events.  Ted’s  initial sound bite revealed sensitive information. The city’s 
SWAT team was preparing a stealth entry into the house to rescue the remaining children.  After providing 
Gordon with the latest information, Ted realized that if the radio decided to immediately air this statement, 
it could tip off the suspect.  Therefore, at Ted’s request, and because of their positive working relationship, 
Gordon erased the sound bite and  recorded a new, benign statement. 
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intoxicated “about four or five times.” The SWAT team subsequently decided to secretly 
enter the house and remove the children from  the confused  and /heavily armed man, 
which they accomplished without incident. 
These details allowed for dramatic affectation and emotional involvement -  “the 
crucial test of one’s  ability as a performer” -  when  delivering sound bites about this 
obvious police success.  Ted,  however, did not display any of the qualities that make for 
good television.  Instead, he used  legalistic, tactical language (e.g.,  “Our  SWAT  team 
I 
was able to extricate the children fiom the home”) that  contained neither the dramatic 
affectations nor the pithy sound bites necessary for impression management.  Moreover, 
the statements provided did not fixme the events as a success despite the fact that all 
“children” were “rescued” by “Spring Lake Police.”  Yet  for GoBEman,  sometimes even 
the most effective means of impression management quires  little more than “keeping 
close to the facts.”  And up until this point, the facts presented the Silver Lake police in a 
rather positive light. 
Unfortunately, as reporters were to go live again at  5:30am.,  all opportunities for 
promoting police successes passed, as new  developments quickly overshadowed earlier 
events.  Apparently, the grandfather -  either drunk or confused -  could not communicate 
with the hostage negotiation team  and either deliberately or accidentally set fire to his 
house while refusing to come out.  Remote units went  live as the fire department was 
called in, with flames providing camera crews with their necessary visuals.  Before the 
6am  broadcast, the fire department would  report  the grandfather’s body found  in the 
south side of the home.  By  not fiaming this event as a successful  police rescue, the story 
became one of a tragic event.  Thus, unlike the Morganville interpretive fi-ame wherein 
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heroism  triumphs  over  tragedy,  for residents  of  Spring  Lake,  disaster  overshadows 
4 deliverance: “Standoff Ends:  One Dead, One Wounded.” 
STANDOFF: 1  DEAD, 1  WOUNDED 
Four children are rescued after a man, who later dies in 
a house fire, shoots  his stepgranddaughter 
A 73-year-old man was found dead in his Northeast . . . 
home early today  after the structure caught  fire during a 
standoff with police. 
The  standoff  began  when  the man  shot  his 26-year-old 
step-granddaughter in the arm. Police were called to the 
home  .  .  .  just  before  midnight  and  found 
[thegranddaughter] lying in the driveway with  a gunshot 
wound to her left shoulder. 
[She] apparently had been shot when  she knocked on her 
step-grandfather’s bedroom door and he fired shots through 
it, police said . .  .  (Newspaper # 001 110) 
For routine impression management, then,  social actors must transcend the simple 
delivery  of  scripfed  lines  Vis-his  the  mere  communication  of  crime  incident 
information.  Instead,  they must stage a performance, utilizing  all of the  talents of a 
veteran stage performer:  drama, language,  and  expression.  Moreover, they must not 
only deliver lines, but  also interpret them  by  providing the meaning  behind  routine 
performances.  This allows for the actor to serve as both performer and critic, and it is a 
skill  that  is  recognizably  absent  fiom  low  media  departments,  as well  as  some 
departments more or less adept at routine media communication: 
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[W]e can give out information on crime scenes all day long 
but  it’s  a completely different world  dealing proactively 
with the press.  It’s  a different talent.  So that’s what I see 
missing is the public relations part of it  . . .  We  don’t  get 
any  credit out of handling crime or investigating complex 
cases.  IpIOs] just  say,  ‘here’s the  bad  guy,  they  were 
arrested.”  It’s not ...y ou can’t make [media] appreciate the 
talent, the resources it takes to actually solve these major 
crimes.  So I guess  . . .  what I’m  saying as far as public 
relations  goes,  that’s  what  I  see as missing.  (Author 
interview -  Morganville Police chief) 
Performing Disorganization 
There are periods in staged performances when one actor is able to benefit fkom 
the misstep of another.  One character or a group of characters may even  try to induce a 
foul-up on the part of another for the sole purpose of creating the appearance of actor 
dominance.  Noting the “various functions of negative experience” in certain aspects of 
perfonnances, Goffman (1974:382-383)  suggests,  “One should anticipate that intentional 
effort will be made to produce these states.” Applying Gofian’s  theatrical analogy of 
the “organizational role of disorganization” to the public sector, it is ofien the case that 
one branch of govemment may prove to credit from the discrediting of another.  Thus, 
politicians often campaign on a promise to improve a failing school system, to restore a 
sense of civility and decency to public office, and to radically improve upon  a failing 
criminal justice system. 
For better or worse, police are inextricably linked to  this game of politics.  As 
government  agents possessing wide  discretionary  powers,  it  is  essential that  police 
remain accountable to the public they serve.  At the same time, police are often lightning 
rods at the center of struggle for political or social control.  Today, few community issues 
prove more contentious and  divisive than the oversight of police performance, forcing 
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file or against them.  Perhaps best expressed by Fyfe et  al. (1997:94),  “if these officials 
stand too close, they may be tarred with scandal; if they stay at  a distance, they may 
allow their police to become entities unto themselves.”  For police, then,  the political 
process is a routine part  of impression management,  and even  the most  well  trained 
police spokespersons face political obstacles in the communication’s game.  I 
I 
The Union Creek Police Department serves as a unique example of how a well- 
equipped public information office can nevertheless  der  from  “low  media power” 
because  of city politics.  To  begin,  the agency was staffed with  a PI0 qualified to 
exercise effective impression management.  Although new to the job,  she was visibly 
excited about serving as spokesperson for the department she has loyally served.  Without 
having received any external media training, she was quite comfortable with her position 
as  the  department’s lone  PI0 despite the demands  it placed  on her physically  and 
personally.  And in her short time serving as PIO, she received a commendation hm  the 
city’s left-wing weekly reader, listing her among their list of “Best of. . .” for the year 
2000: 
Best  press  fiack:  Not  be  [sic]  codbed  with  ‘best 
spinmeister,’ wnion City] police spokesperson 
just tells it straight.  Honest and  reasonable,  willing and 
able. And she knows you’re on deadline. 
The problem, then, was rooted in city politics. With the city’s government run by a strong 
mayor  determined to  maintain control of all government  functions,  the police public 
information office was regularly at the mercy of city officials. The chief, eager to explain 
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the damage caused to the police image by  city politics, explained to me the mayor’s 
communication policy: 
One of the cumbersome things we have in this bureaucracy 
is that when  [we deal wjth] media inquiries, all sorts  of 
relatively routine,  simple requests  for  a crime report or 
something comparable to that [face a]  review process  .  . 
[Tlhe city administration reviews,  they  want  to be  kept 
informed, not only of the questions being asked so they can 
develop a position, but the information that we’re  going to 
provide.  So generally we tell the media that if they want 
some information,  [they  must]  make  a “public  record’s 
request,”  which really slows down the information flow - 
not  for  the  media,  but  the  infomation  flow  to  the 
community.  And  because I’m  part of  an  ve 
process, it’s  important that I follow the guidelines that are 
established  for  me  by  the  administrative head  of  this 
government, although I’m  in opposition to the position that 
they take, I’m  forced to comply.  This is a city policy.  The 
city has enacted a public policy request -  that every request 
for information be documented in a written request.  We 
compile the data and we send it to the assistant director of 
public safety who,  along with some spokesperson for the 
city  administration, reviews  the  request  and determines 
what should be released and the manner in which it should 
be released.  It  seems like a very simple process, but the 
committee only meets once or twice a week and as a result 
the  information to  the  media  gets  delayed.  It’s  rather 
unfortunate, but  it’s  a  way  for the  city government to 
control not  necessarily  the  flow  of  idomation,  but  to 
control and have some insight into what is being inquired. 
So if it’s a controversial issue or a controversial topic, the 
city  can  develop a  policy.  Not  a  policy  but  perhaps  a 
position,  so  everybody’s  informed of the question being 
asked  . . . So that’s the whole purpose of the delay.  It 
really isn’t  an attempt to stop the flow of information but 
simply be aware of it,  cognizant  of the questions being 
asked, see if there’s a problem, and see what position the 
city administration is going to go on this particular topic. 
[But] we get a lot of public records requests.  Upward of 
700 this year.  So I think the media’s perception of us is at 
best “fair,” not because what we’re doing is not honest or 
accurate, but just delayed.  They all have deadlines.  We’re 
not  keeping pace  with them. (Author interview -  Union 
Creek Police Chief) 
.. 
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“Tom,”  a print reporter &om the city’s major daily newspaper, expressed his hstration 
over the inability to obtain information beyond the routine incident report,  this despite 
having a news bureau office within the police headquarters building: 
Any public records  request above and  beyond  the basic 
police  report  [has  to  go  through the  Mayor’s’  office], 
because the mayor has this, you know, you have to file a 
written records request, and then it’s reviewed by  the law 
department.  It  takes  sometimes  two  weeks  to  get 
something.  It’s completely unacceptable.  It’s total kking 
bullshit. .  .  .  I have a good relationship with the PIO.  She’s 
a straight shooter and all  that  .  .  .  I’ve never felt that we’ve 
been stonewalled, or that she’d deliberately tried to deceive 
us.  That  said, I think  the system overall -  that all media 
has to  go through one person, having one filter, I don’t 
think that’s  reporting.  I don’t  think that’s being a police 
reporter.  I don’t blame her for that.  I don’t blame the 
Chief for that.  I think that comes directly hm  the mayor. 
And  he has his reasons for that.  I think the city has this 
siege mentality  [that]  we’re  somehow  we’re  avt to  get 
them, at every shooting we go to we’re looking for a case 
of police brutality (Author interview) 
Recognizing that communication  (Le.,  the ability to speak  in  character) is both 
essential  to  establishing  positive  media  relations  and  necessary  to  thwart  media 
speculations of cover-ups, the department actively took steps to undermine the intent of 
the mayor’s policy while maintaining an appearance of political loyalty.  This action is 
one  that  Goffinan  (1959)  refers  to  as “team  coll~sion.~’  It  represents  a  means  of 
maintaining routine perfonnames while surreptitiously acting out of character, and it is 
most  often carried out  when  a performer must  deliver a line contrary  to  his  inward 
feelings.  The Union  Creek Police routinely engage in  team  collusion.  That  is, they 
“intentionally stretch” what would commonly be considered a routine information request 
for  the  purpose  of  accommodating  media  and  maintaining  positive  police-reporter 
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but we recognize the fact that 99% of the time [media] requests y-e legitimate, the kind of 
things we would in fact be obligated to provide.” Moreover, the department utilizes  “a 
lot of ‘off  the record’ conversations.  I think we do three times as much  background 
I 
information off the record.  We try to do it very subtly, and sometimes not too subtly” 
(Author interview -  Union Creek Police Chief). 
I 
At any given the, any individual performer may overtly express discontent with 
various members of the performance team.  That is, a performer hay  play to the audience 
for the purpose of securing some form of dramaturgical change.  These temporary yet 
controlled character “realignments” are quite common in politics, with one team member 
critiquing the pdormance of another via the public.  For example, the Union Creek 
mayor on several occasions was prone to using the police dep&@ent  as a pawn in his 
own political game to boost public respect for his own staging of events.  According to 
“Lisa,” a Union Creek broadcast reporter, the mayor began using the police as political 
scapegoats since the time he first ran for office: 
The  police  union’s  rank  and  file,  and  the  mayor,  have 
always been  at  loggerheads.  This goes  back  years  ago 
when the mayor was [running for office] for the ht  time. 
The police union did not endorse him.  It’s possible that he 
still  holds  a  grudge.  Instead  of  supporting  his police 
department -  the rank and file -  I believe he supports the 
upper echelons.  I mean, he picks the chief.  But I think as 
far as the mayor and the rank and file police officers on the 
street,  they’ve  always  been  at  loggerheads.  (Author 
interview) 
Tom, the Union Creek print reporter, provided the following example: 
Rank  and  file  police  officers  despise the  mayor.  The 
Mayor, in turn, [despises them].  They think the pay is low, 
their  equipment  isn’t  updated,  and  that  he  raises police 
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brutality issues.  They feel they’re  not appreciated by  the 
mayor.  There was an incident with  the Ku Klwc  Klan  here. 
What happened was, the mayor came out and called a press 
conference and said that he had infomation that there were 
active cells of white supremacists operating in the police 
department.  This was abut a year ago.  And  when  [he] 
was asked for proof of it, he said, ‘well, there’s an ongoing 
investigation.’  Now,  the question is, if you’re  doing an 
ongoing  investigation,  why  would  you  call  a  press 
conference?  wnless],  you’re  really not  interested in the 
ongoing  investigation  as  much  as  to  embarrass  the 
department.  He calls the Feds, and the FBI  comes out with 
a study that says there’s no  proof. Now,  are there racists in 
the police department?  Of course.  There are racists  in 
plain view all over the place, not just in the department. 
So, the police union was pissed about that.  Then,  the KKK 
says they’re going to march in this city.  The mayor, I think 
correctly, said ‘Fine, you have a right to march. We despise 
you,  but you have a right to  march.  And we’re  going to 
have the police provide  you  with  security.’  Well,  the 
Police resented that.  They said,  ‘Look,  you  called this 
press  conference  saying  we’re  racists,  and  now  you’re 
making us provide security for the man! How’s  that going 
to  look?’  And  that’s  the  thing,  the  Chief  is a political 
appointee,  so in terms of  responding to  this via  media, 
does he comment?  Well, no.  He’s  a political appointee. 
So, the chief and the district commanders stand up there at 
the press conference with a grim look on their faces and 
saying, ‘you know,  we’re  going to look into this, check it 
out.’  And  under  their  breath, they’re  saying,  ‘that  dirty 
m.f’ And  so  then  the  rank  and  file  are sitting  there 
wondering why the chief and district commanders didn’t 
stand up  for us.  So,  they’re  in a tough spot.  So,  it’s  all 
political posturing. (Author interview) 
when I had an opportunity to ask the chief to comment on the politics of policing, he 
offered the following comments, agreeing that “certainly the mayor’s office, the elected 
city council, [and] the judicial candidates have  all used  the police division as a tool.” 
Moreover, his comments hinted at the allegations made by the mayor regarding members 
of the police union: 
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the police unions have risen to the level that it’s -  I won’t 
use the word  frightening -  but it’s  unfiir.  I don’t i know 
how  to  be  tactful,  but  at  times  it’s  very  ugiy.  Finger 
pointing, accusations, unions were accusing the leadership 
of the city of not being responsive to  safety issues.  The 
mayor will  respond  by  saying the union’s nothing more 
than a bunch of thugs. (Author intemiew) 
And of course, all of this political struggling is played out in headlines of daily papers  I 
and in the sound bites delivered on the evening news,  leaving the public’s  allegiances 
divided and the police with neither broad based public support nor a favorable public 
image. 
To overcome city politics, police may lower barriers between them and opposing 
teams to  fonn team alignments of their own.  Sometimes, GofEnan  suggests,  teams 
working in “avowed opposition” discover that momentary realignments produce mutual 
 benefit^.'^  With regard to the police, they may have as much interest in  discrediting a 
vociferous political figurehead as a city hall reporter looking for the definitive story on a 
political issue.  During such times of character realignment,  an established history of 
positive police-reporter interaction becomes crucial, as police may  temporarily realign 
themselves with their other vocal critics, especially when each may have something to 
gain.  In Union Creek, the reporters that I interviewed expressed deep hstration over the 
mayor’s policies regarding public information.  That the reporters I spoke with also felt 
the mayor’s charges of racism were unfounded and that the police PI0 was a “straight 
shooter,” suggests that reporters might temporarily display their political allegiances with 
members of what  is traditionally an  opposing team.  Tom,  whose commitment to the 
“Team collusion” and “momentary realignments” constitute what Goffman (1959) refers to  as 
‘‘accommodative  treatments.” As they are most often applied during non-routine events, they will be 
explained in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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media’s fourth estate mandate placed him  at odds with the mayor’s policy on written 
records requests, stated his belief that “quite frankly, [he’s] been mg  to fuck with us.” 
Given his belief that the mayor’s policy blocks any substantiation of his administration’s 
political claims, the police may actually benefit fiom their attempts to establish positive 
police-media relations.  In fact, Tom indicated that given  a rare opportunity for a sit down 
interview with the mayor, he called him  to task on his claims of the KKK operating  / 
within the Union Creek Police: 
I’m  interviewing the mayor and we’re talking about this rift 
between him  and the police.  Is it bad for the city?  And he 
was talking about police brutality.  And I said, ‘well you 
know,  you talked about this [internal] racism, but the FBI 
said your charges were bull.’ (Author interview) 
In  sum,  routine politics often makes  for extraordinary alliances,  with  fkaternization 
between “opposing specialists” becoming necessary for impressipn management.  Thus, 
during both  routine crime news-making process and routine political claims-making, 
police and reporters often  find themselves in a position to provide assistance to  each 
other, both  politically  and  organizationally speaking.  Yet,  it  is essential that  these 
temporary allegiances do not become permanent fixtures, for sometimes political claims 
are grounded in substantiated facts. 
Conclusion 
While the previous chapter attempted to gauge impression management through 
the  use  of national  survey data,  this chapter  focused upon  police performances by 
witnessing police-media relations  at  four selected research sites.  In  doing  so,  it 
uncovered  a  number  of  factors  undetectable  through  survey  analysis  and  therefore 
provided a more comprehensive understanding of the police influence on  the news-  e 
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making process. Similar to GofEnan’s  (1  959) concept of dramaturgical loyalty, the ‘‘high 
media pow&  departments  observed  in  this study were those  whose  commitment of 
police-media relations extended beyond policy and into practice.  The public infomation 
sm  at  the Urbandale Police Department displayed such a commitment,  as did their 
senior ranking PI0 whose theatrical background undoubtedly influenced his behavior and 
his reference to co-workers as his “cast” and the public his “audience.”  This operating 
philosophy was clearly in contrast to that of the Morganville Police Department, a “low 
media power” police department where serving as a PI0  was temporary, unwelcome, and 
an impediment to so-called real law enforcement.  At the same time, even high media 
power  departments  have  diffig  levels of  dramaturgical  finesse,  which  may  be  a 
product  of experience, training,  or both.  Many of skills exhibited by  the Urbandale 
Police Department while in the field -  such as finding the story “angle,” or what Goffinan 
(1  974) refers to as “keying” a fkme -  were undoubtedly skills that were acquired through 
many years of experience and repeated media training.  In fact, much of the language 
used by ‘?>aryl” (such as “dumping”, which is discussed in the next chapter) stems bm 
external media training come  manuals he provided me for review.  Thus,  the Urbandale 
Police Department was able to benefit fiom a “routine” hit-and-run while the less-trained 
Spring Lake Police Department failed to “exploit” a police success.  Finally, case study 
research allowed for an examination of the political context within which PIOs operate. 
Based  on interviews With  Union Creek law enforcement and  their media counterparts, 
much of the poor performance on the part of their PI0 staff is the result of city politics 
and  strong mayoral  figure.  The  next  chapter builds  upon  the  case  study  research 
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described  herein  by  focusing  upon  impression management during  non-routine news 
events, such as  police accidents and scandal.  e 
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CHAPTER 7 
ACCIDENTS & SCANDALS 
From my experience, it’s .  .  .  been extremely difficult when 
a police officer has done wrong and we  try to pursue the 
story.  It’s  really tough,  and  they make  things extremely 
hard for us .  .  .  p]ut thw  people deserve to be on film just 
as much  any other person.  Some of the stuffthat some 
of the guys have done are pretty serious .  .  .  It’s  our job to 
show  the public  who  the  person  is,  and  it’s  important 
because  these  are the  people  that  are representing  and 
supposed to protect us. 
-Local Broadcast Cameraman,  Morganville 
(Author interview) 
Accommodative Treatments 
As per€ormances are staged to suggest a certain reality, it is imperative that cast 
members remain in character.  Appearances are crucial for hpression management, as 
audiences are by  their very nature both critical and demanding. Yet even veteran actors 
may on occasion miss their cues, forget their lines, speak out of turn,  or fail to convey the 
requisite af3ixtation.  When  this occurs, audience belief is no  longer suspended, the 
reality of appearances is placed in jeopardy, and negative reviews are likely to follow 
unless cast members adopt an “accommodative treatment’’ (GofEnan, 1959). 
Accommodative  treatments  are  techniques  used  by  performers  to  overcome 
temporary  performance  glitches.  When  appearances  are  threatened  by  unscripted 
happenings, accommodative treatments re-establish the presence of order.  Yet only the 
most  adept  actors  are well versed  in such dramaturgical accommodation.  Typically, 
when on stage blunders occur, many actors tend to cany on with the show while simply 
ignoring the misstep; that is, they continue with the performance in the same manner as 
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before.  Rarely, however, is this accomplished smoothly enough to preserve the overall 
illusion. A more effective means of overcoming a blunder requires acton to incorporate 
the unscripted  action into the overall production.  Although this produces momentary 
confusion and requires immediate restaging, it allows actors to perform  dramaturgical 
workings  on  even  non-scripted  events,  Mer  displaying  their  theatrical  (i.e., 
improvisational) talent, and thereby restoring control over all occurren~.  Audiences, in 
turn, appreciate when  missteps  are subtly acknowledged,  as they  tend to experience 
embarrassment and discomfort when non-scripted behaviors are routinely overlooked or 
ignored.  Impression management,  therefore, requires quick responses to non-scripted 
events, and the most eff’ective responses incoporate the Unanticipated into the broader 
dramaturgical framework. 
The permanent rehearsal that constitutes the work of law enforcement, coupled 
with their public visibility both on the streets and in the news,  all but guarantees that 
police  performances  will  contain  occasional  non-scripted  behaviors.  Sometimes, 
impromptu actions occur while the officer nevertheless remains in character.  At  other 
times, non-staged events risk convincing audiences of a lack of authenticity within the 
overall production.  Such non-performance police behaviors are most visible during times 
of  accidents or  scandals.  “Accidents” begin  as purposive  activities but  result in un- 
envisioned happenings.  They  constitute miscalculations that  lead to  a breakdown in 
otherwise routine events (Molotch and Lester,  1974).  And  because they result in that 
which is clearly not routine, they become attractive commodities as featured news items, 
much to the dismay of those involved.  “Scandals” involve out-of-character actions that 
become public events by  those not involved.  Like routine events, scandals may contain 
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purposive behavior carried out by cast members, but scandals clearly are not intended for 
public view.  Both accidents and scandals threaten the legitimacy ofrpolice performances 
because their very occurrences are in direct conflict with the appearance of order, control, 
lawfulness and integrity.  And unlike routine events, which are anticipatory in nature and 
trigger  purposive  and  intentional  responses, these  non-routine  events  catch  police 
pdormers off-guard and necessitate character restaging, dramaturgical re-scripting, and 
the employment of an accommodative treatment. 
The very nature of contemporary police work rendm the Occurrence of accidents 
and scandals likely to occur.  To begin, the police work environment has been described 
as one where the  opportunities for out-of-character behavior are "more than  ample" 
(Barker,  1994:48).  Many legitimate police behaviors would raise suspicion if perfonned 
by civilians.  Granted  legal  pmtection,  police  have  an  unparalleled  opportunity to 
engaged in veiled misconduct (Kappeler, Sluder and Alpert, 1994).  At  the same time, 
police must  be  prepared to make  split-second decisions whose outcomes may  prove 
costly.  Finally,  concomhnt with many police  functions are numerous occupational 
stressors that -  if not kept in check -  may lead to abuse of authority or other non-scripted 
behaviors  (Carter,  1994).  Given  the  likelihood  of  such  threats  to  the  broader 
organizational performance, police administrators must possess the dramaturgical know- 
how to recover fiom discrepant appearances.  Like the seasoned stage actor, those well 
versed in impression management will exploit the drama inherent in the discrepancy for 
organizational gain.  Those less versed will tacitly expect audiences to collectively ignore 
what has clearly already been seen. 
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As social actors,  police operate within  a setting that, despite the  similarities, 
I differs in significant ways fbm the theater.  As Gofian (1959:254) notes, “a character 
staged in a theater is not in some ways real,  nor does it have  the Same kind of real 
~onsequences’~  that accompany real performances.  For example, whereas stage actors 
may  engage  in  team  collusion  to  maintain  the  appearance of  appearances,  such  a 
technique requires homogeneity of  goals among participants.  The officer faced with 
charges of misconduct may privately collude with fellow officers, but higbly publicized 
scandals have a way of penetrating the police code of silence, making such collusion 
difficult.  Moreover, he cannot silence the heckling public with whom  he has no team 
loyalty.  Nor  can  the  department  rely  upon  a  temporary  alignment  with  opposing 
specialists, for city leaders may wish to distance themselves, and sympathetic reporters 
may have little to gain by working to discredit the claims-makers.  Therefom, to respond 
to the occurrence of unscripted happenings, police have little choice but to acknowledge 
the temporary glitch in the overall production.  At the same time, they must -  to the best 
of  their  ability  - incorporate  the  glitch  into  their  dramaturgical  framework  by 
thematically transforming the event into one less haxmfid to the department’s interests. 
Transformations 
A primary Mework  is an original interpretation of a natural or social event.  For 
Gofhan (1959;  1974), it is possible for participants to transform primary fi-ameworks 
into new,  interpretive flames,  thereby altering  the  definition of  previously occurring 
events.  While his list of techniques is both long and complex, perhaps the best means is 
to  over-communicate some events while under-communicating others.  To be sure, this 
does  not  involve  either  the  telling  of  lies  or  the  staging  of  false  fionts;  such 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 164 
misrepresentations  - when  discovered - threaten  the  believability  of  all  future 
'performances. Instead,  interpretive  transformations  are  perhaps  best  thought  of  as 
"variations in ~OCUS" that provide re-analyses of taken-for-granted experiences. 
I 
Note  the  following  example  of  a  dramaturgical  transformation  successfitlly 
employed by the Urbandale public informaton office: 
We  had a  situation  a few months  back  where  a police 
officer went to a scene and failed to secure his car. He left 
the car running,  left his keys in the car,  and goes to  take 
care  of  a  fight  situation.  Well,  he  arrests someone, 
handcuffs him, puts him  in the back  seat of the squad  car, 
again  fails  to  secure  that  car,  and  leaves  that  person 
unattended.  That person's girlsiend then  gets into  the 
drivers seat of the police car, drives away the police car, 
goes through  an intersection, and  hits  an oncoming car, 
killing the driver. 
Well, you how, the story can be several things.  The story 
could have very well been,  'its  the police's  fault,  it was 
negligence on the police officeis part and  that negligence 
caused this tragedy to happen.'  And of course the lawsuits 
will  follow.  What  we  did  was,  we  presented the story 
totally different. We presented the story as a 'stand by your 
man'  story.  That the girlfiiend would go to any lengths to 
protect him.  So basically what we took, we took that story 
and presented it in a way that still says, yeah, this happened 
and that happened and that happened.  But the story, the 
angle, is the fact that she stood by her man, taking the focus 
off those other things or at least overshadowing the focus 
on  those.  We fed the story to [media] the way we wanted it 
presented.  There's an old saying that "information given is 
idormation controlled."  And basically we neatly packaged 
it and gift-wrapped it and we gave it to them that way. . . 
And because the sound bites that were given, the things that 
were said, the way it was presented was so  overwhelming 
that it made [the media's] job so  much easier.  The  sound 
bites were so good they were very television oriented.  I 
don't  remember  what  some of them  were  but  they  were 
things that reporters  were eating up .  .  .  you could see them 
as they were doing interviews saying, "Yes, that's  a bite, 
that's a bite that's a bite."  It came off just as we hoped, as 
soon  as it happened  it went  away as quickly  as it came. 
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There was no fiesh angle every day.  The point was that it 
was delivered in a way that said, ‘yeah, these things were 
all factors, but this is the real crime, and  not only lis it a 
crime, it’s a story. It’s a love story actually.  So, you  present 
it in a way  that has all the elements.  Yeah there was  a 
crime; yeah there were collateral circumstances. But this is 
a love story, and it’s a tragic love story. It makes for great 
television.  (Author interview) 
/ 
As accidents and scandals constitute “tragic” events, one meam of transforming  i 
them  into less harmll news accounts requires the over-communication of “rebirth and 
renewal”  interpretive themes.  According to  mythological and  literary  theory (Lule, 
2000),  tragedies are by  definition themes of purification  and regeneration.  Like the 
biblical anecdote of Noah’s  Ark, the Greek tragedy Oedipus,  or Shakespeare’s romantic 
Romeo  and Juliet, tragedies require a terrible event to purifL those on the wrong path and 
set future  generations in the proper direction.  The “tragedy”, namely, is that for renewal, 
there must  first  occur a sacrificial loss.  For PIOs to  prove  successll at impression 
management, they must identify aspects of rebirth  and  renewal  in  otherwise negative 
events, thereby achieving the necessary transformation. As Daryl, the Morganville PI0 
explained, ‘That’s a large challenge, trying to find the angle of the story, especially when 
the story can reflect negatively.” 
We  had  [another]  situation  where  [one]  of  our police 
officers [was] arrested. .  .  [for] doing bad things.  [He was] 
involved in the drug trade.  Well, that is a story.  That is 
one  story.  But  the presentation  was  that  our  officers 
arrested w].  Basically, we’re  so  diligent; we’re  going 
after crime so relentlessly, that we’ll even police ourselves. 
It’s the same story with a different angle, and the fact that 
we presented the angle rather than them  sniffing out the 
story, helped a whole lot in  terms of which  angle you’re 
able to present. (Author interview) 
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Using  this  interpretive  fi-ame,  an  Urbandale  newspaper  made  the  following 
’  announcement: 
[URBANDALE) OFF’IWR ARRESTED  ON DRUG 
TRAFFICKING  CHARGE 
prbandale] Police Department arrested one of its own over 
the weekend on  drug charges,  after finding five kilos of 
cocaine hidden in the bumper of a rented car parked outside 
his residence. 
officer 
midnight  Saturday  by  [urbandale]  police,  the  Drug 
Enforcement  Administration  and  other  agencies  . . . 
[urbandale]  police  began  an intemal  investigation  last 
[year],  after  [the officer’s]  personal car  was  found . . . 
parked outside a known  drug house. (Newspaper W2305) 
was  taken  into  custody  shortly  after 
This story,  appearing in its entirety,  begins  with a theme of rebirth  and renewal  as 
Urbandale Police receive credit for cleaning shop.  A similarly scandalous event was 
reported in a Union Creek newspaper, yet the police department did not provide reporters 
with the intqretive fiame.  As a result, the story begins not with  a theme of resolution 
(via  mest)  but  rather  corruption  (Le.,  “stole”)  and continues  onto  a  back page. 
Moreover, by  not proactively providing media with  the  story fi-ame, the Union  Creek 
police receive second billing in the officer’s mest. 
POLICEMAN ARRESTED IN $12,000 STING 
A [Vnion Creek] police officer stole $12,000 in a sting the 
FBI set up  to see if he was taking money fiom drivers he 
pulled over,  prosecutors said yesterday.  Agents arrested 
patrol officer  at his . . .  home late Wednesday 
afternoon after a year-long investigation by the FBI and the 
Police  Department’s  Internal  Affairs  Unit.  (Newspaper 
#0006 1  1). 
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While the article later indicates steps taken to purify the rank and file (“ .  . [The Chiefl 
plans to have the department’s Employee Assistance Unit speak with officers .  .  .”)’ such 
details are found in the concluding sentence of the news item.  Yet thematic interpretation 
is  largely  dependent  upon  story  sequence, with  opening  sentences  providing  moral 
identifiers  that  quickly  establish  an  interpretive hne  (Cerulo, 1998).  Interpretive 
transformations,  therefore,  require  explicit  and  repeated  thematic  communication. 
Participants must actively provide interpretive cues to primary heworks  in order to 
secure the necessary transformation.  Whereas  Daryl -  the Urbmdalle PI0 -  consciously 
provided the media with the cleansing interpretive Me,  the Union Creek Police Chief 
confessed to having never thought about presenting such a fhme. 
Finally, themes of rebirth and renewal also make for effective news  stories on 
proactive policing.  Although an  “accident” of a different sort in  that it was  initially 
unrelated to any oversight by police, the Urbandale public information office emphasized 
a recent community accident to highlight their efforts to cleanse the city of gun  fatalities. 
The  following proactive news  release notifjing news bureaus  of  an upcoming  news 
conference contains all of  the  elements required to transform  a previously occuning 
accident into a policing success: sacrifice, rebirth, renewal. 
I 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 168 
NEWS RELE4SE 
[Urbandale]  Police Depurtment 
Subject: Joint News Conference 
Date: 
Little  Samantha . . . was  only  10-years-old when  she 
stepped up onto a chair and reached for a loaded .25 caliber 
pistol that  was  hidden  on the  top shelf of  her  mother’s 
closet.  The  gun  discharged, wounding  the child’s  right 
foot.  Samantha’s  older  brother  telephoned  &Jrbandale] 
Fire-Rescue and the girl was transported to the hospital. .  . 
Similar cases  occur  throughout  the  United  States every 
year.  In many instances, the young victim dies as a result 
of the injuries sustained.  The state of  prohibits 
leaving a firearm in a place and manner that allows yound 
children acces to it, and since the ,law’s inception, 21 cases 
have been prosecuted in [urbandale] County. Even when 
the parent is punished, the child is still dead, and everyone 
loses.  The hard  thought  is that  these cases can  all be 
avoided. With the hope  of stopping this type of tragedy, 
[urbandale]  Police  Chief  , [neighboring 
jurisdiction] Police Chief  and the National 
Shooting Sports Foundation (N.S.S.F.)  have joined forces 
in  project  “Homesafe.”  . . . Project  Homesafe  is  a 
nationwide program  sponsored by  the N.S.S.F.  . . . to 
promote safe firearm handling and  storage practices . . . 
through .  .  .  the distribution of free gun  locking devices.  As 
a result,  citizens of [urbandale] will be  able to  come  to 
their police departments and  get  a project homesafe  gun 
lock safii  kit absolutely fiee of charge. 
i 
Story Containment 
Of course, for police to exercise information control, they must maintain control 
over  all relevant information.  That is, they must  eschew  the practice of withholding 
negative information and instead ensure that reported information emanates hm  official 
channels.  Unfortunately, many departments exercise tight control over all information, 
viewing administrative or managerial details as “internal affairs” not publicly relevant. 
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officials, and  information gaps are almost always filled with nod-official news  leaks. 
When this occurs, police must not only respond publicly to the initial news event, but 
also to new  claims brought about by alternate voices.  Rather than story containment, 
withholding  information  inevitably  creates  more  damaging  information.  The 
Morganville Police Department Witnessed  this fht-hand,  as the following newspaper 
clipping illustrates: 
FATAL RAID ON  WRONG HOUSE?  .  .  .  AFF’IDAWI” FALSImD 
Did .  .  .police target the wrong house in a “no-knock” drug 
raid in which they shot a man to death? And if so, did they 
raid that house because of falsified information on a police 
affidavit?  Those are among  the questions being asked in 
the police  and  district  attorney’s investigation #into  last 
month’s raid.  [The suspect] was shot eight times by police 
officers when he reportedly refbed to drop a pistol he was 
pointing at SWAT  officers who had just broken in the fiont 
door of his home.  [The suspect] died at  the scene.  Now, 
some officers, according to a Monday television report, are 
questioning  whether  some  information  in  an  affidavit 
supporting the search warrant was  fabricated, questioning 
whether  they  entered  the  wrong  house  and  killed  [the 
suspect]. 
. . .  The officer requesting the warrant . . .  said he saw an 
informant [go to the house] where the informant said he or 
she bought  a “rock”  of crack.  [But the television] report 
raised the question of whether [the officer] actually saw the 
informant enter the address .  .  .No drugs were found in the 
house,  and  an  autopsy  showed that  [the suspect] had  no 
drugs  in his system. 
“There is an internal-affk case into the shooting . . .” [a] 
police spokeswoman said Monday.  “We never comment 
on internal affairs and internal investigations.”  (Newspaper 
article, #6 10042). 
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What initially began as an “accident,” quickly became a “scandal” due to the failure of 
the public information office to adequately address the original news event. 
limited information provided media in the following news releases: 
Note the 
For Immediate Release 
Date: JDay of Event1  Phone: 
Contact:  Fax: 
At approximately 1:5Opm  members of the worganville] 
Police Metro/Swat Bureau were  executing an immediate 
entry search warrant for controlled substances at  [address]. 
The officers, upon entry, encountered an anned  suspect in a 
bedroom  in  the  residence.  Shots were  fired  and  an 
unknown male was shot and pronounced dead at the scene. 
The homicide unit is currently conducting the investigation. 
1 
PRESSRELEASE 
[MorrganviUe]  Police Department 
For Immediate Release 
Date: lone  Day After Event1 
Contact:  Fax: 
Phone: 
The worganville] Police Department, at this time, is not 
releasing any additional information regarding the shooting 
at [address] on [the previous day].  To this date we have not 
obtained a positive identification on the deceased party at 
the address and therefore have not notified any  next of kin. 
We are also conducting ballistic tests on weapons and are 
processing other items of evidence necessary to arrive at a 
sound investigation conclusion to this incident.  We  will 
noti@ you of any significant developments as soon as they 
become available. 
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PRESSRELEASE 
[Morganville]  Police Deprtment  ,  I 
For Immediate Release 
Date: Two Days After Event 
Contact:'  FaX: 
Phone: 
While  participating  in  drug  enforcement  District  Two 
Neighborhood Police Officers prepared an kffidavit for a 
search warrant  to be  executed at  Street.  The 
[Morganville] Police Department Metro  Swat unit did the 
immediate entry at  this location.  Two people were found 
inside this house.  One person identified as 
produced a handgun  and was told to drop the weapon by 
[Morganville] Police, however [he3 did not respond.  At 
one point [he] started to lower the weapon but then raised it 
up again in a threatening manner.  At  this point officers 
fired  their  weapons  hitting b].  This  is  all  the 
information I have at this point thank you. 
171 
While information was undoubtedly limited at the time these news releases were issued, 
for both the reporter and  for the public, several obvious questions remain.  Why  did 
police raid that particular house?  Did they have idormation that the owners  were selling 
drugs out of the home?  Were any drugs  found at the scene? Will there be a non-forensic 
investigation into the shooting?  When can the public expect to receive more idormation 
on  this  matter?  Ultimately,  information on  this  matter  was  released;  however  the 
information provided stemmed not from the public information office, but instead fiom 
non-official sources who leaked that (a) no drugs were found, (b) the raid occurred on the 
wrong house, and (c) that the incident may have been the result of oMicer perjury.  Two 
days following the event, at Ieast some of this information was known to the police that, 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not if released, would not hinder any investigation.  But as explained to me by a Morganville 
PIO:  I 
Our  Department is very secretive.  But once someone has 
leaked  to  the  media  that  the  [Morganville]  Police  is 
investigating some particular internal matter’  we’re  then 
trying to respond and react to that.  But if the information is 
put  out there that . . .  there is an investigation hto  that 
particular matter, then it won’t  appear as a cover up.  And 
that’s how we damage ourselves. 
An officer was accused of pajury on a warrant.  There’s 
probably not a day that has gone by in the last year that that 
has not been an issue.  When  I give idomation in regards 
to it, in the public’s  mind, probably even in the media’s 
mind, what am I giving out?  Is this one sided?  And  that 
falls in line with why I think  our [image] is bad.  Because 
before, either the chief was non-accessible [or] we weren’t 
releasing any information in regard to personnel matters.  I 
didn’t [even] know about [the perjury allegation] until the 
inquiries started coming in.  I think the department may 
have  [had]  idormation  . . . and  they  started  an 
investigation.  It turned out the media started probing’ and 
someone leaked some information. Then  it had to be looked 
into further and information had to be released. It may not 
have happened exactly like that, but that was the image that 
was being portrayed. (Author interview) 
Sometimes, it is not so much the actions of the public infomation office that fails 
to contain a story as it is the policies of the police administration that dictate the release 
of information.  This was  also the case in Union  Creek, the other low  media power 
department where police appeared to flip-flop on an already racially charged criminal 
event.  According to newspaper reports, a 3-year-old black child died fiom fatal injuries 
she received after being struck by a car driven by a 19-year-old white driver.  The initial 
police report suggested that the driver showed no signs of being under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol, and that despite eyewitness accounts, the car did not exceed the posted 
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speed limit.  Therefore, the Union Creek Police Department decided not to recommend 
criminal charges. As reported in the daily paper: 
This led to allegations of  discrimination by relatives . . . 
who said that police did not pursue charges .  .  .  because she 
is White and [the victim] was Black.  If'the  [driver] had 
been  Black,  they  said,  she  would  have  probably  been 
arrested on the spot. (Newspaper W8389) 
Nevertheless, the department publicly defended their handling of the incident. 
Police spokesperson  denies the allegations and 
says  that  tbe  police  department  used  standard  police 
procedure. The police were at the scene. .  .  and the incident 
was handled the same way as any similar case would be, 
regardless  of race,  said [the spokesperson].  (Newspaper 
#000208) 
Yet two weeks later, a newspaper headline announced: 
POLICE CHARGE DRIVER IN 
DEATH OF  3-YEAR-OLD 
. .  .  rylesterday, city prosecutors announced that they have 
charged her with vehicular homicide .  . .  According to a 
police report,  [the driver] was within the speed  limit  . . . 
when [the child] ran int the street and into the path of the 
car.  City  officials  would  not  disclose  the  determining 
factors that led them to file charges.  (Newspaper #000208) 
The Same city policy that prohibited the Union Creek police Erom  releasing information 
without  mayoral  oversight  again  proved  to  create  the  appearance  of  departmental 
impropriety.  In this case, it  appeared that police  and city officials were ignoring the 
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police report to quickly silence racial unrest.  According to the Union Creek Police Chief, 
this was not the case.  I 
To be quite honest,  our  facts were wrong.  If I had  my 
druthers,  I’d  be  very  honest  and  candid  as to  why  the 
prosecutor  charged.  The fact  is  that  our  internal 
investigators recommended criminal charges, based on the 
evidence.  I should have been  able to say . . . ‘After a 
thorough  investigation, interviewing all of the witnesses, 
reviewing the statements of the motorist, after presenting 
the case to the prosecutor, our recommedatiotl was that the 
prosecutor charge.  But there was kind of a decision made 
by  the  law  department  and  the  prosecutor  not  to  say 
anything.  The mayor’s  press secfetary made a statement, 
which really didn’t say anything.  I wouldn’t  have clearly 
articulated all of the evidence, but I think it would have 
helped to the let the public understand that there was more 
to this than a young  child left wandhg the  street and 
being  run down  by  a motorist,  because  there was  some 
evidence to  support  some criminality on  the part  of the 
motorist.  (Author interview -  Union Creek Police Chief) 
To  contain a story, then, PIOs and their departments must be forthcoming with 
information, good or bad.  By providing reporters with official information, police ensure 
the details provided are both accurate and consistent, and they are able to exert at least a 
minimum of influence on the news item’s interpretive he.  Withholding information 
leads to journalistic speculation with reporters likely to seek out the inevitable news  leak. 
To overcome this possibility, Daryl -  the Urbandale PI0 -  engages in a practice he calls 
“dumping:” 
There are  always leaks.  There  are always  going  to  be 
people who find  out.  Things happen.  Well,  one of the 
things we do in those instances is, we present it.  Dump 
everything we  can.  I  like to  call it the big dump  theory. 
What  you do with the big dump theory is, you  dump the 
bad  news.  You  dump  it all.  That way,  they  don’t  keep 
sniffing and  frnding a fiesh angle everyday.  That makes 
that story soon history.  Bad things are going to happen arid 
bad things are of course going to be distorted from time to 
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up hnt  about it.  Tackle it head on. Dump as much as you 
possibly can in the beginning, and then put it behind you. I 
was  a homicide detective prior to  this.  And  one of the 
things that  would  happen  was,  if I was  about  to  go to 
someone’s house,  and I thought  there were  drugs in  the 
house, I thought there were weapons in the house, I thought 
all of those things  were proof of a particular crime, if I 
could get a consent to search,  my  mindset is going to be 
one thing.  But if you force me into a situation where I have 
to get a warrant, of course rrn  going to be as thorough in 
the search, but the mentality will  be differentj I’m  going to 
suspect  strongly that  you  have  something to  hide.  But 
when  you  open  up  and  let me in,  I’m  going  to suspect 
strongly that there is nothing to hide.  So we’re dealing with 
perception. (Author interview) 
Coordinated Staging 
Finally,  the  level  of  coordinated  staging  inherent  in  public  perfomances 
inevitably  determines  the  success or  failure  of  accomodative  treatments.  As  few 
perf‘ormances  are truly  one character displays,  impression  management  requires both 
cooperation and coordination among multiple cast members, which Goffman refers to as 
“performance teams.”  While performance teams  share the same goals in projecting 
specific  appearances,  they  cannot,  by  themselves,  adequately  pull-off  complete 
performances.  They require instruction hm  directors,  choreographers, producers and 
stage crew.  Without proper direction, characters may upstage one another, speak out of 
turn,  enter or exit scenes at inappropriate times, or perform entirely on the wrong script 
page.  For  law  enforcement, proper  direction  fiom the  department  administrators is 
essential for the maintenance of police performances and for public perception. 
Poor  internal  communication threatens  police  performances,  as various team 
players are performing fiom different scripts.  In Morganville -  a department already 
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troubled by  news scandal -  the absence of any coordinated staging during non-routine 
news  events exacerbated the damage to an already tarnished image.  Many times,  the 
department’s public information office (serving as assistant directors directly under the 
chief)  was last to hear about re-scripted performances. 
A lot of times we’re not called and we’re not notified, and 
we don’t have [any] information that [a]  person is giving 
[an] interview, and you’re stuck with the question, ‘Well, 
according to so-and-so,  this is what has  transpired.’  Well, 
if you don’t have the information, you can’t  veri@.  You 
don’t  know  what  the person said, and  it  allows for the 
pitting of  the  diffit  personnel  within  the  department 
[against each other] because you have one person saying 
one thing  and  another saying another.  The information 
disseminated  needs to  be  as precise  as  possible  and 
accurate as possible at the same time, instead of  one person 
giving this story and another giving another story, and then 
you have conflict. (Author interview) 
The  PI0 went  on  to  describe  a  situation  where  she  failed to  receive  new  staging 
instructions  during  a  high-profile  media  scandal.  As  initial  direction  required the 
department spokespersons to be tight-lipped and secretive, the failure of the revised script 
to reach all cast members makes perf‘ormances appear sloppy: 
A few months ago there was a big story about our  property 
bureau.  Evidence  was  missing:  drugs,  guns,  money, 
property.  It  became  a  hot  topic  because  we  weren’t 
releasing  information.  This was  under the  old  chief. 
Eventually,  I got  a call [hm  a reporter]  asking about a 
press  conference that was  scheduled in  two  hours,  but  I 
didn’t wen know about it.  (Author interview) 
At  other times, the public information office will be  given explicit instructions hm  a 
chief or commissioner to release “scandalous” information, only to be met with resistance 
ftom other team performers: 
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One reporter requested  information hm  Internal Affairs 
on  the  officers  that  [were  being]  investigated  in  our 
department,  and  Internal  Affairs  wouldn’t  ,givth  the 
information when  I requested  it.  When  I told  them  the 
chief authorized it, they  still resisted.  Finally,  the chief 
called down and said, ‘Release it!’  (Author interview) 
Even at the Urbandale Police Department,  where dramaturgical loyalty was evidently 
high, PI0 requests for information were occasionally met with some resistance.  When 1  / 
accompanied an Urbandale PI0  to the homicide unit to retrieve a mug shot on  the day’s 
case, the detective was quite forthcoming (albeit humorously so) about his disdain for 
media relations, questioning the veracity of such axioms as “the public’s right to know.” 
When  the PI0 and I retumed to the public infomation office, he turned to me and said, 
‘Be sure  to make a distinction in your paper between PIO-media relations and police- 
media relations.” 
The PIOs get along great with reporters, and we recognize 
the importance of media  relations.  But  it’s  an  ongoing 
challenge to convince others in the department to accept the 
role of media in policing.  You  saw it upstairs in homicide. 
(Author notes) 
Ultimately,  it is the responsibility of a department’s chief executive officer to “set the 
stage” in tenns of media communication.  As the performance director, she  is “given the 
special duty of allocating the parts in the performance  and the personal  hnt  that  is 
employed  in each part” (Goffinan,  1959:99).  At  the  same time,  the chief-as-director 
allocates all performance “prerogatives,” of  which playing to the audience via media is 
always an  essential part. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter discussed media  impression management  during times of  police 
accidents and scandal.  Accidents begin as anticipated events but result in unanticipated 
consequences.  Scandals represent purposive events not intended for public view  that, 
nevertheless, occur in the presence of an.audience.  The occurrence of accidents and 
scandals require the staging of special performance techniques if police are to maintain 
public support of policing practices.  What Gofhan  (1 959) refers to as “accommodative 
treatments” are collectively known by police as techniques for datnage control.  This  may 
involve providing a story angle or news  fhme that accentuates various details, pretending 
that the activity was anticipated, or simply “fessing-up” and beginning anew.  Concepts 
such as “dumping” or “story containment” build upon findings of deparhnent openness, 
where information provided is information controlled.  The Urbandale Police Department 
used such techniques to avoid extended coverage of accidents or scandal.  Conversely, 
the Morganville and Spring Lake Police -  whether by intent of administrative policy - 
withheld information that could have  shortened the lifespan of bad  press surrounding 
police practices.  While news  framing represented an effective means for the Urbandale 
Police to minimize the harm of police related accidents and scandals, fiaming in no way 
implies  the  deliberate  misrepresentation  of  facts.  The  final  chapter  examines  the 
importance of news media in ensuring a safe and just society by focusing upon the role of 
the reporter in providing police accountability. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
The future sees law enforcement becoming more and more 
transparent.  We  are sharing more and more information. 
We have to do this.  We have to wake up and smell the 
roses. You have to really build relations, formulate a plan, 
and provide other police with  information on how to be 
prepared and deal with media. 
-  ChiefsAddress 
Int '1 Conference on  Police-Media Relations 
Police As Performers 
The thesis of this research asserts that police who adopt dramaturgical discipline 
as part of contemporary law enforcement will maintain a more favorable media image. 
With mass media increasingly guiding public behavior, police must adopt routine work 
patterns that adhere to these media principles.  Undoubtedly, per$omance  is among  the 
principles guiding behavior in  our mass mediated society.  The panoptic eye of  the 
camera lens creates a climate that can only be  described as promotional.  Today,  the 
primary sources for public infomation are the very forums  for public relations, as it is the 
practice of mass media to sell both policies and products.  As public figures that appear 
on  and  within  these promotional media, police have little choice but  to posture  and 
perform. 
We can use drama to idom  the public and still be accurate 
. .  .  And if. .  .  cops [don't like] this, then they had better go 
back to a time when TV  didn't exist; like it or not, we live 
in a media/video/showbiz world.  We can either understand 
that and work with it or live in a bubble. (Author interview) 
Yet policing has always been predicated upon promotion and performance, and 
the  literature  on  policing  is  filled  with  theatrical  allusions.  We  talk  about  police 
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performance, staged operations, and the drama on the street.  The blue curtain -- already 
4  a  dramaturgical  referent - has become  the  thin blue  line, while  the  imagined  wall 
separating actors fiom audience is today the blue wall demarcating the police bm  the 
policed.  Even the very nature of  police work is described less as a job than a role, where 
the permanent rehearsal that constitutes police work require that officers cast themselves 
as obedient  soldiers.  This dramaturgical conceptualization of police work  is  really 
nothing  new.  What  is new  is the uniquely “mass” mediated  nature of contemporary 
police  perfomances.  While  police-citizen  “encounters”  have  traditionally  occurred 
through  the dime novel, the penny press or muckraking “rag,” never before has  the police 
image been accessible to so  many people on so many occasions.  Because of this, and 
whether  or  not  by  their  own  design,  police  are  indeed  “sharing  more  and  more 
infomation.” 
Even  in  a climate where promotion and  public relations reign,  police must - 
above  all - serve the  public  interest.  They  must  never  knowingly  without  public 
infomation, and they must never misrepresent facts.  They must not sacrifice accuracy 
for image, and they must know when to stage a show and when to halt a promotional 
campaign. 
[There are times when] It’s very important not  to get the 
two jobs mixed up.  Public information entails supplying 
reporters  with accurate and  truthful  information.  Public 
relations implies putting  a  ‘spin’  on information  or  the 
news  . . . How  do you  make  something positive  out  of 
racial  issues  or  situations when  police  have  to  provide 
protection  to  women  trying  to  enter  abortion  clinics? 
(Author notes) 
Moreover,  even  seemingly innocuous promotional  campaigns  may  have  widespread 
ramifications, as one sergeant at a police training seminar explained to me: 
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I get calls from COPS  all the time requesting permission to 
do a show on us,  and each month, I send  them the same 
letter telling them 'No.' I have to consider the view rof  the 
city manager  and local government, about how  the show 
will  impact tourism.  Our city is the largest tourist site in 
the state.  And  the public isn't  aware that it takes COPS 
three weeks  of ride-dongs to produce  a half-hour  show. 
Even though our chief has fbll and fid  editorial decision- 
making power,  whatever  footage doesn't  end up  on  the 
cutting room  floor is either going to be boring,  at  least 
according to the network.  Even with major crimes edited 
out, the remaining footage won't  reflect positively upon our 
city.  I  happen  to  watch  COPS fkquently,  and  [this 
convention site] is commonly featured on that show.  I've 
never been here before and expected it to be much worse 
than it really is, based on what I've  seen on TV. But this 
city is beautill! (Author notes) 
Regardless of the challenges, it is imperative that police maintain public support through 
the daily delivery of public information.  As community leaders with enormous powers 
and  legal protections, it is foolhardy for police to expect their organization not to be 
viewed  with  rigorous  scrutiny.  As  the  eyes  of  the  public,  media  are  any  police 
performers' biggest critic.  It is the police, therefore, who must bend to the will of the 
media, placing public relations at fiont and center stage. 
Things are happening in this department every single day, 
good  things.  Good  police  work  is  going  on  in  this 
department every day.  Every corporate office has a team 
that is trying to figure out how best to market that particular 
business.  Well  we're  a business,  and not  only are we  a 
business but  we're  the people's  business,  and  the people 
need to see that we're  not only out there doing our job but 
that we're kind, we're caring, and we're human beings doing 
the job.  And that's very marketable.  And  that's what you 
have to do.  I mean, that's the other challenge.  You can be 
reactive,  and every police department has to  do that, but 
how many police departments, how  many people work at 
being proactive?  Therein is the separate challenge.  You 
create the challenge. (Author interview) 
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Reporters as Police 
If  police have  always  been  perfomers, likewise -  reporters  have themselves 
traditionally  perf‘ormed  an  important  policing  function.  In  fact,  the  policing  of 
govemment by the mass media is inextricably linked to their very inception.  According 
I 
to Emery’s (1962) interpretive history of journalism, with the birth of the printing press 
came a new  form of democracy as the press made  a record of official actions for all 
citizens to  see.  In  the  British  colonies,  mass produced  dailies were  essential to the 
formation of a revolutionist movement, and upon  the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, 
a  fiee press  having  the  ability  to  police  government  actions  was  essential  to  the 
establishment (and maintenance) of a just society?’  Even before the ratification of the 
U.S.  Constitution, colonial businessmen recognized the money to be earned by appealing 
to the masses, and they began a publishing tradition predicated upon the establishment of 
a fourth branch of government.  With contemporary newspapers still possessing names 
like Tribune, Sentinel, Plain Dealer and Examiner, the policing function of the American 
press still exists today. 
Ironically,  given  that  media  have  historically  engaged  in  the  policing  of 
government, it is perhaps surprising that neither the police nor the media realize they 
essentially performing the same job: investigative work.  Mozee (1987)  notes that the 
police-media conflict stems -  in part -  not from their supposed differences, but  rather 
fiom their occupational similarities.  Both occupations investigate wrongdoing,  often 
relying upon informants. Both require “facts” for their version of events to be taken as 
*’  According to Emery (1 962), freedom of the press is fundamentally an  American law despite its roots in 
British custom. Whereas Parliament is authorized to revoke that right, neither the President nor Congress 
can abridge this freedom without first amending the US.  Constitution. 
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valid and truthful.  Both work to routinize non-routine events and are first to appear at the 
,scene of accidents or scandal.  Both  work for ‘%bureaus” or organizations possessing 
certain  legal-occupational protections.  Finally,  both  police  and  news  organizations 
ultimately serve the public interest. According to Mozee (1987:142),  a veteran police 
officer with the Chicago Police Department, recognition of these occupational similarities 
might be a key to the resolution of conflict that Occasionally typifies the police-media 
relationship. “It has been my  experience that once a newsperson and a police officer 
[make] an attempt to understand the other’s  point of view,  cooperation is usually the 
result .” 
Negative Reviews as Police Accountability 
As every pdormer has its critic, police must be open to criticism and willing to 
take it, for it is through such commentary that staging may be modified “if the situation is 
to be saved” (Goffinan, 1959: 234).  When faced with poor police performance, ‘You’re 
going  to take  the bumps  and  bruises.”  As Daryl - the Urbandale  PI0 explained, 
“Sometimes there is no way, no other way to present it.”  When such performances occur, 
police must quickly address the staging error and emerge anew.  One PI0  I met working 
for a federal law enforcement agency provided me with the following example: 
One time, one of my agent’s informants was later killed. 
How can our agency turn that into something positive? The 
best that a PI0 can do is to provide truthful information to 
the press quickly, and just be honest. (Author notes) 
Police must not, however, hide behind the blue curtain in an  effort to avoid negative 
reviews.  As explained to me by one such cameraman-turned-critic: 
[The Morganville Police] smoked us basically, pretending 
to take [the officer] out this way and [instead] taking him 
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out  the  back  way.  These  people  are  getting  special 
treatment  because  they’re  part  of  the  fkaternal  order or 
something, and it’s like brother looking after brother.  But 
these people deserve to be on film just as  much as any other 
person.  Some of the stuff  that some of the guys  have done 
are pretty  serious  allegatjons.  It’s our job to  show  the 
public who the person is, and it’s important because these 
are the people that are representing and supposed to protect 
us. (Author interview) 
Another Morganville reporter supported this view by adding: 
They view us as the media, they don’t view us as the link to 
the public.  The public has a right to know what  they’re 
doing.  They can’t operate in secrecy and I don’t think they 
understand  that.  And  they  think the big bad  media  is 
snooping in their business.  The truth is, the public has a 
right to know.  There’s a real problem in Morganville].  I 
thin  they  would  describe  their  job  as  to  block  all 
information.  To  try and hide things hm  us.  Put a wall 
between the department and the media. (Author interview) 
Today, while various citizens and  social groups debate the efficacy of  various 
means  Qf preventing police misconduct, mass media remain a central means for police 
accountability.  With image-reflexivity now  a dominant part of contemporary society, 
Reiner (1985:139)  argues that “the existence of the media  as apparently independent, 
impartial and ever-vigilant watchdogs” is actually “conducive” to the legitimacy of the 
police as an institution. Knowing that media are critical of police performance, officers 
are driven to behave in a media-fiiendly fashion.  Flanagan and Vaughn (1995:122) note 
that media coverage of an individual case of police excessive force often serves as a 
catalyst  for a  more  widespread  examination  of  police  brutality.  They  suggest  that 
isolated  coverage  of  even  non-routine  events  “can  provoke  discussion  of  topics 
previously ignored by the media” Ericson (1995) concurs with  this perspective, adding 
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that media coverage of police accidentdscandals may prove usefbl in helping officials 
discover problems within their ranks.  I 
In  short,  all  performers  make  mistakes.  Those  committed  to  improving 
performance eagerly listen to the critic’s voice, for it both shapes (and often reflects) the 
dominant public opinion.  Recognizing the reflexive nature of media performances, they 
monitor their appearances as guidance for change.  Negative reyiews are a powerful 
argument for the necessity of re-staging.  In this regard, the fhction of  the press as  police 
cannot be understated.  Beginning in the  196Os,  newspaper  accounts, such  as David 
Burnham’s  articles  featured  in  the  New  York Times, brought  about  the  Knapp 
Commission  investigation into  corruption  within the  New York  Police  Department. 
More recently, mass media were essential to bringing to light the Rodney King video 
produced by a non-reporter critic.  In fact, as argued in Chapter 2, many highly publicized 
- 
police scandals have brought about important changes to police performance, including 
reform  era  and  community  policing,  civilian  review  boards,  increased  minority 
representation, and national police accreditation (see also Skolnick and Fyfe,  1993).  At 
the same time, as police-media relations inevitably improve, reporters must not abandon 
their vigilance for the sake of journalistic expediency. Skolnick and McCoy (1984547) 
succinctly voice the growing concern that accompanies the development of sophisticated 
police impression management: 
Does  the  PIO’s  usefulness  undermine  the  reporters’ 
capacity to engage in objective and skeptical inquiry? Or at 
least,  does  the  PIO’s  ready  storehouse  of  facts  about 
particular  crimes  subtly  divert  inquiry  away  firom  the 
processes  and  procedures  of  policing?  . . . The  more 
qualified the police media specialist, the less independence 
the reporter may exert.  As reporters become dependent on 
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the police department, they may lose the capacity to dig 
independently. 
These  concerns cannot be overstated.  As the line between public infomation and public 
relations continues to blur, reporters mwt reaffirm their commitment to serving as the 
fourth branch of govemment. 
At the same time, PIOs must recognize the distinction between propaganda and 
public relations,  as their job consists of increasing public support, not skepticism.  In 
1937, a group of American intellectuals established the Institute for Propaganda Analysis 
in New Yo& City and published a newsletter to educate the public about the dangers  of 
propaganda.  They identified seven recognizable characteristics that “eady” define what 
constitutes propaganda: the “name calling” device where labels are employed to create an 
immediate judgment  (“AI  Smith is  a  Catholic.  He  must  never be president);  the 
“glittering generalities” device where concepts (e.g.,  “truth” or “honor”) provide the 
purpose  for immediate judgment;  the “transfer,”  whereby a propagandist lobbies the 
authority of another in support of  something the public would  otherwise reject;  the 
“testimonial” and allusion to “plain folk” suggests that the seller is just like the rest of us; 
what distinguishes these devices as propaganda is the conscious attempt of non-plain folk 
to appear as common (e.g., money barons working on a factory line for the camera); the 
‘%andwagon” where  claims  that  “everybody’s doing  it”  is presented  as the  seller’s 
rationale;  finally,  there is “card-stacking”  where the  communicator resorts to  “lies, 
censorship, and distortion” (Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1937). 
While  wartime  propaganda  is  (arguably)  different  fiom  more  contemporary 
conceptualizations of public relations, Jackall (1995:35 1) cautions the image-makers and 
public opinion shapers of contemporary society to be  ever conscious of the fine line  0 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not distinguishing the two.  He notes that even the pressures of non-wartime organizational 
operations “inevitably affects to some extent managers’ own concdptions of their work 
and  of  themselves,  [and]  public  goodwill,”  making  morality  and  propriety  central 
concerns of even the most innocuous means of self-promotion.  He continues to warn 
I 
the public that the mediated images that appear on the television screen do not displace 
substance or notions of truth so much as they merely “leave them in the dim periphery of 
the theater” (p. 389). 
Summary of Findings 
1.  Municipality crime rates alone do not  determine a police department’s media 
image.  While a number of agency-specific factors undoubtedly influence a police 
department’s  public  image,  survey  data  hm  nearly  200  municipal  police 
departments nationwide failed to produce a significant association between the 
municipality crime rate and the quality of the police image as assessed by Chiefs 
or their PIOs.  With crime in  the media  a geographic constant, there is little 
distinguishing high and low crime communities in the headlines of local news. 
“Media power,’’ then, has less to do with what is in the news and more to do with 
how police manage the news. 
2.  Departments having police media policies and public information oflcws are not 
more likely to report a favorable media image.  Survey data failed to support 
hypothesis  l(a), which  predicted a positive relationship between police media 
strategiedpublic  information  officers  and  a  favorable  media  image.  Most 
respondents indicated that their department’s media policy proved “helpful” or 
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“very helpful” in presenting a favorable image, yet the small variance regarding 
the  presencdabsence  of  policies  among  departmeqts  tmakes  a  definitive 
conclusion  regarding  the  influence  of  media  policies  on  the  police  image 
problematic.  And while a test for association between the presence of a PI0  and 
the quality of the department image was conducted, it failed to provide support for 
predicted findings. This  does mean, however, that police media polices and PIOs 
do  not  contribute to  impression management.  In  fact,  police  respondents 
overwhelmingly felt their department’s media policy proved helpll in preparing 
them for media communication, while almost half (49%)  felt their policy proved 
‘’very helpfid,”  in  support  of hypothesis  I@).  Moreover,  those departments 
employing a media PI0  were more likely to be proactive in dealing with the news 
media -  see hypothesis l(c) -  although proactivity was ndt significantly related to 
a more favorable department image.  Therefore, assumptions that police media 
policies and PIOs  alone can improve the police image appear overly simplistic, as 
impression management  constitutes more  than  policies  and  persons,  but  also 
behaviors. 
3.  Police media policies that encourage communication with reporters at all levels 
are positively associated with a favorable department image.  It is not so much 
the  presence  of  a  media  policy  but  the  content  of  the  strategy within  that 
contributes to effective impression management.  One such strategy that emerged 
as significantly and positively associated with a favorable police image is best 
summarized as department “openness.”  Those departments that both authorized 
and  encouraged its officers to communicate with news reporters were more likely 
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to assess the quality of their department’s image as favorable.  As it is officers and 
not their PIOs who are first to anive at a crime scene, their reluctance or inability 
to communicate with reporters creates an information gap that may likely be filled 
with  non-official information.  A policy  that  emphasizes a  constant  flow  of 
idormation creates the appearance of openness and honesty and  ms  police 
control over a story we. 
4.  Police  media  training  plays  a  small  but  significant  role  in  impression 
management.  Although  survey data suggests that police media  training has a 
rather  small influence  on the  success  of  impression management,  case study 
observations of PIOs in action suggest a level of importance not directly captured 
by the questionnaire.  Those departments that offer media training instruction to 
their staE  were no more likely to report a favorable media image.  Moreover, of 
those departments that do provide media training, only instruction in conducting 
television  interviews  emerged  significantly associated  with  a  more  favorable 
police image.  Finally, those departments that do offer media training are no more 
likely to  engage in  proactive contact with  news  media.  While  these  survey 
findings do not lend support to hypotheses 2(a) and 2(c), quantitative data was 
less successll in capturing the importance of media training as qualitative data. 
Specifically, case study observations of the Urbandale PI0  staff that receive on 
average 40 hours per year of media training revealed behavioral practices (such as 
“dumping”  and  concern  over  sound  bites and  visuals) quite  similar to  those 
discussed in various police-media training manuals.  And  their success at having 
various “staged” events realized  as news items (e.g.,  the  “gun safety lock news 
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suggests a greater importance of media training than was,  ca$tured by survey data 
alone. 
5. Political and situational factors constrain police impression management.  Case 
study research of four police departments produced findings that clearly support 
research hypothesis 3.  The most  convincing evidence stems fiom interviews 
conducted in the city of Union Creek, where both the police chief and individual 
beat reporters independently identified a similar coflsfrainf to a more favorable 
, 
police image.  In  this case,  both  city politics and  city policies intdkre with 
impression management  as a  strong mayor  often  aligned himself against  the 
police or exercised tight control over “official” information.  In other instances 
and in diffkrent departments, occurrences of police accidents or scandals alter the 
dynamics  of  impression  management.  While  some  circumstances  allow  for 
accommodation, others (e.g., “ . . .when police have to provide protection to 
women trying to enter abortion clinics”) clearly do not.  Such interviews and 
observations revealed  that  there exists no  formulaic  approach  to  impression 
management. 
Implications for Police Administration 
1.  Police administrators should not  rely solely  upon  a police public  information 
officer to provide the public with information.  While police have traditionally 
maintained a stronghold over police-related information (Ericson, Baranek, and 
Chan,  1989), the adoption of  the public information oficer marked a turning point 
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serve.  With newly appointed "official" police spokespersonp trained in the art of 
media communication, many departments have indeed opened up.  At  the Same 
time,  they  have  decided  to  streamline  information  through  one  police 
representative in an attempt to control the flow and content of public information. 
Results fiom this research, however, suggest that  a media policy that enmurages  I 
public communication among numerous ranks and, in particular, line officers, is 
significantly  associated with  a more  favorable public image.  Not  only  does 
variety in  spokespersons stave off the appearance  of a hired  spindoctor and 
suggest that the department is not hiding behind a tallcing head, it also constitutes 
an occupational practicality.  Many times, the public idormation officer is last to 
arrive at the scene and may not be the responding officer closest to the source of 
information.  When  an incident occurs close to airtime, reporters and camera crew 
may be reluctant to await the arrival of an official spokesperson and may seek out 
alternate voices.  In this regard, departmental attempts to streamline information 
and avoid leaks may actually contribute to the appearance of challenging voices 
within the news. 
2.  Police  administrators should  adopt a  media strategy  in  addition  to  a  media 
policy.  A policy is that  which  defines or restricts specific behaviors for the 
purpose of organizational expediency.  A strategy is that which establishes a plan, 
method, or series of maneuvers for obtaining a specific result.  Many municipal 
police departments have incorporated media relations into their standard operating 
procedures,  yet  the  language used  is often restrictive  and  fails to  specify  an 
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organizational goal.  While policies stipulating privacy rights and the release of 
victim information are certainly necessary,  so too is a plan that establishes means 
of  proactive  communication  with  reporters  for  the  purpose  of  impression 
management.  Police administrators should adopt guidelines that not only specify 
communication restrictions but  that also delineate acceptable proactive contact 
with reporters and other members of the news media. 
3.  Police departments should provide public information stag with extensive and 
ongoing media  training skills.  While the need  for an extensive evaluation of 
police-media training programs will be discussed below, it is clear fiom survey 
results  that  media  training  in  conducting  television  interviews  is  positively 
associated  with  perceptions  of  a  more  favorable  departmental  image. 
Additionally, all respondents to the national survey indicated that media training 
was at least helpfbl in allowing departments to present a favorable media image, 
while a majority found media training to be more than helpful.  The Urbandale 
Police Department, receiving the most regular and extensive media training of the 
four case  sites,  also  displayed  the  highest  degree of finesse in  dealing with 
reporters.  As many departments receive only a minimum of media training on a 
non-routine basis, it is difficult to establish with certainty the contribution to a 
positive image that media training plays.  What  seems clear, however, is that as 
media communication increasingly becomes the norm, police officials must be 
adequately prepared to meet the needs of today’s media demands and formats. 
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1.  Members  of  the  media  must  maintain  their  vigilance  as a  defender  of  civil 
liberties and a source of police accountability.  As government agencies become 
increasingly open with infomation and well versed at media communication and 
public relations, reporters must not  become  wholly dependent upon "official" 
voices as the only legitimate news sources. Udortunately, the norms of the news- 
making process already favor the politically and socially powerful at the expense 
of  less  heard  challenging  voices.  As  officials  take  steps  to  make  their 
organizational ideologies more publicly palatable, reporters must reafhn  their 
commitment to maintaining government accountability.  One means with  which 
this  may  be  achieved  calls  for  news  agencies  to  increase  the  diversity  of 
perspectives typically  quoted  in the  news.  According to  crime reporter and 
professor of journalism David Krajicck (2000:196), "reporters and editors would 
do well to wean themselves hm  the police department agenda and spend more 
time examining strategies and  holding the authorities responsible for those that 
fail."  While expediency calls for reporters to quote fiom official news releases 
and police blotters, thoroughness calls for a balanced assessment of social events. 
2.  Reporters must recognize the diflerence between public information and public 
relations.  Like PIOs themselves who must take caution not to let public relations 
taint the accuracy of public information, reporters have an ethical obligation to 
ensure the accuracy of information received.  As the role of the police officer 
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than ever -  become increasingly similar to police by chqlcink facts, substantiating 
evidence,  and  searching for  collaborative testimony.  This does  not  mean, 
however,  that  reporters  should  avoid  proactive  input  into  the news-making 
process on the part of the police.  By all means not the exclusive crime news 
gatekeepers, police nevertheless have access to information often  beneficial to the 
public.  Responsible journalism simply requks that reporters take an active part 
in the construction of a news  item and not merely allow police to construct 
proactive stones unchecked. 
3.  News reporters must report on crime in a  broader context.  When  police officials 
were asked to indicate their biggest complaint about newdlmedia  coverage of their 
department, the most frequent response provided (35%)  was that crime stories 
sensationalize violence within the community.  Another 13% criticized media for 
failing to report on departmental successes. Undoubtedly,  an  emphasis on  the 
fonner  distracts  hm  the  latter  and  Contributes  to  the  reluctance of  many 
departments  and  individual  officers  to  be  forthcoming  about  crime  scene 
information.  While information about local crime incidents is both necessary and 
informative, Krajicek (2000:195)  nevertheless argues that there exists ways for 
his profession to tell the truth “less poorly.”  Such additional incident-based items 
might include information about whether the victim and  perpetrator knew one 
another, whether alcohol use was involved, and  information on where weapons 
used to commit the crime were obtained.  Moreover, “If [a] crime is part of a 
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pattern, share that infoxmation with readers or viewers.  But if a crime is atypical, 
that too must be reported -  and prominently.” 
4.  Crime reporters must learn the  beat they are covering.  As police are quickly 
learning the noms governing mass  media,  there is similarly a movement  for 
reporters to learn the noms that govern their sources.  Beginning in  the early 
1990s and  perhaps  part  of  the  victim’s  rights movement,  journalism schools 
nationwide began  hosting professional workshops and  conferences to sensitize 
crime reporters to the traumatic impact of both violence and its news coverage on 
crime victims.  For example, Michigan State University’s journalism department 
now offers as part of their curricula coursework instruction on how to interview 
survivors  of  shootings,  rapes  and  other  fonns  of  trauma.  The  School  of 
Communications at the University of Washington has recently adopted a similar 
program, requiring all joumalism students to receive training in conducting victim 
interviews.  Cote and Simpson (2000)  who spearheaded these programs provide 
additional suggestions for additional education and sensitivity on  the part of beat 
reporters.  For example, they note that: 
Hospitals,  police  and  fire  departments,  and  emergency 
agencies often hold disaster drills, testing each department 
and  person  to  see how  rapidly  and  productively  each 
responds.  Whereas news media sometimes report the drills, 
the scenario seldom  directly incorporates journalists . .  . 
[Lleaving  them  out  of  the  planning  may  worsen  the 
situation,  News organizations might benefit from what has 
been learned in “critical incident” programs (p.57). 
Clearly, it remains the responsibility of both police and reporters to  familiarize 
themselves  with  the  work  patterns  and  responsibilities  of  the  people  and 
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organizations with which they interact daily to more comprehensively serve the 
public interest. 
Implications for Further Research  , 
1.  Additional observation-based analysis of police-media relations.  While attempts 
have been made overcome the limitations of self-report assessments of impression 
managemeit through the review  of standard operating procedures, newspaper 
clippings,  site visits  and  interviews  with  reporters, clearly  a  more  objective 
measure of impression management is needed to assess the relative contribution 
of a number  of factors on  the quality of the police media image.  Ideally, such an 
assessment would include a measure of public opinion surrounding departments 
having differing media strategies, as well as a more systematic analysis of media 
coverage surrounding each department over an extended period. 
2.  l%ere is a  need for  an  evaluation of  the  content and  eflcacy police-media 
training  courses.  While  an attempt was made to evaluate the contribution of 
police media-training to the overall quality of police-media relations, and while 
survey and case study results produced mixed  findings regarding the importance 
of media training, a more comprehensive evaluation of various media training 
seminars  is  necessary  to  more  accurately  assess  its  relative  importance  to 
improving the police image. 
3.  Future  research  into police-media relations  should  include  more  site  visits. 
While  approximately  100 hours  of  site  visit  observations and  numerous and 
extensive interviews was conducted across four case study departments, research 
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findings are limited in their generalizability to other departments nationwide.  The 
departments included for case study research were all large agencies serving large 
metropolitan  areas purposely  selected  to  meet  research  criteria.  Additional 
research  is  needed  to  more  confidently  extrapolate  findings to  a  broader 
population. 
Conclusion 
However simplified in  this research, the relationship between news events and 
impression management  is inherently tautological.  As an independent  variable, it is 
apparent fiom the case study research that media power is causally Wed  to impression 
management, with departments more adept at media communication similarly more adept 
at preventing the “appearance” of police accidents or scandal.  At  the same time, it is 
undoubtedly  true  that  the  realization  of  accidents or  scandal  as news  events often 
determines the ultimate success or failure of police impression management.  In that 
sense,  news events are both an independent and dependent variable,  and  impression 
management  is both  the cause and effect  of  daily news  events.  Perhaps the  most 
significant finding fiom interviews with reporters, chiefs and PIOs is that with practice, 
police have within their power the ability to help  determine the  news rather than be 
detded  by it. 
a 
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SCHOOL 
The purpose of this survey is to collect information about your department's  relationship 
with the media.  Of particular interest are the policies that regulate how and when your 
department communicates with the news media, the efforts made by your department to 
promote  policing  objectives  through  media,  and the  nature  of  your  department's 
relationship with the news media. 
When  answering  questions  about  the  news  media,  please  think  about  newspapers, 
television, and radio in your local area only.  Upon completion, please return the survey 
in the pre-addressedstamped  envelope provided.  All  information  will be  treated  as 
confidential, and will be used only for research or statistical purposes, except with your 
permission. If you'have any questions about completing the questionnaire,  please contact: 
Jarret S. LoveU 
School of Criminal Justice 
123 Washington Street 
Newark, NJ  07102 
jlovell@,,pegasus.rutpers.edu  __ 
(973) 353-3411 
George L. Kelling 
School of Criminal Justice 
123 Washington Street 
Newark, NJ  07102 
glkell@,aol.com 
(973) 353-5923 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not National Survey of  Police Media Relations 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Crime  and its  enforcement  are  popular  topics  in  the  news.  On  average,  how 
fiequently does your department communicate with the news media? 
cl Monthly  Q  Weekly  Daily  CL  Morethanonceaday a Not at all 
Please list how many different news organizations your department communicates 
with in an  average week. 
# Newspapers -  #Tv  # Radio -  # Other (  ) 
Please list how many different reporters your department communicates with in an 
average week. 
# Other (  )  -  #Newspapers -  #Tv-  # Radio - 
On  average,  how  often  do you  or your staff contact reporters for the following 
reasons? 
Not  Other 
Monthly  Weekly  Daily  atAll  (  ) 
To issue a press release  CL  CL  P  P  P 
To schedule a new conference  P  #  P  cl  P 
To provide assistance with  #  CI  CL  cl  P 
crime coverage 
To organize a meeting with  CI  CI  CI  cl  P 
Other (Please specify)  CL  CI  c3  cl  LI 
managers of local media 
2 
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Q No  (Go to 46 on page 4)  Q Don’t know (Go to 46  on page 4) 
(Year)  T 
5a.  In what year was this policy or strategy adopted? 
5b. Did any specific event prompt the adoption of this media policy?  (Please specify) 
5c.  Is there a key objective, goal, or mission statement in this Written media policy? 
(Please specify) 
5d. How helpfbl has your department’s current media policy been in the following 
areas: 
i. Preparedness when 
communicating with media 
ii.  Ability to control news leaks 
iii.  Ability to address allegations 
of misconduct 
iv. Ability to present a favorable 
public image 
v. Ability to create a positive 
relationship with reporters 
vi. Ability to promote department 
policing strategies 
Not 
Helpful 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
Don’t 
Know 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
3  45  -9 
Box Continues on Next Page 
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policy to accomplish the following? 
1 
Create a favorable image of your department: 
Success: 
Difficulty: 
, 
Create a positive working relationship with the media: 
Success: 
Difficulty: 
6.  Who within your department has routine authorization to communicate with media? 
Q Line Officers  Chief 
Q Sergeants  0  Public Information Officer 
Commanders  CL Other (Please specify  3 
7.  Does your department have an employee whose primary responsibility is to serve as 
a media public information officer? 
CL  Yes (go to 7a) 
7a.  How many members of 
your agency are assigned 
to public information 
duties? 
# sworn 
#Unsworn 
0  No (go to 7b)  Q Don't Know 
(go to Q8)  4 
7b. Since your agency does not have a member 
specifically designated to serve as a public 
information officer, who most often 
performs these duties? (Please list the 
title of the person(s) who perform@) this 
duty. 
' 
I 
=I 
4 
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training in media communication skills? 
Yes (Check all that apply)  Q No  Don’t Know 
Q Educational background ((Le.,  degree in journalism, public relations, etc.) 
Q Prior occupational background (i.e., working in medidpublic relations) 
Q In-service training 
Q Other (please specify) 
9.  Does your department provide training in media communications for your staff? 
Q  Yes  Q  No (go to QlO page 7)  Q Don’t Know (go to QlO page 7) 
9a.  Approximately how many hours of media training are offered per year? 
9b. Who within the department receives media skills training? 
(Check all that apply) 
Q Line Officers 
Q Sergeants  0  Chief 
Q Commanders  Q  Other (Please specify)  - 
5  Public Information Officers 
9c.  Please indicate when media training is provided by your department. 
(Check all that apply) 
0  Police academy training  Q External course training 
CI In-service training  Q Other ( Please specify) 
Box continues on nextpage 
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(Check  all that apply) 
cI Video presentation  Q Distribution of reading matkal 
0 Guest lecturer  # In-service coursework 
Q Other (Please specify) 
9e.  Please indicate the content included in the media training provided by your 
department.  (Check all that apply). 
Q Writing a press release 
CI  Arranging a press conference 
Q Negotiating media coverage 
Q Conducting print interviews 
Q Conducting television interviews 
cI Managing information leaks 
Q Managing coverage of misconduct 
Media relations during emergencies 
P Other (Please specib) 
9f. How helpful has media communication training been in the,  following areas: 
i. Preparedness when 
communicating with media 
ii.  Ability to control news leaks 
iii. Ability to address allegations 
of misconduct 
iv. Ability to present a favorable 
public image 
v. Ability to create a positive 
relationship with reporters 
vi. Ability to promote department 
policing strategies 
Not 
Helpful 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
1  2 
12 
1  2 
Very 
HelDful 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
45 
Box continues on nextpage 
Don’t 
Know 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
-9 
6 
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I  , 
9g. What has been the greatest success and difficulty regarding the ability of media 
training to accomplish the following? 
Creating a favorable image of your department: 
I 
Success: 
Difficulty: 
1 
Creating a positive working relationship with the media: 
Success: 
Difficulty: 
10. How important is communication with the news media regarding the ability of your 
department to do the following: 
Not 
Important 
P  Gain citizen assistance with investigations 
Promote crime prevention education  cl 
Build police/community partnerships  c1 
Build a positive police image 
Inform the public of police initiatives 
cl 
Q 
very  Don’t 
Important  Important  Know 
cl 
cl 
CL 
CL  P 
5  CL  P 
CI  P  # 
CI  Q  CL 
7 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
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stories that reflect positively upon individual officers, department policy, or crime 
prevention efforts.  In the past month, about how many stories have 
appeared in the media that reflected positively upon any aspect of your 
department? 
-  # Newspapers -  #Tv -  #Radio  #Other(  )  - 
Below, please briefly describe the subject and content of one of the more favorable 
stories: 
12. Please describe the most common situations when media coverage is: 
Favorable:  - 
~  ~  ~~  ~ 
Unfavorable: 
13. On a typical day, how would you describe the quality of your department’s 
working relationship with news reporters? 
Q Poor  Fair  Good  cL Excellent 
14. Even departments that have friendly and cooperative relations with media 
encounter disagreements regarding the coverage of police matters. In the 
past month, about how many news stories presented a biased or unfair 
description of your department or personnel? 
-  # Newspapers -  #Tv -  #Radio  # Other (  )  - 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
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within the news media? 
Fair 
c) 
Poor  CI  O1  Good  c,  Excellent 
16.  In general, how would you  describe public opinion regarding the quality of your 
department? 
Q Poor  Fair  Good  '  Excellent  CI 
17.  Of the following, what is your biggest complaint regarding media coverage of your 
department?  (Please check only one) 
Media do not understand the role of police in the community. 
a Media reports are biased against the police in cases of alleged misconduct. 
a Media sensationalize violent crimes in the community. 
Q  Media do not report on our department successes. 
Media interfere with ongoing investigations. 
Q Other (Please specify) 
18. Please describe what steps, if any, your department is taking to address your 
complaint regarding media coverage of your department. 
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I 
Department Name: 
Department Address: 
Telephone: 
# Sworn Officers: 
Your Name: 
Your Position: 
How long have your served at this agency? 
20. Please use the space below to write any additional comments you have about 
questions on this survey or about issues regarding police-media relations. 
End of survey.  Thank  you! 
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NEWS -  TEL 
NEWS-RAD 
NEWS-OTH 
SPEC-OTH 
Cardl 
POPUL 
OFFICNUM 
Card2 
PROPCRIM 
VIOLENCE 
HOW-FREQ 
1-21 
22 
23 
24-25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
1 
# 
# 
1 
# 
# 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
# 
# 
# 
# 
1 
2 
3 
POLICE-MEDIA SURVEY  CODEBOOK 
Variable  Column  Code  Explanation 
I  Cardl contains agency-specific 
information. 
Population of municipality 
Number of sworn officers 
Card2 contains agency-specific 
information 
Property crime total w/out arson 
(1  999) 
Violent crime total (1 999) 
Frequency of Dept. communication 
w/ media 
Not at all 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Daily 
More than Once a Day 
Total # of newspapers agency 
works w/ 
Total # of television agency 
works w/ 
Total # of radio agency 
works w/ 
Total # of other agencies 
Specification of ‘other’ 
Free-lance 
Interneuweb 
Magazines 
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REP-TEL  35 
REP-RAD  36 
OTH-REP  37 
SPEC-REP  38 
PRESSREL  39 
NEWSCON  40 
# 
# 
I 
# 
# 
1 
2 
3 
Total # of newspaper reporters 
works w/ 
Total # of television reporters 
works w/ 
Total # of radio reporters 
works w/ 
Total # of other reporters 
Specification of ‘other’ 
Free-lance 
Internetlweb 
Magazines 
Frequency of press release 
issuance in past 12-months 
Not at all 
As needed 
Less than monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Daily 
Frequency of news conferences 
held in past 12-months 
Not at all 
As needed 
Less than monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Daily 
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MEETING 
41 
42 
OTHERCON  43  e 
DESC-CON  44-56 
POLICY  57 
0 
1 
Frequency of news assistance 
provided in past 12-months 
Not at all 
As needed 
Less than monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Daily 
1 
Frequency of meetings w/ 
Media mgrs. in past 12-months 
Not at all 
As needed 
Less than  monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Daily 
Frequency of other police-initiated 
Contact w/ media in past 12-months 
Not at all 
As needed 
Less than monthly 
Monthly 
Weekly 
Daily 
Describe Contact 
Does dept. have Written media policy 
No 
Yes 
YEAR  58  Year adopted 
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0 
1 
DESC-EVT  60 
GOAL  61 
0 
1 
DESC-GL  62 
HELP-PlZE  63 
HELP-LEA  64 
HELP-ALL  65 
Did any specific event prompt 
Policy adoption? 
No 
Yes 
Describe event 
Does policy have key goal or 
Objective? 
No 
Yes 
Describe goal 
Helpfulness of policy w/ media prep. 
Not helpfbl 
Helpful 
Very Helpful 
Helpfulness of policy w/ news leaks 
Not helpful 
Helpful 
Very Helpful 
Helpfulness of policy w/  allegations 
Not helpful 
Helpful 
Very helpful 
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HELP-STR  68 
RELATDIF  144 
IMAGE-SUC  69 
IMAGE-DIFF  94 
RELATSUC  119 
AUT-LINE  169 
1 
2 
3  It 
4 
5 
HELP-RJ3L  67 
0 
1 
Helpfilnss of policy in presenting 
Favorable image 
Not helpful 
Helplid 
Very helpfbl 
Helpfulness of policy in  creating 
Positive working relationship w/ rep. 
Not helpll 
Helpful 
Very helpfbl 
Helpfulness of policy in  promoting 
Policing strategies 
Not helpful 
Helpfbl 
Very helpll 
Greatest success of policy w/  image 
Greatest diff. of policy w/ image 
Greatest success of policy w/r/t 
Improving relationship w/ reporters 
Greatest diff. of policy w/r/t 
Improving relationship w/ reporters 
Do line officers have routine auth. to 
Communicate w/  reporters 
No 
Yes 
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AUT-COMM  171 
Do sergeants have routine auth. to 
Communicate w/  reporters 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
Do commanders have routine auth. 
To communicate w/  reporters  I 
No 
YeS 
I  0 
1 
AUT-CHIEF  172  Does chief have routine auth. to 
Communicate w/  reporters 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
AUTH_PIO  173  Does PI0  Have routine auth.  to 
communicate w/  reporters 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
AUT"-OTH  1  74  Do any other people have routine 
Auth. to communicate w/ reporters 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
Does yur  dept. have PI0  PI0  175 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
SWORN  176 
UNSWORN  177 
MOSTOFT  178 
FORMALTR  179 
#  # Sworn 
#  #Unsworn 
Since no PIO, who handles media 
Does person most resp. for PI0 
Duties have formal media training? 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
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0 
1 
No  I 
YeS 
Does person have occ. Background 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
Does person have in-service  training 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
Does person have other training 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
STAFF  184  Does dept. provide media training 
For staff 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
HOURS 
LINE-TR 
185 
186 
#  Appx.  # hours per year offered 
Do line oficers receive training 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
SER-TR  187 
COMM-TR  188 
Do sergeants receive training 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
Do commanders receive training 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
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0 
1 
No 
YeS 
CHF-TR  190  Does chief receive training 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
OTHER-TR  191  Other people receive training 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
ACADEMY  192  Training offered at academy 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
INSERVE  193  Training offered in service 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
EXT-TR  1 94 
OTHERTIM  195 
VIDEO  196 
LECTURER  197 
Training offered externally 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
Training offered at other time 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
Video presentation w/  training 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
Lecturer w/  training 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
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0 
1 
No  I 
Yes 
COURSEW  199 
OTHERFOR  200 
Training in form of coursework 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
other folm of training 
I 
No 
Yes 
0 
1 
PRESSIN  201  Training in Writing press releases 
0 
I 
No 
YeS 
CONFERIN  202  Training in arranging press cod. 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
NEGOTIN 
PRI”T 
203 
204 
Training in negotiating news cov. 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
Training in conducting print 
Interviews 
No 
Yes 
0 
1 
TELEINT 
MGINFO 
205 
206 
Training in conducting tv interviews 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
Training in controlling news leaks 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
 and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not MGCOV 
EMERG 
OTHERIN 
HTPREP 
HTLEAK 
HTALLEG 
207 
208 
209 
210 
21 1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
212 
Training in managing coverage of 
Officer  misconduct 
I 
No 
YeS 
Training in media relations during 
Emergencies 
No 
YeS 
I 
Other topics of training 
No 
Yes 
Helphlness of train. w/ media prep. 
Not helphl 
Helpful 
Very Helpll 
Helpfulness of train. w/ news leaks 
Not helprl 
Helpful 
Very Helpful 
Helpfulness of train w/  allegations 
Not helphl 
Helpful 
Very helpful 
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1 
2 
3' 
4 
5 
"REPORT  214 
HTSTRAT  215 
TRIMSUC  216 
TRIMDIF  248 
TRRELSUC  280 
TRRELDIF  312 
CITIZEN  344 
0 
1 
2 
Helphlness of train. in presenting 
Favorable image 
Not helpful 
Helpfut 
Very helpful 
Helpllness of train. in creating 
Positive working relationship w/ rep. 
Not helpful 
Helpful 
Very helpll 
Helphlness of train in promoting 
Policing strategies 
Not helpfil 
Helphl 
Very helpful 
Greatest success of train. w/ image 
Greatest diff. of train.  w/ image 
Greatest  success of train. w/r/t 
Improving relationship w/ reporters 
Greatest diff. of train. w/r/t 
Improving relationship w/  reporters 
How  important is media comm. 
W/r/t citizen assistance w/ invest. 
Not important 
Important 
Very Important 
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0 
1 
2 
COMMUN  346 
POSIMAGE  347 
INFORM  348 
POS-NEWS  349 
POS-Tv  350 
POS-RAD  35 1 
POS-OTH  352 
OW-TYPE  353 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
0 
1 
2 
# 
1 
2 
3 
DESCRIBE  354 
How important is media comm. 
W/r/t promoting crime prevention 
I 
Not important 
Important 
Veryimportant 
How important is media comm. 
W/r/t building commUnity 
Partnerships 
Not hpbrtant 
Important 
Very imp-t 
How  important is media comm. 
W/r/t building a positive image 
Not important 
Important 
Very important 
How  impodt  is media comm. 
W/r/t informing public of initiatives 
Not important 
Important 
Very important 
# Positive newspaper stories in past 
Month 
# Positive tv stories in past month 
# Positive radio stories in past month 
# Other positive stories in past month 
Source of story 
Free-lance 
InterneVweb 
Magazines 
Describe content of one such story 
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SIT-UNFA  356 
RELATION  357 
BIASPAP 
BIASTV 
BIASRAD 
BIASOTH 
DESCBIA 
358 
359 
360 
361 
362 
363 
# 
1 
2 
3 
Please describe most common 
Situations when coverage is 
Favorable  ,  I 
Please describe most common 
Situations when coverage is 
Unfavorable 
How  would you describe quality 
Of your dept.’s working relationship 
w/  reporters 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
# Biased newspaper stones in past 
Month 
# Biased tv stories in past month 
# Biased radio stories in past month 
# Other biased stories in past month 
Source of story 
Free-lance 
Internevweb 
Magazines 
How  would you describe quality 
Of your dept.’s image in media 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
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Opinion reg.  your dept- 
0 
1 
2’ 
3 
Poor 
Fair 
Good 
Excellent 
ROLE  365  Biggest complaint that media 
Don’t understand police role? 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
BIASED  366  Biggest complaint that media 
Are biased in allegations? 
0 
1 
No 
YeS 
Biggest complaint that media 
Sensationalize violent crimes? 
SENSATIO  367 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
SUCCESSE  368  Biggest complaint that media don’t 
Report on police successes? 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
INTERFER  369  Biggest complaint that media 
Interfere w/  investigations? 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
COMPLAIN  370 
DESC-COM  37 1 
Is anything else your complaint? 
0 
1 
No 
Yes 
Please describe your complaint 
PROPERTYOF 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) 
Box 6000 
Pockville, MD  20849-6000 
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Card3 
RANK 
372 
401-406 
407 
LONG  408 
COMMENTS  409 
1 
2 
3 
4 
# 
I 
What steps is your dept. taking 
To address biggest complaint? 
Agency-specific information 
I 
Rank of respondent 
PI0 
Asst. to Chief 
Chief 
mer 
How  long at agency? 
I 
Additional Comments 
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